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This dissertation gives me a good. opportunity 
to explore the close relationship between philosophy 
and culture. Nietzsche and Marouse, especially in 
their roles as critical theorists of culture, seemed 
to me to be ideal focal points from which I could 
begin a study of the philosophical trends in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially with 
respect to the influence of these trends on the 
cultural situation and the manner in which the new 
philosophical attitudes proposed by Nietzsche and 
Ma.rouse a.re hoped by them to regenerate the existing 
culture. 
It is hoped that this dissertation will also 
go toward untangling certain of the confusions and 
misunderstandings that surround the thoughts of both 
Nietzsche and Marcuse. There has been a great deal 
of oontroversy over their negative, even destructive 
. . 
influences on men, for example, Nietzsche with respect 
to the Nazi use of his thoughts, and Marcuse in so far 
as student unrest finds justification in his ideas. 
The question of blame or praise becomes less pressing 
if we regard the ideas of both philosophers.as containing
potentiaJ. for both good and evi1 influences, and that 
it is up to us to be influenced creatively or destruct­
ively and accept responsibility for the choice we make. 
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I N· T R O D· U C T .I O N. 
It is the purpose of this dissertation to 
examine significant philosophical trends in the 
nineteenth century and in contemporary oulture as 
the background against which Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Herbert Marouse react, as well as critically 
analyse the alternatives each philosopher puts for­
ward in an attempt to rescue I!la.11 from what he oo:r.­
siders to be a period of acute cultural crisis. We 
then go on to oonsider certain pertinent diff�renoes 
and similarities in the approach of the two philosop,­
hers as well as draw some general oonolusions concer­
ni:rig the existential character of cultural systems. 
The philosophies of Nietzsche and Marcuse 
reflect their concern about the problem:of what con­
stitutes a meaningful existence for man� about What 
lea.de man into alienation and thereby unauthenticity 
and what ought to bed.one to rescue man from cultural. 
dislocation. Both philosophers regarded the specific 
cultures of their time as harmful to a mea.ning:f'ul. 
existence, in so far as they were not in line with 
man•e •real• needs. 
This brings us to the relationship between 
culture and the speoific existential situation of
man. Culture (both the □aterial and •spiritual' 
elements in society) is a reflection of man's needs 
and aspirations.as well as man's attempt to cope 
with these needs.and. create a meaningful. and secure 
life for himself. We can regard culture as the 
result of man's attempt to create an authentic 
existence for himself in conformity with specific 
existential and historical needs. Man's search 
for authentic existence is the search for ' the 
good life' .. the kind of life that is meaningful 
and conducive •••••• 2/ •• 
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and conducive to happiness within the existential 
.situation. 
This search is reflected in the cu1ture that 
man creates, in all the spheres.of cultural. activity--
the religious, the material, the political, the 
ethical and so on. By 1i ving in line with the cul tu­
-ral values of his time� man believes he 1s living 
authentically. 
However, because of his finite condition and 
his inability.to arrive at fina1 solutions and parma­
-neht answers� man is perpetually confronted by the
question of meaning and value. It is this faotor
which is responsible for the differences in cultures
and oul.tural values� For example, the Greek conception
of authentic existence and subsequently its culture
is necessarily different from that of the medieval or
more modern eras, since the needs and cirownstances
of each epoch are so different. This aspect of
culture - its relationship with the specific existen­
-tiai situation - will be discussed in greater detail
in chapter one.
Nietzsche and Marouse, both deeply concerned 
about what enhances life and wp.at represses it; reveal. 
a profound dissatisfaction with their contemporary 
cultural values and. attempt to provide (in different 
ways) for the 'roa.11 needs of man which they believed 
their specific cultures were not catering for.· Both 
offer a •solution• to the problem of man's authentic 
existence, providing guidelines for the creation of 
a more meaningful culture, one that is more in line 
with reality than the ones they oppose. However, by 
their alternatives, Nietzsche and Ma:rouse have not 
solved the problem of man's authentic existenoe in 
relation to culture� for the simple reason that no 
man possesses•••••• 3/ •• � 
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man possesses the ultimate or final solution. What 
these philosophers have done is to offer a speoifio 
perspective of truth which is different from the 
existing one but which is nevertheless determined by 
the existing cultural conditions. 
These are some of the aspects this dissartat­
-ion proposes to examine - the cultural values of the
19th and 20th centuries, the reaction of Nietzsohe
and Marcuse to these values and the alternatives they
propose, in what respects they are similar or dissim­
-ilar, whether these alternatives solve the problem
of man•s authentic existence and also the relation­




CULTURE AND AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE. 
The problem of authenticity is basic to human existence. 
Philosophers, artists, poets, writers� religious men are 
all in some way concerned ·with the quest :for meaning. 
In any philosophy, any theory o:f life we can discern the 
attempt to provide a meaning for existence. Art, litera,. 
-ture, religion, even the opinions and prejudices of
ordinary men are no less attempts to order the world
according to a specific conception of reality. The
search for meaning is always undertaken in the face of
the perpetual insecurity man feels in the universe.
Finiteness, contingency, historicity, the lack of any
kind of permanence is what man continua.l.l.y comes up
against. There is no permanent meaning or value which
the uni verse in i tsel:f' offers. Man has to create this
meaning for himself in terms of his specific existent-.
-ial needs. Once he creates a meaning and lives by it,
man believes he is living authentically; Man's quest
for meaning takes the form of a number of questions
concerning the nature of the universe, his conception
of himself and his place in the universe, his relation­
-ship with his fellow humans, his likes and dislikes
and so on. His answers to these questions constitute -
a specific Weltanschau� or unified vision of reality.
Armed with this view of life, man is able to 
live securely and creatively in terms of the •meaning• 
and •truth' he has created for himself. Truth in 
this sense is al.ways man-made and relative. In the 
light of a specific •truth' man goes on to create •the 
good life' for himsel:f'; to create a culture that 
satisfies his materia1, intellectual and spiritual 
needs • ••••• 5/ ••••• 
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needs. Culture, then, reflects man•s attempt to order 
the world, to create a meaning for ito ''Generally
speaking, we may say that human truth originates in. 
man's rational disposition to order his surroundings, 
to determine the relations in which he stands to them 
and to interpret the events of the past in a meaning­
•f'ul. way, from a specific point of view and in aooord­
-ance with the particular circumstances in which he
finds himself, in order to anhieve a certain sense of'
stability and security. These various fields of' order
may be of' a private, scientific, humanistic, philoso:p­
-hical or theological natureQ In brief they represent 
the whole scale of human cultural activity�" l) 
We can describe culture in the medium of Saint-Exupery 
and call it a citadel amid the ever-encroaching desert 
of meaninglessness which threatens to annhilate man.' 
Cultural values provide a shelter within which man 
feels secure, which saves him from being overwhelmed 
by the incomprehensibility of tb.e universe. By 
coming to terms with the cultural. values of his time, 
the individual lives authenticallye
However, the quality of life is never static. 
Men's needs and aspirations as well as historica1 
circumstances change from one era to another. This 
in turn alters the existing conception of what it is 
to live authentically. A change in man's material. 
and spiritual needs leads him to adopt a Weltanschau,ung 
that is more suited to the changed existential 
oonditionso Factors which had once seemed of primary-­
importance.may begin to lose their significance and 
vice versa. This change in man's need.sand in his 
view of life inevitably leads to a modification or 
transformation of cultural values, because of the 
link that exists betwco� culture and a specific 
existential situation. Man 1; s cul.tural activity 
points to ••••••••• 6/ ••• 
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points to the 'TruthQ or •the Good 9 - an ought the 
observance of which leads man to real or authentic 
existence. However this etruth' must not be regard­
-ad in absolute terms, as the permanent achievement 
of any one cultu.re o •Truth' as reflected in the 
cultural values of man is always posited in accord­
-ance with a specific vision of reality within a 
definite existential. si tuation o As this situation 
changes and as ma.n t s needs change one •truth' gives 
way to a new Vmore meaningful' one which better 
satisfies the new needs that have arisen o That is 
why the c�ltural values of one epoch differ from 
those of another 5- dep-Jnd.ing on the prevalent conoept­
-ion of life� Real or authentic existence, then,
means different things to different men and different
societies� It is this factor which led Nietzsche and
Marcuse to reject their specific cultures as incompat­
-ible with •real� human needs _, thereby leading to in.;.-
-authenticity and then offer new conceptions of life
which propose to cater :forman t s •real' needs. It is
this sru:ie factor which accounts for the difference in
cultural systems,, Each system reflects a different
view of life, a different patter:n. of existentiaJ. needs,
a differer ..:t conception of authenticity., A specific
Weltanschau�E,g r:1.akes i"t possibIG for man to live
meaningfully and create culture.., However, when new
circumstances arise and. the prevailing oonoeption of
life proves inadequate i.:;1, the face of the new needs,
men turn to another more satisfying world view and
consequently 9 cultural values also undergo a trans­
-formation.·· I will now attempt to show this by
using. a few examples in historical order viz�_, the
Greek, Medieval and the more modern conceptions of
life and cultureo
The Greek •••••••••?/ •• 
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The Greek oonoeption of authenticity and subsequently 
Greek cul.tu.re was indissolubly bound to the polis or 
city-state� Originally, the polis {composed along 
aristocratio lines) had been guided by the Olympian 
hierarchy of gods who eobodied the merits and flaws 
of the Greeks themsel ve·s even though they were immortal.. 
All explanations of why things happen were given in 
terms of the actions of the gods who were supposed to 
descend into the midst of huoan. society
,. 
intervening 
in and influencing huoan action. 
Hooer1 for instance, ma.king one of the earlie.st
attempts at ordering the world and. fulfilling the human 
need for explanation and meaning, wrote against a 
background of divine action. This divine background 
was for the Greek a perspective of meaning against 
whioh the particular actions of man could be fitted� 
The will of the gods could be us�d to explain marcy­
incomprehensible things. 
However, the originally self - sufficient polis 
became more and more dependent on trading. The growth 
of a new commercial class, which could also aspire to 
the highest office, contributed to the democratisation 
process in the previously aristocratic polis. Trading 
and colonisation of new areas resulted in greater contact 
with and a deeper study of nature. Because man was now 
in possession of innumerable new ideas, he could no 
longer be satisfied with a purely divine explanation 
for the universe. More and nore he came to exercise 
his faou.1ty.of reason in his search for explanation 
and insight. 
By the application of hum.an reason man dis­
covered a harmony in nature which he translated into 
principles. By resorting to the search for first 
principles (arohe) man not only succeeded in order­
ing.the universe but also satisfied urgent intellect­
ual, spiritual and material needs� In this wa:y 
Greek man created a background against 
which he•••••••• 8/ •• � 
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which he could live authentically� no longer at the 
total mercy of.the gods. The gods were al.so seen to 
be subject to certain principles in nature (ananke -
rationa1 necessity.) Their perception of harmony in 
nature led the Greeks to believe that the universe is 
ultimately rational. Man can discover its reality 
and its meaning by reasoning, since he himself is 
pa.rt of rational nature. (It is interesting to note 
that man is not yet a personality in his ovm right, 
standing individually before his oreator as in 
medieval Christianity. The opposition between mind 
and nature is as yet undeveloped.) 
Within the framework of rational nature, Greek 
man set out to find order and meaning by means of 
rational principles - a search embodied in the theo­
-ries of Greek philosophers, beginning from .the
Milesians and indlud.ing Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle and so on. The Greeks reasoned that the
orderliness evident in the world pointed to the faot
that the cosmos constitutes a unity. In nature they
found a harmonious relationship between elements.
This led them to believe that only that whioh is
symmetrical, well proportioned, harmonious is 'real.•.
Man lives in line with nature by finding this propo�
-tion, this balanced unity in naturEh .Az-:istotle•s
doctrine of the Golden Mean reflects the search for
balance• Appllo who symbolises reason and harmony
and form has to be complemented by the unbridled
passion of Dionysus. Greek culture embodies the
complementarity of these two gods. Authenticity
meant balance. The Greek ideal of man was a
personality harmonised and control1ed by reason,
the reeu1t of which would give self knowledge and
clear judgement. About the Greek_ search for unity
and balance in nature H.J. de Vleeschauwer writes t
"T}ie Greeks never asked the question how the
universe had ••••• 9/.� •• 
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come into being •••••• The question which they asked was 
always firstly, whether the Wliverse represents an 
order that could always be accepted without question 
on the.basis of the visible order and regularity of 
things, and secondly, where such an order had come 
from ••••••• Greek philosophy always.strove towards the 
concept of the unity .of the cosmos, and in order to 
maintain unity it postulated a single principle lying 
at the basis of the universe." 2)
Beginning from the Milesians, philosophers 
looked for this pemanent persisting principle in 
order to reach the inner reality of the universe. 
The universe is not the Vplaything of dark powers• 
but is intelligible and can be studied in terms of 
first principles. Beneath the apparent multiplicity 
and confusion in nature, there exists a permanent 
primary substance (physis) which reason can discover. 
Thales believed this principie to be water�· Others 
found it.in vapour or fire� Though their theories 
differed, the Greek philosophers all prooeedad from 
observed facts and logical reasoning towards the 
conception of a rationally ordered universe, thus 
making a b�ea.k with supernaturalism anc1 asserting 
the autonor.:w of human reason. The Greek search for 
unity culminated in Plato's Theory of Forms. The 
highest reality for Plato is�he Good· (which can 
also be identified with God). Knowledge of'the Good 
can lead man to achieve his own authentic nature. 
Kitto compares the Good as belonging to the same 
order of things as "the Ch:fistian State of Graca."3)
The emphasis on Reason crune to be the motif 
of Greek culture - to be found in politics, philosophy, 
literary and artistic creation and so on.· The wonder­
-ful creative vitality of Greek aulture is due to the
absence of•••••••••• 10/ ••• 
- 10 -
absence of acute politica1, mora1 or religious restraint. 
There was no Bible to a:ppea1 to as final authority. 
Greek man was thrown back on his own reason, on his own 
sense of right and wrong. It was believed that man e.s
part of rational nature could not rest in the irrational. 
Even the gods were subject to rational judgement. R.w.
Livingstone contrasts the attitudes of Job and P.rometheus 
to their respective gods. Job is full of humility. . 
Prometheus, believing himself to be guided by reason, 
curses Zeus with insulting defiance. Aeschylus does
not hesitate to judge and condemn Zeus when he appears
unjust and hence irrational�' 4) The Greeks came to
identify the content of the Good, the Beautiful, the 
Just and so on with Reason. A vision of perfect.truth 
could be attained by means of reason. The polis, of 
course, was the historic expression of a rational 
universe. The material and spiritual life of man 
rested in hie being a member of the polis community. 
The polis in other words provided scope for the 
achievement of the Good Life, for the realisation of 
arete or virtue, just as in medieval. times this was 
the concern of the Church. W,G. de Burgh quotes the 
example of Socrates to illustrate the authenticity of 
life in the polis. ''When Socrates; after his condem­
�natio� by the Athenians, was offered escape from 
prison, he replied that to evade the law of the polis, 
even when unjustly exercised, was as morally wrong 
as for a son to do violence to an aged parent." 5)
Since the polis is grounded in reason it constitutes 
the focus of ma.n's mora1, intellectual., aesthetical, 
social and practical life. And so Greek man lived, 
believing himself to be guided by rational. principles. 
Why, then, did the Greek conception of life 
decline in validity? Historical circumstances arose 
which completely altered the situation in terms of 
which Greek•••••••••• 11/ •• 
-
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which Greek culture had developed. The solidarity of 
the polis was disturbed by wars, both internal and 
external. Among the Greek philosophers there was no 
uniformity about the nature of reality;, It became 
evident that philosophy was unable to provide final 
insight into the nature of virtue and happiness. The 
rational investigation of nature was not sufficient 
to provide all the answers. Millions who lived in 
the Ro�an Empire felt excluded from the good things 
of this earth and turned longingly towards a better 
world. The Graec�oman world was split by the dual­
-ism between the earthly world and a supersensuous 
one. It was believed that.man on his own strength 
can become neither knowing, virtuous nor happy. A deep 
passionate need for true salvation (for which Greek 
philosophy made no provision) came to be felt. 
Foreigh forms of worship, a mingling of Oriental and 
Occidental religions� came to be eagerly accepted. 
Man sought meaning beyond nature and the world of 
sense. New theories like Neo - Platonism, Neo -
Pythagorean.ism� Cynicism, Gnosticism, Stoicism, 
Epicureanism� eto•arose in an attempt to satisfy the 
new needs of the time. Howevex; it was Christianity 
which proved most sudcessful in providing tnan with a 
new conception of authentic existence, entering" the 
surfeited, decadent Graeco - Roman wor1d with the 
youthful force of a pure high religious feeling and 
a conviction that was courageous to the death. u 6)
The Greeks had relied on their own rational. faculty 
to arrive at truth.- However,this self-certainty 
had been shattered in so far as they felt that they 
could no longer live meaningfully on the strength 
of philosophical inquiry alone. The desire for a 
new source of authority led to the dominance of 
divine revelation as the highest source of lmowledge. 
Truth •••••• 12/••••• 
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Truth - unquestionable and supreme is to be found in 
revelation. And the new instrument in the search for 
truth and authenticity is faith� Philosophy voluntarily 
submits itself to religion in so far as man's rational 
faculty is to be used to comprehend and explore revealed 
truth. In this way, Christianity satisfied the emer­
-gent new needs which the Greek way of life coul.d no
longer satisfy�, The Church seemed the on1y hope of
redemption amid the dissolution of political and moraJ.
life.
The shift in emphasis from reason to faith is 
reflected in the culture of the new epoch - the medieval 
era. Medieval culture filled the gap which Greek 
culture could no longer fill• Faith provided a new 
certainty that men desired so desperately. Man found 
more meaning as a creature of faith than as a rational. 
being. This faith found its object in the revealed 
truths of the divine Scriptures. G.A.Rauche writes 
"In medieval philosophy the real ground ••••••••••is 
found in the •lumen supe.rnaturale• i.e.- the revealed 
truths of Holy Scripture e.g. the incarnation, 
resurrection; ascension, transubstantion, trinity,etc. 
It is the task of reason to provide the form for these 
unassailable truths, to systematise them and to explain 
them logically as far as this is possible."?) 
Revelation, then, is the first principle of reflective 
thought. The holiness of reason lies in the clarifio­
-ation of revealed truth. The prime motif of medieval 
cul. ture is faith in God. MedievaJ. archi te otura, 
Soulpture, literature, painting and music was Christian 
in essence and articulated the Bible. Its philosophy 
and science centred around the Bible. Its ethics and 
laws were an extension of Christian commandments. Its 
political and economic organisation was also motivated 
by Christianity. Medieval culture stressed union with 
God•••••••• 13/••••••••• 
God as the supreme end and encouraged a negative attitude 
towards the sensory phenomenal world. The entire culture 
is Videational• as Sorokin calls it, because it is based 
on "the principle of a supersensory and super-rational 
God." B) 
The Christian Church became the focus of medieval 
life and culture. The Church was all-comprehensive, 
watching over evecy human creation. Following the New. 
Testament ideal of reward in Heaven or penalty in Hell, 
the Church represented order in a time predominantly 
chaotic and violen"to It offered salvation to all men 
by decreeing how m.on should live fl That men observed 
strictly its d.ecrees is reflected in the medieval. fear 
c.f c.:,::co:omurlicotion f�oo the Church. This separated the
offe�der from all ecclesiasticaJ. ministrations and left
him to the mercy of the devil� Excoomu:nication was
regaz'ded as the most horrible of punishments since it
barred man from the only way of life which offered
salvationr the only authentic form of existence. And
so the individual submitted his private opinions to
those of the Church,which we.a the vehicle of divine
revelationo Men were genuinely concerned about the
salvatio� of their souls.
It is for this reason that medievaJ. culture 
reflects man's gaze as being firmly fixed on the 
spiritual goal of life. Fervent faith made man ever 
ready to strive and sacrifice in order to enhance hie 
spiritual life, earthly life being regarded as of 
little or relative importance ., "The dominant note 
of the medieval spirit was �•o• .. •••••• other world­
-liness., To its thinkers and men of action the 
supersensible world possessed a reality denied to the 
scene of man's temporal pilgrimage ........ Those who 
were nost absorbed in mundane concerns never questioned, 
when they pausedooe••• 14/ ••• 
- 13 -
- 14 -
when they paused to think, that these were of secondary 
moment, that 'this earth our habitation• was but a 
transitory stage of discipline, or that the only 
knowledge of intrinsic worth was that of ma.n's spirit­
-ual goal and of tho instruments that led to its
attainment�" 9) That is why "people's minds were
constantly attentive to all manner of signs, dreams
and hallucinations�" lO) R.W.Livingstone compares the
Greek and medieval attitudes to life� "For him (the 
Greek) the whole of creation was not groaning and 
travailing in pain� He was waiting for no glory to be 
revealed with which the sufferings of this present 
time were not worthy to be compared •••••••••••But to 
abolish the unseen world for the Christian, is to alter 
the whole meaning and value of life. The permanence in 
Christianity is the persuaiJion that the world is not an 
adequate theatre for man, nor is he capable of reaching 
the perfection of his nature unaided." ll.) Hearty 
support for the Crusades which were an important 
aspect of medieval culture also indicates the.intensity 
of the medieval concern for salvation. Popes, kings, 
warriors and peasants set out to find salvation through 
crusading .• In slaying the heathen and recovering the 
Holy Land, men were doing God's work as well. as expiat­
-ing their own sins.
The desperate desire for salvation can be explain­
-ed by the quality of medieval life. Nature was. not as. 
tame and controlled as today. Epidemics, plague, famine, 
war between the feudal kingdoms, the growth of heresy 
and the violent savagery with which it was punished gave 
life a quality of perpetual insecurity and added to the 
general fear of the unknown. The Greek mind saw a 
rational order in nature with which it oould identify 
its own being. The medieval mind saw no such order -
only confusion and misery. 
There was •••••••• 15/ ••••• 
mm• ... ~r • . , • 
..... 
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There was evecy indication that the Second Coming was 
at hand. The Church took on itself the task of making 
men ready for it, if necessary by force. On earth, 
life was miserable and reward.less. The promise of joy 
and happiness after death made men all the more ready 
to accept the teachings of the Ohurch as the on1y.au.th­
-entic way of living. To secure its own position, the 
Church encouraged a homogenous culture which was induced 
by the individual's fear of hell and his desire to get 
to heaven - ideas which were amply and horrifyingly 
depicted in medieval literature, for example, Do.nta·_t s 
works. Revelations of the prophets were valued above 
the achievements of individual men. Consequently, 
medievaJ. culture lacks a preoccupation with the oont­
-ents of human consciousness or analytic criticism of 
human experience and is essentially theocentric in 
character as Greek culture had been geocentric. 
Philosophy had to concentrate on the study of 
the Scriptures for a oausa.1 explanation of the universe. 
G .A. Rauche wri tea "while the Greeks worked out the 
causal principle by.observation and arrived �t a first 
cause by reflection, medieval thinkers.*knew• the 
oause of the universe, God the Creator, by revelation. 
This explains the subordination of philosophy to theo­
-logy in the Middle Ages. Thereby philosophy becoraes
the ancilla theologiae� the task of which is to afford
rational insight into the revealed truth which is not
questioned but is accepted on faith." 12) The 0nd of
philosophy is lmowledge of God
t
which required the har-
monious co-ordination of faith and reason, philosophy 
and theology. Saint Augustine, for instance, found the 
Platonic Ideas of Goodness, Beauty, Justice, and so on 
in God's mind. "In Him they are all contained in high­
-est union. He is absolute unity, the all - embracing 
truthJ He is the highest Being, the highest Good, 
perfect Beauty • • • • l.6/ • �-
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perfect Beauty (unum, verum, bonum). All rational 
lmowledge is ultimately lmowledge of God."l)) Thomas 
Aquinas also attempted to justify faith by.reason and, 
with the aid of the Aristotelian dialectic, to "oons­
-tru.ot a logical system that would vindicate a world 
outlook already revealed and dotermined."14) And so
the Church sought to c�ordinate human cultural aot­
-tivity, thus satisfying the intellectual. and spirit-
-ual longings of men. Men obeyed its injunctions be-
-cause they believed it embodied truth and goodness
and hence offered the most authentic way of life.
However even this tightly knit cultural. homo­
-geneity was not to last. A variety of historical 
circumstances arose which transformed the purely rel­
-igious world view into a more secularised one. A 
secular civilisation proved more adequate to satisfy 
new needs. The unity of medieval. life was shattered 
by the Reformation which ushered in a new era that 
encompassed events like the French Revolution, the 
Industrial. Revolution, the invention of gunpowder and 
printing, geographical discoveries• the growth of 
cities and so on. As a result vast new dimensions
were added to ma.n's horizons. The quality of men•a 
lives changed radically, and so did their needs. The 
desire arose for a freer and more human conception of 
nature and life. Men no longer believed that theology 
was adequate enough to comprehend. fully the meaning 
of life. A serious attempt was made to assess life 
from different standpoints, since man now desired a 
more oomprehensive outlook on life than that offered 
by the Church.
Religion was no longer able to provide the 
foundation for a theory of the world and of human 
life. Man's gaze turned more and more to himself 
and his••••••••••• 17/ •• 
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and hie human enviro:nnent. Science and philosophy 
defined their lir.ri.ts as against theology and assumed 
a conscious independence. The fact that □en were no 
longer content with a cornon tradition led to the 
awakening of national life; and the unity of culture 
disappeared. The intellectual concentration of the 
Middl.e Ages gave way to deoentralisation and the rise 
of new centres of learning,for exar.iple, Paris,Geneva 
and London�- The invention of printing freed literary 
life from its rigid connection with the church schools 
and led it to"assuce new forr.1s shaped by individuaJ. 
personalities. 
The urgent deaand for new lmowledge of the 
world found its fulfilment in the growth of the natural 
sciences. The nedieval outlook based on the unity of 
causes gave way to a conception of the world whioh did
not adnit the notion of one single highest principle., 
The scientific revolution led to a new interpretation 
of nature in terms of natural physica1 causes., God's 
existence was not denied but nature was studied in 
itself "as a dynamic system of bodies in motion, the 
intelligible structure of which can be expressed 
□athe□atically." lS) The universe cane to be seen
as a rational predictable oachine which men could
understand�' Experiment and verification gained more
and □ore stature as raeans of attaining lmowledge •'
Men turned to science for truth as they had once
turned to religion.
The 'ideational' culture of the Middle Ages 
had clearly given way to a •sensate culture' 16)
The emphasis on man and huraan dignity and achieve­
ment becomes more persistent and exclusive� The 
tendency is towards individualism and self-sufficiency.· 
Freedom from rigid medieval discipline led to an 
astonishing display of individual. genius., Greek . 
man had needed the polis to achieve the good life, 
to live authentically;, 
Medieval man.• •• 18/ �; �, 
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Medieval man needed the Church but with the waning of 
its influence, men felt confident of achieving the 
-
good � on the strength of human reason, will and 
personality. Scientific achievements which allowed 
men greater control of nature confirmed this conviction 
in the power of man to achieve a meaningful life on 
his own. So, instead of concerning themselves with 
happiness in some other realm, men directed their 
efforts to creating a better life on earth. Values 
like power, pleasure, wealth which were previously 
rejected as sinful now came into their own. Man is 
more than ever •the ceasu:re of all things• and this 
is reflected in the new seoularised culture. 
Philosophy, like science, assumes a new 
position. In Greek times, when the naive religious 
and ethical consciousness disintegrated, philosophy 
developed along scientific lines; replacing religion 
in showing what direction life should take. In the 
medieval era, philosophy became the hand maiden of 
religion. But in more modern times, philosophy, from 
the analysis and defence of revelation, passed to a 
criticism of it. Independently of religious interests, 
it sought to ground its teaching in the light of human 
reason and experience� Since it was no longer believed 
that life was rigidly determined by divine laws, man 
felt that he couid• by the application of human reason, 
control his progress towards higher levels of well -
being and happiness. 
Modern philosophy is said to begin with
Rene Descartes in France and Francis Baoon in England. 
Bacon emphasised the empirical study of nature in order 
to increase man's control over his material environment. 
Hobbes even desired to eliminate completely from 
philosophy all speculation on the immaterial or spiritua1. 
Descartes ••••••••• 19/ ••• 
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Descartes and Leibniz also saw philosophy as a means of 
increasing human lmowledge about the world. Knowledge 
was seen as a means of enabling man to better his earthly­
life as it became more and more divorced from religious 
interests. Desc�tes,who was dissatisfied with lalowledge 
grounded purely in revelation as well as the mass of
uncohneoted facts now available to man, proposed the 
method of induction which would establish a single principle 
of highest certainty from which the whole field of experience 
would be explained.· From Descartes• thinking there sprung 
two branches - the one from Descartes, the physicist who 
sought to make comprehensible all events in the corporeal 
·world (which was eventually to lead via men like Locke
and Hume to the positivism of the 19th century) and the
other branch from Descartes, the metaphyaician who sought
elementary truths of oonsoiousness (which eventually
culminated in Hegelian metaphysics).
The former aspect of Descartes• philosophy led 
to Lodke and British empricism with its etliics of happiness 
through suoess. In line with the new empirical approach 
towards reality and the beginning Industrial lievolution, 
men t�ied to establish anew the authentio nature of man•s 
existence especially in the light of the new circumstances. 
Locket s ethics benefited the growing oapital.ist oondeption 
of property: He hoped that the welfare of the people would 
be determined by the interests of the majority but his 
individualist ethics led to the leaders of ootnmerce and 
banking taking control, thus paving the way for capitalism. 
"Locke's dictum that 'government has no other end but the 
preservation of property• worked historioally as a bulwark 
of individualistic and laissez-faire policies. Locke 
wanted to regulate the accumulation of property by the 
requirements of the community as a whole, but the common 
good in turn resolved itself into the search of the 
majority for••••••••• 20/ ••• 
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majority for their own prosperity�" l'7) In fa.ct, Locke's 
emphasis on rights rather than duties made it easy for 
the proponents of econo□ic individuality to dispense 
entirely with the oottraon good as a standard for regulat­
ing the use of property.s So the new e□piriciso was not 
to result in the values its proponents desired� The 
Industrial Revolution transformed the lives of millions 
who now fomed the working class which had to sell its
labour in the. open competitive :market. Their lives 
were, nore often than not, niserable and poverty-ridden. 
as has been described so graphically in Dickens• novels.· 
Descartes• rationalisn; on the other hand, 
culminated in the attempt of the French Revolution to 
establish society on the basis of reason alone •. Just
as Newton had set the pattern for a rational investig­
ation of the physical world, so to, nan ought to enploy 
hi� reason for interpreting moral, religious, sociaJ. 
and political life• .Philosophy could then be an inst­
runent of liberation, a means to.discover a rationaJ. 
foundation for society. However, the absolutisation 
of the principle of reason was to lead to new aliena­
tion and even to nurder. The guillotine.ruled supreme. 
Albert Cat.rus points out in The Jlebel how, in the Frenoh 
Revolutioh� reason is absolutiSed.to such an extent that 
it becones unreasonable., Howe�er, the emphasis on 
reason and its separation fron sensibility was deplored 
by men like Har:u::ian, Herder and Jacobi� who desired a 
synthesis of reason and sensibility like Nicolaus of 
Cusa 1 s idea of ooincidentia oppositoruo. In his 
Transcendental Idealism, Kant attenpted to reoonoile 
the best features of Continental Rationalism and 
British Enpiricisn. However, this synthesis was 
shortlived.· 
The development ..... 21/ •• , 
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The development of philosophy after 1790 led to �e 
revival of the old oppositions under the new forms. 
of idealism and positivism. Idealists like Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel supported the extreme claims 
made by reason. Hegel constructed his vast compre­
hensive system around the principle of absolute reason. 
On the other hand, positivists like Comte an� Mill 
appealed to our experience of faots and the limits of 
knowledge •. In the 19th century, Nietzsche, in ad!iition 
to others, like Schopenhauer and Bergson, again attempt­
ed to reunite reason and experience by the central 
synthetic notions of 'will' and 'life.• 
The new trends in the.more modern era - the 
waning of religious influence, man's emphasis on the 
power of his own reason as well as on empirioa1 investi­
gation of this world, scientific and industrial. develop­
ment, the rise of'forces like nationalism, capitalism, 
socialism and so on - are the consequence of the dis­
integration of the medieval outlook and reflect an 
entirely different world from that known to the Greeks 
or the medieval man. The new culturai. an� philosophica1 
forces which came to the fore in this period and which
attempted to satisfy man's new needs - metaphysica1 
idealism, positiVism, nationalism, materialism. eto., 
are later strongly attacked by Nietzsche and Marcu.se 
as leading to new forms of alienation instead of cater--­
ing for man•s � needs. I have attempted to show 
in this ehapter how a particular conception of life 
enables man to live meaningfully and creatively, and 
how, when this.conception becomes inadequate,it gives 
way to another, affecting also the culture of' a given 
period. Nietzsoge and Ma.reuse hold that the conception 
of life in their particular times as well as the culture 
created in accordance with that conception of' life, are 
leading to inauthenticity and self-estrangement since 
man I s reaJ. • • •·• •••• • 22/ • • • •. 
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man's� needs are not being satisfied. Both, 
consequently,offer a new conception of life in order 
to revitalise life ·and ou.1 ture • In the next chapter 
I will deal with Nietzsche's analysis of the oultura1 
pattern in the 19th century as it had emerged as a 
result of the disintegration of the previous pattern 
owing to changing circumstances of life,and the 
reasons for his dissatisfaction with the cultural 
system of his own time. 
• 23 -
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CULTURAL CONDITIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
In the light of my topio, I will now attempt to 
show the philosophical and oultural environr.1ent that 
existed in the nineteenth century. Nietzsche's contem­
poraries offered various alternatives to rescue man 
fr01::1 being swallowed. up into Hegel• s all-era bracing 
system.· In addition, scientism� □aterialism, national­
ism, democracy, etc., also forr;.1ed part of the existing 
cultural pattern. Nietzsche was subsequently to reject 
all these aspects as being synptoras of the cultural 
malaise, rather than means of escaping from it. 
The alternatives offered by men like Marx, 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and by proponents of scient­
ism, democracy, eta., reflect the conceptions of these 
theorists about what leads to alienation and unfreedora 
e�g� Hegel's Absolute� The alternatives also indicate 
how man ought to live, and under what conditions culture 
is in line with realityl This links up with my attempt 
in Chapter One to show the connection between culture 
and the authenticity of hunan existence, as well as the 
shift in cultural values with changes in ma.n's needs 
and circumstances. 
Of the nineteenth century, Johl:l. Stuart Mill 
wrote how " a change has taken place in the hw-...ian 
mind ••••• The conviction is already not far £ram 
being universal. that the times are pregnant with change, 
and that the nineteenth century will be known to post­
erity as the era of one of the greatest revolutions of 
which history has preserved the remembrance, in the 
human mind, and in the whole constitution of human 
history;" l) 
In the face of this change, persistent 
adherence. • • •• • • • 25/ ;,., 
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adherence to the old cultural values was J.ea.ding man 
into self-estrangement� To a large extent the 19th
century cultural crisis was caused.by Hegel's total 
philosophy posited against reality, and also scientific
and teohnologioaJ. developments in the light of the 
bewildering new problems this raised,which I will 
discuss in greater detail below. Hegel had propound­
ed the wonderful vision of Absolute Reason moving 
dialectically through the world and becoming manifest 
in the various spheres of.human cultural enterprise -
art t religion, philosophy, p�litice and so on. In 
the movement of the Absolute were realised the values 
of tru.th, freedom; justice, beauty and goodness into 
which man was absorbed. Man lived authentically in 
freedom when ha subsumed his entire life and will to 
that of the Absolute Spirit� The glory of this ideal.-
1st system, however, remained in the clouds� The 
absolute values were revealed by man's actual. situat­
ion to have no bearing on �eality� To attempt to 
live by them would result only in alienation from the 
world and from one's true nature� Hege1 had sought 
to incorporate every as�ect of human reality into his 
rationalist constru.�tion. 
It soon became inoreasingly' obVi.ous tb a
saddened mankind that the Hegelian synthesis oonta.:inr­
ed a glaring discrepancy between abstract cultural. 
and intellectual idea1s, and everyday life� The • 
promised millenium had not materialised� Instead, 
there was a growing feeling of seli-es.tra.ngement, of 
bewilderment at the inability to locate oneself with­
in a meaningful pattern of life. Cultural. dislocation 
was the inevitable.result of the conflict of oul.tural. 
values and reality;. Traditional meanings in .the 
various cultural. spheres were no longer valid. 
To a.dd•••••••••26/•••• 
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To add to aJ.1 this, the Industrial. Revolution 
further transformed human life, bringing fresh horror 
into the lives of men. The factory system uprooted 
the traditional. perspectives of the existing culture. 
Materialism,the profit motive, deference for wealth, 
together with periods of alternating prosperity and. 
depression resulted in the development of a faceless 
urban civilisation. Ou1ture was valued.in terms of 
practicability, its relevance to demand, oost, eto.
The result was a standardisation and stultification 
of art, literature.and so on. For the growing mass 
of the proletariat, reality consisted of long hours, 
low wages, bleak industrial. l.andsoapes, child l.abour, 
the destruction of human dignity - in fact,expl.oitat­
ion and misery. The desire to improve the lot of the 
workers led to Marxist theory, anarchism and so on. 
In fact, liberalism, constitutionalism, democracy, 
nationalism, imperialism were all politica1 trends in 
the 19th oentury enoouraged by the Ind.ustria1 
Revolti.tion. 
With the growth of science also, religion 
lost its effectiveness. Christianity in the accept­
ed sense was no longer able to provide an anchor for 
the faith that men needed so desperately- to exercise. 
The growing materialism, theories like those of 
Darwin were serious threats to the validity of Christ­
ianity and its morality. Dostoevsky, for instance, 
makes one.of his characters say in The Brothers 
Karamazov, "If there is no God, everything is 
possible." 2) Many, then desired to create some­
thing in the place of religion. Robespierre's idol.­
atry of virtue and reason, Comte an positivism and 
Marxian socialism were all attempts to arrive at a 
satisfactory answer. 
It was••••••••• 27/•••• 
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It was quite obvious that the old world was 
gone forever. But what was to be the motif of the 
new? As a oo?Teotive to the crisis of life and·cu.lt­
ure in the 19th century, there were two types of alter­
natives offered• a more existential one, directed 
against Hegel's speou1ative ideaJ.ism (Marx), his rat­
iont:lJ. totalitarianism (Kierkegaard) and his absolut­
ised rationalism (Schopenhauer)J and a more scienlifio 
one.• directed against Hegel; a metaphysics and seeking 
to pase man's authentic existence in scientific thought 
as it emerged in the 19th century. 
First wa deal with Marx. He protested against 
the idealist consciousness which Hegel's system had 
sought to engender to the neglect of nan's material. 
needs. Marx developed Hegel's philosophy of history­
into a theory of class struggles whioh, by dialectical. 
necessity, leads to socialism where the proletariat is 
in control of the means of production and is henoe ·no 
longer alienated fiom the commodities it produces and 
from the world. He transformed Hegel's philosophical. 
categories into eooia.l and economic ones� and offered 
eoonoI!lio forces as the basid cause of all change in 
the world of thought and things� 
.Marx was convinced that his new theo?1" of 
reality� which he called dialectical. materialism; 
could lead man to an authentic life, especial.4>" in
the light of the new needs which the growing industX'­
ialisation of sooiety had created. For him, it was 
a scientific theory, more meaningful than Hegel's 
abstraot spiritualism which deals with the idea1 
rather than.with the real; Philosophio theory, in 
Marx's view, must oonceni itself with altering oond­
itiona in the practical. situation in order to satisfy. 
man's material. needs;, Marx wro� that ._. ...... ..-i 
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"the truth i.e the reality and power of thought mu.st 
be demonstrated in practice� The contest as to. the 
reality or non-reality of a thought which isolated· .. 
from practice� is a. purely. scholastic question� ••• �� 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point however is to chge it·�:" 3) 
Marx visu.alised a complete .transfonnation in 
the existing consciousness as well as in reality; in 
order to lead man away from alienation to a oore 
meaningful existence. Though he ridiouJ.ed Hegei•s 
speculative idealism; Marx agreed with Hegel that.the 
world develops according to a dialectioaJ. procedure 
(thus continuing the 19th century conception of 
change; growth and evolution as an ultimate fa.ct of· 
universal. validity);· Marx disagreed with Hegel how­
ever as to the force underlying dialectical. ohange;• 
Matter; not spirit� .. is the driving foroe;· Cultural. 
values mu.st.be determined by a conception of reaJ.ity 
as material;, CUl.tura.l values are determined not by 
the movement of the Absolrtte Spirit; but by the methods 
of production of a particUlar epoch;· 
Capitalism. has an attend.ant culture which.is 
used :to justify and maintain the status quo 1;e ;i
exploitation of the masses� It must be replaced by 
a system which takes into account the needs of the 
proletariat (whose needs are the only real ones since 
they are in line:�th the process of history);; 0�
then can a valid; no:n-exploi tative culture develo_p; 1 
The state will wither away and the individua1 can 
live authentico.J.ly in the classless society. b:f"
contributing to the well-being of the whole.· There 
would no longer exist the necessity for religion, 
for Christianity which had created false needs and
thus led man into self-estrangement;, 
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Earthly happiness oan be achieved by abolishing the 
circumstances (social and economic) that lead to the 
necessity for religion. Christianity had offered an 
otherworldly joy to compensate for grave social a.nd 
economic ills in the presont� Once these ills are 
removed there will no longer be need for the false 
lures of religion. 
By this theory of dialectical materialism; 
Marx hoped to eliminate the social and culturaJ. rot 
that had set in; His theory is ootivated by interest . 
in •real• existence as opposed to Hegel's abstractions-;• 
His alternative appealed to many; answering a neai 
created by the development of industry and the rise. 
of technology; With its claim to scientific rigour, 
it offered to man the vision of an economically and 
materially integrated universe as the source of all 
cuJ.tural values; Since Hegelia.nism offered no more 
consolations, many turned to Marxism as a wa:y of sal­
vation since it took.into· account material. and eoonomiQ 
conditions and needs. 
Like Marx (and Nietzsche later on) Kierkegaard 
saw himself as 'a corrective against the age• and 
passionately opposed the intelleo'tualism and aesthet­
icism of the era; His alterhative is presented in 
terms of the value of the individual in his unique
relationship with the Christian God� Kierkegaard 
reacted sharply to Hegel's gigantic amorphous system
wbioh absorbed the individual and alienated him; 
lfegelianism prevented any movement; either in the 
direction of complete atheism (which Nietzsche oa.ll­
ed for) or to a more.honest Christianity ( which 
Kierkegaard desired) ;, 
The characteristic of the age� Kierkegaard 
saw as ·a crippling 'vis inertias• that cou1d o�. 
retain man••••••• 30/ �;;, 
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retain mart in his condition of self estrangement;: He 
was one of the first to react to the existing intell­
ectualism,· thus providing a sharp stimulus to the, 
great revolt against Hegelianism which was.later carried 
on by-Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Germany; .William 
James in .America and Henri Bergson in France. The 
movement Kierkegaard laW1ched to restore man to a more 
authentic life.was in the direction of a recognition 
of temporality, oonoreteness, the value of the indivi­
dual.and his existence; as against Hegelian abstract­
ness. 
Kierkegaard rejected the Hegelian claim to.
comprehend reality through reason• Rationa1 philosophy 
has no bearing on man's actual needs since it did not 
help him in the concrete decisions he had to make every 
day� ilso � it fails to grasp the fact that man is not 
a pure thinker but an existing individual.; Kierkegaard 
condemned strongly the thinkers who accepted Christian­
ity because it appeal.ad to the intellect as logica1 ahd
reasonable. This had transformed ·the living religion 
into an abstract Christian culture. 
Further, the subjection of •God• to finite 
human reason was abhorrent to Kierkoga..9.J:'d;, The ultimate 
truths.about huoan existence cannot be discovered by 
reason� Truth can only be found through fro.th; leierke• 
gaat'd's rejection of conventional Ch:ristianity fora. 
shadows Nietzsche ts latet vene□ent repudiation of 1 t; .. 
Christianity; instead of.tulfilling man•s real. needs; 
was fast leading him into a meaningless existence. 
Kierkeganrd maintained that merely to live ·in a 
Christian environoent does not autot:1aticall.y make 
one a Christian; "When all are Christians� Christian-
i ty eo ipso does not exist;'" 4) The concept of
suffering and sacrifice is missing. The Christian 
virtues have been reduced to a comfortab1e code of 
bourgeois ethics;·.• ••• 31/ �;.;. 
bourgeois ethics. 
"The bourgeois love of God begins when vegetable 
life is most active� when the ho.nds are comfortably 
folded on the ·stomach; and the head sinks back into the. 
cushions of the chair, while the eyes� drunk with sleep, 
gaze heavily for a moment towards the ceiling;" 5) 
Hegel had rejected the •complacent devotion of 
the individue1 to his own beloved individuality;,  Man 
only lives in freedom by submitting his will to the 
Absolute; Kierkega.o.rd rejects this totally;, "I am no 
part of a whole; I am not integrated, not included;. 
To pUt me in this whole you imagine is to negate me�"6) 
Hegeiian philosopl:cy' implies the dispersion of oa.n in 
the world process, a factor which led to self-estrange• 
ment� Kierkegaard always emphasises the value; of the 
individual; deploring the levelling tendencies of his 
o.ge (which Nietzsche also denounced later)• 
The crisis created by the levelling process 
leaves the individual confused and lost in meaningless 
abstraction; What can save him is his self..ia.iscove17 
as a being who stands in a direot reiationsliip with 
God; rierkega.axi(3. attempted to restore a personal 
religion as a tlea.ns of leading man out of the ou1tural 
crisis� He hated f�rvently the orowd; the mass� etc i·
That is why he protested. also against.the idea of 
, I .  . . 
socialism as the salvation of the age.· The exaltation 
of1mankind1 as a first principle negates the value of
the individual being� .Yet "the ·•individual.' is .the 
category through which� from a real point pf view; our 
age, our race and its history must pass;:n 7) 
The Hegelian system is false to human existence 
since it does not oo?Tespo:nd with what is. Its abstraction 
was an object of derision to Kierkegaard., 
He writes,•••••••• 32/.��� 
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He writes, "I am a humon being •••••••. a.nd I assume that 
every-one I have the honour to talk to is al.so a human 
being. If he presumes to be speculative philosophy.in 
the abstract· •••••• I mu.st ren01mca the effort to speak 
with him, for in that case he instantly vanishes from 
my sight and from the feeble sight of every mortaJ.;,n_ S) 
Elsewhere he wrote, "Our age. is essentially one of .. 
understanding and reflection, without passion.••·••••• 
Men feel their.resJ.ity as refJ..ected.in something exte1-
nal. to oneself� in some abstraction; thus.de�:ng the
responsibility of an individual. existence�" g) To 
rescue man from this condition� Kierkegaard proposes a 
religious •solution' - the return of the individual. 
from the abstraations he had been.swallowed up into, 
to a direct relationship with God •. 
Schopenhauer, in his reading of realityi stress­
es the primacy of the Will in opposition to the Hegelian
emphasis on Reason •. Deeply pessimistic about., life and
cultural. efforts, he regarded his age as deeply. degraded 
as regards all higher intellectual efforts. Hegel's 
�hilosophioal..ideru.ism had proved a treraendoJ.s let-down� 
bitterly disappointing the hopes it had created in. man;V, 
of an ideal existence under the benevolent guidance of 
the Absolute Spirit. Schopenhauer's philosophy appeal-· 
ad to those who found the ideals of a former generation 
bereft of meaning; The highest values of his philosophy 
- resignation; fortitude� sympathy, compassion; etc.
provided an attractive and satisfying philosophical.
explanation.for the growing feeling of disappointment
and despair.
Like Kierkegaard,.Sohopenhauer rejected
conventiona.1 Christianity, making no effort to 
reoonoile the truth of revelation with philosophical. 
truth.· He saw the existing religion.to be lacking in 
the asceticism and pessimism which r.iad� _ ���-
Ohri stia.ni ty�·�·�•••�.� 33/�;;, 
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Christianity meaningful.. Schopenhauer was convinced 
that there is a deep sense of evil in the universe 
and his pessmism is a sharp contrast to the optimism 
of Hegel, Marx, Comte and others. He was contempt­
uous of Hegel and others like him who sought to undel'­
stand reality by means of the historical. method. 
Historicist systems he dismissed as eopty bombast 
(Fichte) and charlat�sm (Hegel). The •progress' 
disclosed by an analysis of history is a mere delusion� 
the result of placing undue emphasis on particular 
accidents of history. He writes, �The true philosophy 
of history lies in perceiving that; in a1l the endless 
changes and ootley complexity of event, it is only the 
selfsame unchangeable being which is before us, which 
today pursues the same ends as it did yesterdey and 
as it ever will." lO)
Hegel had not solved the glaring discrepancy 
between the ideal aspirations of men and rea1ity i� 
self. Schopenhauer objected to the general belief in 
the power of reasoning, pointing out the eopty and 
derivative character of al1 rational. knowledge. 
Reason dea1s with truth only at.second hand. So it 
is not,as the idealists believe, at the centre of the 
lln;i verse_, What governs the uni verse is a. non-rational. 
element which merely.uses reason as an instrument to 
achieve certain ends� The essence of reality is a. 
blind unoonsciou.s striving that is o� definable as 
Will. In can the_ will of the universe emerges into 
the light ot selfconaoiousness. This will in oa.n
makes hie ooncerned with nothing but the gratificat­
ion of his own appetites and desires, wholly controll.­
ed by the lust for will. Man can never be.happy be­
cause the will to life is insatiabl.e. Art, especially­
poetic and musical. art does provide temporary rel.ief 
by raaking •• •• •• • •• •. 34/ ••�' 
b7 making one lose oneself in contemplation of the 
Platonic Ideas. 
Only in total renunciation did Schopenhauer 
see the possibility of oomplete victoey over. the 
will� Man must follow the path of asoetioism., free 
himself from the body and its appetites in an effort 
to save himself from eternal bondage to the will.-
By realising that 'all life is essentially sorrow• 
and by denying the will to life, man pierces the 
veil of� or illusion and attains to a state of 
non-being or NiTVana;; SUch a condition is.one where
'knowledge only is left,· will has vanished�-• By 
recognising the striving of the will Sl'1d attempting 
to overcome it; man lives in accordance with reality. 
Rationalism as wall as the materialism and scientism 
of the 19th century held no hope for man� Reasoning 
and abstraction would never.achieve truth about real­
ity as Hagel had believed� Neither woul.d science 
which oan only deal with the world ot phenomena� 
their relations; Li�e however is not reducible to 
scientific knowledge� _· As an antidote t9 the fa1se 
optimism of Hegelian rationalism a.rid 19th oentury 
sdient1sm, Sohopenb.a.uer propounded his philosophy of 
the Will� Thie. emphasis on the Will was iater taken. 
up by Nietzsche� though in an entirely diff�rent way;
=
In addition to.the theories of Marx, Kierke­
gaard and Schopenhauer; the emergent acientifio 
spirit in the 19th century led many to believe that 
in soienoe.lay the answer to many of the problems 
faoing man. Science and �chnology were advancing 
at ·a rapid rate�: What was more, many scientific 
discoveries couJ.d be applied to everydey- life; a.Dd 
emphasized the authority and progress of science; 
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Men had lost faith in philosophical. abstract­
ions� The certainty provided by science as well as 
its power to aneliorate misery appealed to oa.ny as a 
refuge froo the confusions and mi.certainties of the 
age. And so the cult of scientism spread. L�th 
quotes R.H.Haym•s description of the nineteenth 
century: "At the t1oment we find ourselves in a trem­
endous and al.most universal shipwreck of the spirit 
and of belief in the spirit in general ••••• It is no 
longer an age.of systeos, no longer an age of.poetry 
or philosophy�· Instead it is an age in which� thanks. 
to the great technological discoveries of the century, 
the material seems to have come to life� The deepest 
foundations of our physica1 as well as our spiritual 
life are being torn up and reoodelled through these 
triunphs of technology." ll
)
.The tendency generally was towards a greater 
realism, a consideration of the influenoe of material 
interests on life and culture. It was believed that 
any conception of reality was incomplete if it did not 
take into account the development of science and tech­
nology. Eophasis on the reiifbility and fruitfulness 
of scientific methods led nany to.believe that a 
•science of man' could be created;.without resort to
anything transcendent and abstract.
Philosophioa1 positivisn was upheld as the 
answer to many problems. The positivists believed 
that science provides the only kind of lmowledge to 
whioh·man can attain. All that we can know of reality 
is what we observe or legitimately deduce from our 
observations. The mind oust confine itself to a sober 
study of experienced facts stated as laws�· Knowledge 
must be capable of empirical verification and must be 
seen as relative. 
Positivism •••••• •. 36/ • � •· 
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Positivism denies the validity o:f a prior:\ means. of 
}mowing as well as the possibility of metaphysioal 
and religious knowledge. Affirming the validity of 
empirioal modes of knowing, positivism opposes 
Christianity in so far as it claims to know the 
existenoe of the supernatural. 
The man who foundod positivism, whioh filled 
the void creat0d by the loss of faith in God, was 
Auguste Comte. He attempted to overcome the crisis 
of values by the application of his scientific 
sooiaJ. theory. He had lost his belief in God in muoh 
the same way that he severed all attachments to the 
monarchical regime in France, and deolared atheism 
to be an important part of the new cultural situation. 
Faith in God was replaced by the dogma •All is 
relative', which subsequently became the method of 
the positive sciences, governing the realm of 
phenomenal facts. 
Comte saw three stages in the development of 
society - the theological where belief in gods or a 
God is predominant, the metaphysical which progresses 
from belief in God to abstract notions (like Hegel's 
Absolute Spirit) and finally the positive stage whioh 
is governed by scientific laws. He regarded his law
of the three stages as a natural law which, of 
neoessity, governs our scientifio, philosophical and 
cultural advance. 
In the positive stage (whose features include 
the real, useful, precise, certain and organic) the 
mind must limit itself to phenomenal facts as 
contained in empirical laws. To speak of first 
causes, ultimate ends and essences is nonsensical, 
because these are not a valid part of a scientific 
outlook. The positivist position went hand in hand 
with the 
development of ••••• 37/ ••• 
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development of the speeial seiences. All lmowledge is 
seen as relative and th1s stems from the rec.ognition 
that the knower is conditioned by phenomena in the 
external world. The mind must investigate laws which 
govern phenomena to observe the relations between 
them. These soientific laws are not a 12riqr� but 
empirically observed, and in the absence of a 
meaningful religion they are to determine the new 
cultural order. 
The general. study of human nature belongs to 
sociology of which Comte regarded himself as the 
founder •. In it, he attempted to constitute the 
sOientific attitude into a genuine positive 
philosophy - of which humanity was the guiding 
principle. The ultimate aim of positive philosophy 
is contained in its duty to humanity - the improvement 
of natural conditions. He believed his philosophy 
could guarantee order and progress (which were the 
demands of the new industrial era) and ensure the 
salvation �f man. This was shared by those others 
who also believed that human progress is an inevitable 
law and that science and scientists are the guardians 
of the new society. 
The theory of evolution with its purely 
mechanical explanation of the elements of organic life 
and its belief in organic laws of development fitted 
well into the nineteenth century scientific consciousness. 
Darwin supplied a mass of evidence for this doctrine 
and gave it a scientific force which it had not possessed 
before. He maintained that all forms of life had evolved 
from a common ancestry, through natural processes of 
adaptation. T,,.c stzw�;::le for existence and survival of 
the fittest is the source of evolution. This law then 
came to be applied to psychology, socio1ogy, ethics, 
history and so on, as 
the only •••••.••• 38/ •••••• 
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the only scientific method. The concept of 'progress• 
was upheld in so far as everything was supposed to be 
moving towards some goal. 
This, then, is the cultural situation as it 
presented itself to Friedrich Nietzsche in the 19th 
century. He expressed his profound dissatisfaotion 
with the various interpretations of reality and the 
alternatives open to man, sharing Goethe's view of 
the age as one where "confusing theories for confused 
minds hold sway over the earth." 12)
Nietzsche maintained that the optimism of 
men like Marx and Conte, as well as the pessillliBiil of 
Schopenhauer, masked a basic decadence which is 
inimical. to neaningful action. Nowhere does true 
culture exist. Positivism, Socialism,.Denocracy, 
Nationalism, Moralism, Scientism, etc., despite their 
claims, are still, expressions of a culture divorced 
from reality. Each presumes to represent •truth' but 
they alienate man as r.iuoh as the crisis they hope to 
rescue Jiim from. 
The age is clearly nihilistict men persist in 
living by values which are neaningless. Culture is 
decadent and life impoverished in the bourgeois -
Chri·stian world. Nietzsche wri tea of the age in. 
gloocy terms: "The waters of religion a.re ebbirigt 
and leaving swar.ips or stagnant poolst The nations are 
drawing awa;y in enni ty again and long to tear eaoh 
other in pieces. The sciences, blindly driving along, 
on a laissez faire system, without a cannon standard, 
are splitting up, and losing hold of every firm principle. 
The educated classes are being swept along in the 
contemptible.struggle for wealth. Never was the world 
nore worldly, never poorer in goodness and love •••• 
Everything bows before the oomng barbarisn, arts 
and science included •••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••• 
There ia ••••••• 39/ ••••• 
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There is a wintry sky over, and we dwell on a high 
mountain, in danger and in need." l3)
Nietzsche, who shared in cormon with Marx,
Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard a total. rejection of 
Hegel's absolute Christian culture as a false front 
to cover up a basic decadence and inauthenticity, 
could not reconcile himself to any one of their basic 
positions. Neither could he wholly accept soientism 
and positivism as a solution, though he did recognise 
the importance of a scientific approach to oan•s 
problens. Nietzsche's position on many of the cu.lturaJ. 
issues of the day echoed the earlier oritioiet1s of 
Marx, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer.· However, he could 
not see how any_of the alternatives offered by these 
nen could alleviate the position sinoe they merely. 
added to the general cultural confusion. As such, 
they can only lead to new alienation. 
Schopenhauer, for instance, had recognised 
the primacy of the Will over the rationa1 faculty but 
had pessioistioally branded it as evil. Nietzsche on 
the other hand saw in the Will an instrument of cultu­
ral regeneration. The positive exercise of the will, 
of will e.e will to power can provide man with a new.
grasp of reality and lead to a oore oeaningful life. 
Equally unsatisfactory to Nietzsohe was 
Kierkegaard's �leap• into religion, which he describes 
as: "Weariness, which seeketh to.get to the ultioate 
with one leap, with a death-leap, a poor ignorant 
weariness, unwilling even to will� longer; that. 
created all gods and baokworlds;" 14) Christianity,
even if rejuvenated, can only enfeeble and destroy. 
".All the possibilities of Christian life have been 
tried out. It is tine to discover sooething new." 15)
Marxian ••••••• 40/ •• 
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Marxian socialisn certainly could not provide this� 
With its eIJ.phasis on equality (which went contrary to 
the laws of nature) and its attenpt to create the 
Christian heaven on earth, it was oerely leading man 
astray from his real. nature and his true needs� 
Denooraey� nationalism and state worship 
appaJ.led Nietzsche just as much. Deoocraoy with.its 
levelling influence, could only breed mediocrity; The 
. growing nationaJ.ism of his tice which emei:-ged as an 
accompanying factor to the rivalry and ooIJ.petition 
at:1.ong nations, was a corrupt and perverse enotion of 
the herd man� State idolatry inticidates :oa.n into 
conforci ty. It appeals to his tribal instinct and 
relieves h.iD. of individual responsibility. Oollins 
writes ''Fron a cultural. standpoint�- Nietzsche draws 
up a severe indictr:ient against the Moloch of the 
State. Its nain effect is anti•culturaJ. since it 
levels down talents and encourages oonf orr.1isn &1ong
its oitizens�" 16)
As far as the sciences are ooncerned, Nietesohe 
agrees with its stress on the exam.nation of the ohaxlg'­
ing historioa1 worl.d since nan belongs to the earth 
and. not to sone othex-worldly realtl•. He approved 
also of a scientific procedure, but the cult of 
soientiso is quite another catter •. He ooul.d not 
accept its absolutisation of itself; nor its secular­
isation of Christion values. 
Nietzsche was equally sceptical. of the Darwin­
isri that was sweeping the 19th century. While acknow­
ledging change and conflict as basic,.Nietzsohe could 
not accept that the struggle for life, enforced by 
external oirounstances, deternines our whole existence.­
The struggle whioh he finds is the consequence of 
overflowing energy�� ••• �41/� �' 
- 4l. -
overflowing energy. Natural. selaction and will to 
power have little in ooIJraon;; Nietzsche als.o re ;f ected 
Darwin beaause, like Schopenhauer� he did not take 
his theory to its logical. conclusion� If life is a 
struggle; then et'eength.is the ultinate virtue and 
weakness. the only fault� The •good' .is that which 
survives, the •bad• that which fails� Durant writes: 
"Only the Mid-Victorian cowardice of the English Dar­
winians; and the bourgeois respectability of French 
positivists and Gercan socialists.could conoea1 the 
inevitableness of this conclusion� These-oen were 
brave enough to reject Christian theology but they 
did not dare to be 1ogioa1� to reject the coral ideas, 
the worship of meekness o.nd altruiso whioh had grown 
out of that theology�" l7) 
Nietzsche could not see how any of the exist-­
ing alternatives could lead rnan out of the cultural. 
crisis into which nan had been precipitated� A new 
culture was urgentl.y needed, a new conception of can 
and reality in order to resaua ca.tJ..froo the sterility 
of alienation to a □ore nea.ni:ngfuJ.,creati\re existence. 
Nietzsche proposed the 'I wi111 of the Supernan to 
replace the now oea.ningless 'Thou shalt• of Christian­
ity-. Hegel had elaborated the Christian doctrine that 
'God is spirit•� The new eulture oust witness the 
birth of a corporeal god .. SUperoan. ·
What is needed is the realisation that strength• 
pride, intelligence are □ore ioportant to life .and
culture than pity,' □eekness� hur:lillty and so on, and 
the realisation that the goal of evolution is not the 
oass of oankind but only the Superoan. Ma.n's nature 
1s unfixed, open to ahange but the direction of change 
i.s the outstanding individual. - warriors, artists•
philosophers, statesmen.
"Oulture •••••• 42/ •••• 
- 42 -
"CUlture is nothing else than the oeans for keeping 
huoan nature fluid and progressive, so that the great 
:oan may break through to a higher oode of existence 
(what Nietzsche will oall later on the level of the
superman) ;.u 18)
The historicism of IJen like Hegel and Comte, 
Schopenhauer's rejection of the will as evil, Kierke­
gaard's religious •solution• and Marx's socialistic 
•solution• - all these dissatisfied Nietzsche�- Nor
could he reconcile himself to soientism, nationalise
and democracy. The machine-a.a.de ugliness of the bour­
geois world, devoted to the production of •the cheap
and the nasty• was even more horrifying� As a •solution•
Nietzsche proposed the •will to power• doctrine and
the splendidly audacious Supeman to burst the chains
of the existing cultural decadenoe and guide the
creation of a new culture which will enable man to
live more oeaningfully since it is in line with reality
and with real hunan needs. The revaluation of the
existing values in the direction of will to power will
bring about a cultural regeneration by which also the
question of man•s authentic existence will be answered.
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NIETZSCHE'S STAND WITH REGARD 
?:O NINETEENTH CENTURY CULTURE 
This chapter will concern itself with a detailed 
analysis of Nietzeohe's oriticiso and rejection of the 
trends in nineteenth century culture in so far as 
these trends contribute to can's alienation froo the 
world and hiosel.i' • In addition, an examination will be
oade of .Nietzsche's proposed solution for the orisi•a of
culture. 
Nietzsche believes that true culture 
begin when man frees himself froc r:ietaphysioal 
can only 
and. 
religious notions. Any fora of_philosophioal idealise 
was abhorrent -to Nietzsche. Because.this world is 
apparent, conditioned, oontradictoey, evolving, neta.­
physioia.ns believe that there 'OU.st be a rea1,. uncond-
.. . 
itioned, uncontradictory,. static world. Reeen�ent 
against reality leads philosophers to create a.n 1mag-.
inary world frorJ. which they oondecm ever.yday existence, 
in a desire to escape f'roo the pa.in of reality. 
Nietzsche·writes: "The history of.philosoph1' is tha 
story of a secret am mad hatred of the pre-requisites 
of Li�e••••••.••••Philosophers have neyer hesitated to 
af'firo a fanciful. world proVided it contradioted this 
world and f'u:rnished them with a weapon wherewith they­
·could oaJ.umnia.te this world.••• •••• even todey our
soienoe_whioh pretends to be the advocate of.Life has
accepted the fundaoenta.l position of slander� and
treats this world as •appearance• " l )
Philosophers like Kant and Hegel who take the 
absolute as •••••••••• 45/ •• � 
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absolute as their highest value den.v this finite, 
temporal eXietenoe, Nietzsche regards the absolute 
as an absurd concept. An absolute oode of existence 
ie impossible since the concept 'being• is always 
relative to roan. The conditions of a oetaphysical 
world (if it exists) are inaooessible to nan, and 
also an irrelevant foro of lmowledge. European 
culture leads nan into self estra.ngeoent by teaching 
hio to lose sight of actual. things and hunt after 
probleoatio ideal aios. What the world is, man has
created according to huraan needs and eootions. 
Metaphysics deals with fundaoental errors as 
if they were fundamental truths, bu.t neither faith 
nor knowledge of mtaphysical. natters are necessary 
in the reality within which man lives. Idealiso in 
all �ts foros, Nietzsche saw as opposed to the high• 
est 'Yease.ying' to life. Where cen saw ideal things 
he saw huo.a.n, all too human things. The desire for 
a beyond, for an ultioate condition is a syoptoc of 
siolmess. 
Nietzsche desires to apply an axe to the root 
of the •cetaphystca.l need• in can, Philosophers ha.i/'e 
mummified reai things by divorcing thee from history 
andfroo Beooaing. They have rejected the senses be­
cause they reveal an apparent world of Beooci:ng. In 
this we::y can has been oisled. Rather than deifying 
tho unknown o.n4 trnnaf'erring joy to a false world, non 
should detel'"J:line to what extent he creates his .own 
values within the worl.d of Becoming. Man JJUst put an 
end to the tyr� of the old idea.list val.ues and
oreate a new order of more realistic ones. 
Religion was Eµiother obstacle in the way of 
the creation of a new,more meaningful culture.
Nietzsche •••••••• 46/ •••• 
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Nietzsche sees belief in God as a result of nan•• 
weakness, his inability to understand reality. As 
suoh 'God* is a crime against life. He writes "!he 
concept •God' was invented as the opposite ot the 
conoept *life' ••••••••••The concepts 'beyond• an4 
•true world' were invented in order to depreciate
the only world that exists •••••• The concepts 'soul'
and *spirit• were invented in order to throw contenpt
on the body ••••••• The concept •sin• was invented in
order to contuse and muddle our instincts .. •• 2)
Nietzsche saw God . as a "too palpably cl'1CBJ' 
solution of things;.••• At bottoo, He is no oore 
than a.coarse� rude prohibition ....... ye sha11 not 
1;hink ! u 3) To the Christian religion, so insidiousl.7
doriinan.t 1n the nineteenth century, Nietzsche was · 
totally opposed. He condecned it in the strongest 
taros t •� reg� Christianity as the moat fatal and 
seductive lie that hae·ever yet existed - as the 
greatest and tiost impious lie " 1) and "I dari
Christianity the one great curse, the. o:he enotmous 
and innermost perversion, the one great instilict of 
revenge ••••••• I call it the one iz:D:lortal blemish of 
oankind•" 5)·
Nietzsche saw religion a.nd the concept of 
God as a danger to hue.an ou.ltural activity. Men 
experience a feeling of power and attribu.te it to 
God because they dare not think theoselvee the source 
of it. He rejects his strength as 'God' and accepts 
his weaknesses as 'Man'. In this way religion has 
degraded the nature of nan. Man feels proud to det3T 
responsibility for his power .. Huoa.n energies,instead 
of being concentrated on the construction of culture, 
are f 6cused on God and a religious otherworld. The 
resul.t is a perversion of man as a striving beil'lg. 
In everyday••••••• 47/ •• � 
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In everyday- reality - in a.rt, soienoe, industry, 
etc. Christianity had ceased to be an active meaningful 
foroe� It was built on oondi tions and needs long van­
ished and in no way satisfies- existing needs •. It is 
now no oore than a. •soft coralismJ what Nietzsahe calla 
the •euthanasia of Christianity.• _6) In spite of this
failure of Christianity, nen still try to solve the 
problems of life with Christian concepts like altruiSCl, 
self-sacrifice, denial of the will, etc. David Strauss 
for instance frankly' proclaims that he is no longer a 
Christian but is loath to disturb the contentcent of 
Christian oorality. Like Feurbaoh; Nietzsche saw 
Christianity and its morality as irreconcilable with 
the oodern world and the needs of oen who lived in 
that world. So a Christian civilisation has no per­
nanence because it is based on conceptions long van­
ished. Man has outgrown Christianity.  It is time to 
find a new home.
In its appeal to the disinherited everywhere, 
Christianity reveals its foundation to be resentment. 
The resentment which the weak feel for the strong ciakes 
then aooept Christianity which offers blessedness to 
the cost wretched and insignificant men. Resentoent 
has fostered a slave oorality which expresses its 
desire for revenge against the strong by branding 
every aristocratic instinct.as evil. The truly.good 
al'e fhlpposed to be the weak, the poor in spirit, the 
degenerate. 
So, in this way,tha Christian slave oorality 
has destroyed the higher values of.life. Pride, 
responsibility, passion, adventure• knowledge, whioh 
the higher man desires, are condemned. Man i's tat1ed, 
his cultural vitality sapped. The high tone of lite, 
vital for •••••••••• 48/ ••• 
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vital. for culture, is weakened. The happiness of the 
weak becomes the standard of values. "The morality 
of paltry- people is the ceasure of all thingat this
is the most repugnant kind of degeneraoy that civili­
sation has ever yet brought into existenoe. And this.
kind of ideal _is-� still, under the name of God, 
over cen•s heads." 7 
The Christian has polluted the world with his 
oonoepts of sin, guilt and punishment. "The Christ­
ian resolve to consider the world ugly and bad has 
made the world. just that." S) Man has been emasoulat­
ed into a weak, huoble sinner - a sick a.niraal. SiciJ.­
arly,Christianity and the Church have perverted nan•s 
attitude ·.towards the passions. They preach the despa­
ising of 'the body. And, Nietzsche asks, how can one 
oarry a 'beautiful soul• in a despised body� Every­
thing associated with man's natural iopulses are 
associated with eternal da.anation.· Nietzsche wri. tee a 
"Body JP1 I entirely, and nothing more; and sou1 is 
only the naoe of something in the body." 9) 
The.only passions Christianity encourages a.re 
love of God, fear of God, fanatic belief in God." The 
passions becooe evil and malignant when regarded with 
evil and ugly eyes. It is in this way that Christian­
i ty has succeeded in transforming Eros and Aphrodite­
sublime powers, capable of idealisation - into hell­
ish genii and phantom goblins ••••• we connect the pro­
creation of oan with a bad conscience." lO
) 
Depreciation of the sexual life by the oon­
cept. 1 impure 1 is a orine against the Holy Spirit of 
Life. The need for redemption ste:mming from a fee1-
in& of sin is a sign of a decadent cu1ture. Al.so, 
the Christian recognition that all men are equal. 
before God••••••••• 49/ ••• 
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before God thwarts the principle of selection. It is 
unnaturaJ. to regard the sickoan (the Christian) to 
be of the sane value as the healthy one (the pagan) 
or even that· the sick man has a higher value. 
So, Nietzsche sees every aspect of Christian�
ity as anti-ou.ltural. It prizes everything that 
should be rejected - the oondeoned, the leprous, the 
sinners, the outcasts. Culture is deprived of its 
clean conscience by the profanation of all higher 
creative values. The Christian •truth', hostile to 
life, has exposed man to the danger of perishing. 
But in the •death of God' Nietzsche sees the possib­
ility of a new creative freedon for oa:n. 'God' had 
destroyed oan•s nature and dignity. His 'death' 
neant that nan could surraount hinself towards the 
goal of Supernan. But this could only be achieved 
on the basis of radical atheiso, not on a sen:l­
Christian foundation• 
The entire Christian oorality built on faith 
in God oust be elininated. This will be a disaster 
for culture since there will be nothing left of value 
to nan but it oould also be a.blessing sinoe it cou1d 
lead to the creation of a new, nore realistio culture. 
The higher oan can begin his search for new knowledge. 
"Perhaps man will rise ever higher fron the tine when 
he no longer flows away into a.god•" ll
)
Nietzsche saw morality, Christian or any other 
as being ininical to culture. Morality is an illness 
afflicting Europe. Every sphere of culture has been 
dominated by moral values which are opposed to the 
fundanental instincts of Life. "Morality is the life 
denying instinct. Morality must be annhilated if 
life is to be ena.ncipated. " 12
)
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Morality is no more than obedience to custom 
and tradition. That is why it perverts man's real. 
nature which ac�epts morality out of laziness or cow­
ardice or fanaticism or resignation - none of which 
should be a guide to action. The authority of mora­
lity undermines man's independent thinking faculty. 
The higher man will depend on his ovvn will, not on 
moral precepts. That is why morality is useful to 
, the mediocre, the weak and the lowly. 
Europea.� morality is one of sympathyt pity
sacrifice, living for others. Schopenhauer and J.s.
Mill played a prominent role in popularising pity as 
the basis of action 9 But sympathy degrades mru1. 
"He is in distress and strai.ghtway the 'conpassionate• 
ones come to him a.'1.d depict his misfortune to him. At 
l,ast they go awa�r again
?-
satisfied and elated, after 
having gloated over the unhappy man's misfortune and 
their ovvn, and spent a pleasant Sunday afternoon." 13)
In the oora1i ty of syr ..1pathy Nietzsche sees a 
£lllY dangerous aspects, but this is to rob it of all 
meaning. The proud mar� allows himself no pity or 
sympathy for others,.. Pity is a weakness, detrimental 
to th� well constituted nan who says 1 yea' to life. 
Pity is really a perverted will to power since the 
weak feel pleasure and superiority when others exhibit 
pity for them.. Nietzsche writes : 
"•••••••in.this very instinct I saw the great danger 
of mankind, its most sublime temptation and seduction 
••••••••in.these very.instincts I saw the beginning 
of the end, stability, the exhaustion that gazes back­
wards, the will turning .§:!lainst life, the last illness 
annowicing itself with its ovm mincing melancholy. I 
realised that the morality of p.i ty which spread wider 
and wider��•••••••••51/ ••• 
and wider, and whose grip infected even philosophers 
with its disease, was the bost sirµ.ster symptom ot
our modern European civilisation."· 14)
The morality of Eu.rope is that of he�, 
Such mediocre nen seek to naintain a decadent uncreat­
ive life,distrusting all exceptional. nen ae da.nr,erou.s. 
The moral.standards of.the weak are modesty, pity, 
obedience, resignation, peacefulness. Morality has 
replaced the aristocratic values, vital to. culture� 
with a desire for "the distorted,the dwarfed, the 
stunted, the envenomed�" 15) The •r.iasters' have
been done away with and the morality of the vulgar 
oan has triumphed. Yet men call their lives blessed. 
The valuation of deolinin&, feeble, exhausted men is 
posited as primary. Nietzsche laughs at this 
"artificial hoisting up of a small species of nan to 
the position of an absolute standard of things." 16)
The result is that man has been civilised and
domesticated to a dangerous level. Morality has led
to the decline of vitality, to a senile existence. 
By elevating the claims of the weak, morality has
thwarted the claims of.life. Its Socratic spirit, its 
concern with happiness and virtue, is an expression 
of decadence. It is preventing Nature's efforts to 
arrive at a higher type of man. Instead of promoting 
life and cul�e it destroys the�e• Its injunction 
that men should prefer the good and shun the evi1 :ls 
life.denying since "in al.l its instincts life has 
both yea and nay-�" By sanctifying errors as truthst 
morality has 1ed maii astrai. 
With the death of God;morality stands in self. 
contradiction since the divine sanction for mora1 
values has disappeared• 
Once morality••• •••• 52/ •• ;;
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Once morality- had postulated man•s goal •• Now he must 
create a new c.eaning for himself mid reality. He must 
create new values which will be life promoting. These 
values must be evaluated according to life� according 
to their tendency to foster the feeling of increased 
power. Moral systems must recognise that the values 
of the herd cannot be applied to the higher men •. 
These.men, whom society condemns as cursed, evil� im­
moral, are really its most valuable aspect since they 
will create the new level of existence. The mediocre 
man can have his mediocre morality but must not aspire 
to a position of supremacy. ''My philosophy aims at 
a new order of rank ••••• The spirit of the herd should 
rule within the herd but not beyond it: The l.eaders 
of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation 
for their actions. n l7) Everything which morality had 
condemned out of fear.and resentment - the passions, 
power, strength, will, danger, etc now come into their 
own. 
Nietzsche greatly adoired a proper scientific 
spirit. He saw that it could prove valuable in quest­
ioning the conviutions of those.in authority and in 
this way break through to truth. It can assist man 
to gain control over emotional sensations that Christ­
ianity has induced. "Soience cakes us somewhat colder 
and more sceptical, and in particular cools tha faith 
in final and absolute truths. tl 18)
But� unfortunately, the manner in which man 
pursues scientific study.is corroding and poisoni.n8 
life� "Life is ilise�sedt thanks to this dehur.ianised 
piece of olookwork and mechanism •••••••• The object 
whioh is culture is lost sight of: modern scientific 
activity as a means thereto simply produces barbarism."19) 
Scientific lmowledge cannot give knowledge of being, 
only of ••••••• 53/•••••• 
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only ot particul.ars� Sinoe there are other kinds ot 
knowledge, science cannot c1aim to be an end in itselt. 
The goal. ot science is to create the most 
pleasure possible to man and the least possible pain. 
Bu.t, Niet�sohe states� pain and pleasure cannot be 
separated� He who wants the greatest amount of the 
one must also want the greatest amount of the other. 
By minimising all pain science depreciates man's 
capacity for enjoyment. Science is harmful to oulture 
since it regards problems of pain and suffering as 
alien to her world.· Man places great store by scient­
ific lmowledge. Morgan writes: "The theoretio man 
pursues truth in the delusion that reality can be 
fathomed and even purged of evil by rationa.J. thOU8ht 
and its applications." 20) Nietzsohe believed that
reality is irrational. and cannot be fathomed. 
Soientifio optimism is only leading man into 
greater alienation. It satisfies man's longing for 
certainty, for stability. In this way it is a refuge 
for the weak, "a hiding place for every kind of 
cowardice•" It has become a se1f - anaesthetic:,• 
hiding the fact that man has no clear ideal.. The 
subdivisions of scianoe are dealt with purely in
relation to themselves. Their relation to life, to. 
culture, is not examined. Man onJ.y seeke knowledge, 
nothing be;y-ond it� The individual, when subjected to
the enormous range of science, becomes fragmentary 
instead of being enriched. 
Science assists the metapeysioal belief 
that this world is one of appearance, a representation 
of the •real world•. But what other world is there? 
The •real world' (which suggests that this one is 
dishonest) since it depreciates the value of this 
world••••••••••• 54/ •• 
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world is dangerous to Life� The road to genuine 
scientific lmowledge is blocked by belief in the 
•real world'. Ideally, science should confirm and
support the highest and profoundest con.ception -
which is saying yea to Life, t�e Dionysian attitude.
As far as Darwinism is concerned, Nietzsche 
accepted its fundamental implications - that man has 
evolved from animals in a purely naturalistic wey 
through change and accident. There is nothing out-
side the world (God) directing man's progress. But 
evolution is not mere adaptation to external circum­
stances. This is no more than a second class activity 
which does not take into account the real essence of 
life which is its will to power. The theory of adapt­
ation negates the idea of true creative activity. 
The struggle for power more than the pressure of 
environment, the desire to be master, rather than for 
self preservation shapes man•s life. "Tlie influence 
of envirohment is nonsensically overrated in Darwin& 
The essential factor in the process of life is 
precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and to 
create forms, which merely uses, exploits environment. 021 )
Nietzsche did not accept the argument of the 
•survival of the fittest' either. In the struggle
for existence the weaker creature does not always
perish, so that there is an increase in the perfection
of creatures. The weak survive because of their
larger .npnbers and their craftiness. The will to
power of the mass overwhelms the exceptional man.
Real evolutionary progress will consist in the fact 
that the mass of humanity is sacrificed for the 
higher men. The goal of evolution must be the 
production of the highest specimens of humanity­
Superman. '*Conclusion concerning the evolution of man: 
the road to perfection lies in the bringing forth of 
the most ••••••••• 55/ •• 
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the most powerful individuals, for whose use the great 
masses would be converted into mere tools." 22) 
The various sooiologioal and political. ids 
-
in which man has sought refuge, Nietzsche sees as 
having resulted in the •mediocritisation• of cul.ture. 
He sees no hope for man in.dernocraoy, socialism, nat­
ionalism and state worship� The steady democratisation 
of Europe disgusted hin. He saw in it the great lev­
ell.er of quality� "Decocraoy represents the disbelie� 
in all great men alld in a1l elite societies: every-body 
is everybody-•s equal. At bottom we are al.l herd and. 
mob." 23) European demooraoy, by equating the lazy,
the weak and the exhausted with the strong, has led 
to the decline of culture. The will to power is under­
mined and mankind is transforoed into cattle. Modern 
politics has been diseased bj' the belief in the 
equality of al.l men. 
Socialism, like decocracy, is another attempt 
to transfer the Ohristia.n ideal of heaven to earth. 
It ignores the basio inequality of man and will result 
in the perpetuation of mediocrity. Nietzsche writesi 
"I do not Wish to be confounded with these pi-ea.chers 
of equality• For within ae justice saith z 'Men are 
not equat• ••••• we wish to possess nothing in cotmon."24)
Socialism is anti-biological in that it doesn't recog­
nise the inequalities in Nature and in its denial of 
the desire to have raore,which is f'undanental to Life. 
It deraands a comfortable life for the greatest number 
of people. If such a state were reached the groU114 
out of which superior intellects could energe would 
be destroyed. Mankind would be too indolent to be 
capable of producing men of genius. Men should desire 
rather that•••••••• 56/•••• 
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rather that Life retain its.wild foroes and energies
so that men of genius could, by sublicating these 
forces, live creatively.· The Socialist utopia ie fi� 
only for·wear:, men. "I ar.i opposed to Socialism. be­
cause it dreams ir1geniously of 'goodness, truth, beauty 
and equal. rights•. (anarchy pursues the same ideal. bu.t 
in a more ideal fashion." 25)
Nationalism� like socialism, is motivated by 
envy, laziness and hate for higher individuals who 
do not allow themselves to be drawn into the herd for 
a collective effort• Nietesche contemptuously defines 
a nation as consisting of "men who speak one laJ16U.868 
and read the sat1e newspaper.• 26) By insisting on
belonging to a particu1ar nation men lose the breadth 
of vision which enables them to grasp the values � 
culture. 
State idolatry is equally anti-oul.tural.. When. 
man dissipates his reason and will in the interests of 
the state he has no.interest in a broader culture. He 
writes : . "The state, I oall it, where all are poison 
drinkers, the good and the baa. .. , The state where all 
lose themselves, the good and the bads the state, where 
the slow suicide of all - is called 'life•" 2'1) Tha 
state breeds conformity by quelling all individual asp. 
irations. ''Everything that a man does_ in the service 
ot the state is against his own nature." 28)·
Above petty nationalistic ooncerns Nietzsche
visualises a •united Europe• • The •European• man must 
aoerge :troo the vat-ioue nationa1i ties • In hit1 will be 
embodied the perfection of culture�. When God was 
alive aJ.l. men were equal before him; And so demooraor, 
socialism and other humanitarian theories flourished. 
Bu.t now that God is dead the highet men will not be 
equal. to the herd men. The aristocracy of the su.pe;-­
men nu.st guide the masses in a more reaJ.istio society. 
Nietzsche•••••� 57/ ••••• 
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Nietzsche was ot the opinion that the above oultu.lial 
trend.a point only 1n one direction• to Nihilism�- It 
is not only the • death of God• , the collapse of the 
Christian Wal tansoAA:'!9PB; which has preoipi tated man 
into this cu.1 tural. Nihil.ism� Even the values which 
seek to replace Christianity are degrading. ill. the 
cultural. values that constitute the nineteenth century 
consciousness have driven man into this orisis of 
culture. The goals and values towards which man moves 
in bis cultural. activities are no longer suited to hie 
needs. The result is cul.tural. decomposition. Nihilism 
ha.a triumphed over culture. ''What does Nihilism. mfilan? 
- that the highest values a.re losing their value.
There is no bourne. There is no answer to the question
- •to. what purpose?'" 29) Man lacks purpose, tru.th,
goals, unity. The pessiIJi.em of Schopenhauer's philo­
sophy' is a symptom of this nihilism (not a solution 
to it); 
The 'death of God' - the loss of a.11 effective. 
belief in God, began man•e journey towards uncertainty, 
nothingness, towards nihilism. The Christian urge to 
ultimate truth led to its own downfall. Man was driven 
to a realisation of the falsity of the Christian inter­
pretation of reality. This loss of faith resulted in 
the inability of man to live and act oeaningfully. The 
result was an escape into various equally nihilistic 
directions - commerce, scientism, romanticism. (W86,118r), 
historicism (Hegel, Comte), democracy and socialism� 
hucanita.rianism which was no more than a degenerate 
Christianity. But all these •solutions• seemed to 
Nietzsche to be II but temporary veils over an u.l timate 
conviction of the worthlessness of existence�" 30
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The soul. of nineteenth century cul.tu.re was oor.1r1et0e.
The products of artists, thinkers, scholars� philos­
ophers, statesmen were all valued 1n comr.iaroial terms.· 
What was once done for the love of God is now done for 
love of money. That is why, despite the optimism. and 
prosperity in nineteenth century Europe, culture was 
spiritually sterile. Scientific optimism was replao­
ing the.traditional confidence in religion; But 
science, like democracy and other offshoots of Ohrist­
ianity, promised no adequate goal. for living, oncy the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
Nietzsche is nauseated by modern man. OUlture 
is suffering from •man• who is no more than a misei­
able worm. Nihilism is due to the faot that the "tame 
man, the wretched� mediocre and unedifying creature 
has learnt to consider himself a goal and a pinnacle, 
an inner meaning� an historic principle, a higher 
man�" 31) 
Men who lack the Dionysian spirit,value the 
world according to their mediocre standards� The 
herd.man ovei-values himself in cosmic terms, the result 
being a vulgarisation of life and culture� The higher
species of mania lacking, who could enrich life with 
his ab1mdant power. SUbsequently, the cul tu.re . of
Europe has the air of a madhouse.or a hospital� "The 
siok are the great danger of mant not the evil••••••• 
They who are.botched, oppressed, broken, those are 
they • •·• ••••• who most undermine the life beneath the 
feet of man�·" 32) These •sick' men evade the real. 
needs of man-in terms of will to power, by shunning 
the stronger, more masterful instincts. Man must be 
freed from his chains - "the ponderous and signifi­
cant errors of moral� religious and meta.physioa1 
ideas; Only when the disease of chains is overcome 
is the first .• •••••••• 59/ � •• 
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is the first great.goal reaohed • the separation of 
man from the brute." 33) 
Nietzsche warned against the nihiliSI!l of the 
culture philistines� Their smugness and contentment 
threatened the elevation of man as well as the creat­
ion of a vital. culture which Nietzsche defined as 0a 
harmony of living,' thinking, appearing and willing•
or as "the unity of artistic style in every expression 
of the life of a people� u 34) 
The culture philistine is the opposite of the 
gemrl.ne man of culture• . His • mil ture • is really bar­
ba.ri ty � masking an ugly mediocre existence• Nietzsche 
once regarded Wagner as the Dionysian can who couJ.d 
1ead man away from the oUlturaJ. decadence but later 
discovered that Wagner's music was. a symptom of the 
declining culture and not evidence of a regeneration 
of culture·; 
But if Nietzsche was deeply disturbed at the 
nihilism of nineteenth century Europe, he also saw in 
it the possibility of an awareness of the need for 
new values. Its extrecism could emphasize the need 
for a new condition of existence for nan. L�with 
writes : "Nihilism as such can have two meanings 
it can be a Syt!lptom of finaJ. and.complete downfall 
• • 
and aversion to existencej but it can also be a.first
symptom of recovery and a new will to existence�" 35) 
The paralysis of existing cuJ.ture coul.d point 
in the direction of a hew culture of self�transcendenoe; 
the kind of culture that will promote j;he development 
of a higher species of Ma.rt� The fW1ction of cul.tu.re 
will point, to the developoent of the highest species 
of humanity. 
The way out.••.• •• • .60/ •• �.
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The way out of the nihilism and alienation, 
which have enveloped man� towards a more authentio 
form of existence is the recognition that the basic 
motive in life is the will to power: "Wherever .I 
found a living thing, there found I Will to Power�" 36)
The will to power is the integrating principle of 
life and culture• Aey-thing which. increases the will 
to power is judged to be valuable� All that is good 
involves the constant affircation of the will and an 
increase in its power: "I value a man according to 
the quantum of power and fullness of his will�" 37)
This principle is applicable to every aspect 
of human life� Man's conception of reality is the 
outcome of his will to power. The unfamiliarity and 
comstant change in the world lead man to interpret 
facts;.schematise things in such a way that he feels 
secure. Man•s will to power creates the impression 
of Being out of Becoming. But this is a perversion 
of the will to power. Man must accept the 
reality of the world - change, evolution, contrast,
contradiction� becoming - and live creatively' guided 
by their will to power. 
With regard to truth Nietzsche declares that 
the criterion of.truth lies in the enhancement of the 
feeling of power. Similarly� happiness ie also. 
derived from an increase in the feeling of power.­
Every degree of power leads to the elevation of man. 
Nietzsche raa.kes it clear that there is no such entity 
as the will� e�g�� a foroe emanating from tha body.­
Willing is simply the act of coIJinMding� the act of 
overcoming onese1f; 
He did not deny that the will to power was a
dangerous force. Its value lies in its being 
controlled,••••••• 61/ •• � 
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controlled; sublimated into.creativity� Only man can 
desire mastery over himself� And that which demands 
the greatest power is the mastery of onesel.:f. By­
means of the will. to power man can aim at the . over­
coming of himself, at the transcendence of man; "Man 
is a rope tiea between beast and Superman - a rope 
over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is 
a bridge and not a goal •••• �Behold, I teach you the 
Superman •' The Superman is the ceaning of the earth•· 
Let your will say : The Superman shall be the mean­
ing of the earth�" 38) 
In this way the will to power becomes the 
driving cultural factor in that it prepares the wa:y 
for the creation of Superman - the man who is "strong 
eJ1.ough for freedom, who can allow himself. every liberty 
because he has his passions under control, who is master 
of his life and not its victim, and. who� because joy 
consists in the exercise of one's will to power, enjoys 
life and subsequently affirms it." 39) 
Superman is a.person who has orga.ni_sed the 
chaos of his passions, integrated them into a harmon­
ious whole and thus achieved mastery over himsel:f and 
nature. He has given style to his life and so has 
become creative. This is the new goal of man. To 
raise himself above the senselessness of existence; 
man must surpass hinself. He must be valued il'l a
new way - according to the degree of power he possesses. 
In this way he will become lord of the e�th and take 
the place of God� Man must be recreated in his own 
image., 
Since there is no God• no purpose, �o - goal·� 
man must fix his own goal and work towards it. And . 
this goal is superman..;. the transcending and pe�feot..:. 
ing of ma.n; whom Nietzsche calls "this man of the 
fu:ture. who.• ••••• • 62/ ••·• 
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future who will redeem us from the old ideal., as he 
will from that ideal's necessary corollary of. great 
nausea., will to nothingness and Nihilisn •••••••who 
gives back to the world its goal atld. to man his hope, 
this Anti-Christ and·.Anti-Nihilist� this conqueror of 
God and of Nothingness.·,. 40)
Tha Supercan with his overflowing spirit and 
fullness of bodily vigour possesses a great healthiness 
which enables him to feel the joy of life. His nature, 
disciplined spirit is wiafraid to follow a path of 
danger and strife - a proud man on an ascending path 
of Life� These men in whot:1 there is " The union of 
intellectual. superiority with well•being and an over­
flow of strength," 41) are the causes of all. great
movements. Since a trenend.ous amount of power is 
concentrated in them. they alone a.re necessary for a 
vital culture� The rest of mankind; the masses, forn 
the foundation on which the culture of.Supercan.rests. 
Handicraft, conmerce, art, agriculture, science, all 
professional and business oallitlgs are to be under­
taken by this foundation-of medioore men.
So mediocre men are not to be coapletel.y- eli­
minated from society. On the contrary, they must live 
for the good of the more vaJ.uable man. In this way 
I:lall aids Nature in the production of genius and al.so 
enters 'the circle of cu1 ture' ; The Supermen will 
stand above the masses as their leaders and lawgivers. 
superman dares to live.in a world purged of 
morality�·beyond good. and evil. To hiD what is good 
ia that which inol'ea�es the feeling of power; what 
is bad is that which stems from weakness� This is 
the foundation of the new system of valuation. It is 
with this principle.that the Superoan effects a trans­
valuation of values• Nietzsche offers a transvaluation 
as a formu:J.a •• •••••••• 63/ �••' 
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as a formula for ':'mankind's greatest step towards com-­
ing to its senses." 
Transva1uation involves a repudiation of the 
type.of man now regarda:ti as the highest - the good, 
kind, oompassionate man. His vaJ.uations are incom­
patible with ascending life, since reaJ.ity does not 
always constitute beneficent instincts. The new 
values are judged according to their relation to life. 
Loyalty to life woul.d thus exclude any supernatural.; 
idealistic values. ''Reoain true to the earth, _my 
brethren, with the power of your virtue •' Let your 
bestowing love and knowledge be devoted to the mean­
ing of the earth�" 42) This world is the highest
ideal. possibl.e c
Since life is will to power, all val.ua pers­
pectives are oeasured according to the standard of 
power. All other motives lead only to weakness and 
decadence. The result of the new valuation wili be 
a Dionysian attitude to Life. Nietzsche uses the tert1 
•Dioeysian• to describe a synthesis of Dionysian and
Apollinian qualities; The Dionysian is the explosive
ungoverned force of creation, whereas the Apollinian
is the power of sel.f.restraint and serenity� The one
is the will to power, the other the aublit1ation of it.,
A synthesis of the two is ideal. for culture since 
creative energy is controlled and redirected. 
It is the Dionysian man who will shape the 
future culture� Such a man is not afraid.to
reality in spite of its terrors and pains. 
face 
He lives 
by "a formula of highest affirmation ••••• a yeasaying 
without reserve to suffering's seJ.f, to gu.ilt1 s self, 
to all.that is queetionabJ.e and strange in existence 
itself. This final cheerfullest, exuberantly mad 
and merriest •••• ••• 64/ .-,: •. 
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and merriest Yea to life is not only the highest in­
sight, it is also the deepest� it is that whioh is 
nost vigorousl.y oonf"iroed and upheld by truth and 
science." 43) 
The weak oan's desire to seek only after haP­
piness is replaced by a Dionysian strength that w111• 
ingly accepts the whole of reality. By this accept-. 
a.nee of his fate nan is on the road to a higher life.' 
"My forcu.la for greatness in nan is aoor fat:i;_. 
The fact that a nan wishes n&thing to be different� 
neither in front of him, or behind him or for all 
etel:"ni ty." 44) Rea.ued from nihillen, the wey is now
open for meaningful oul.tura1 activity-. 
The Superoen - "that new party of life -
advocates" undertake the destruction of all. degenerate
values and create a new systen which will elevate and 
perfect aan. They reJeot the belief that God directs
the fate of the world, and in investigating the 
conditions of a higher culture, they adopt new aios 
enbracing the whole earth. Whereas previously,can 
had developed unconsoiously, he can now consciously 
create.a new culture which will l.ead to the elevation 
of nan. 
The new direction lies in the enancipation of 
nan froo the.existing morality of altruisra, self -
renunciation, towards a trust in all that which has 
up to now been forlidden� damned and despised. 
Man realises that there are no more sins in 
the metaphysical. sense and also no virtues� His 
perspectives are the creation of his own valuing 
oind.; Since it is nan Who orea.tee and values his 
worl.d - this is an indication ot what lies in the 
power of the human will to create• What Nietzsche 
desires is to give man a. clean oohsoience about the 
use of his •• •.• •• ••· 65/. •· 
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uee of his will to power. Instead ot attributing :Lt 
to God he must aocept it as his own� With this new 
innooenoe and faith in the will to powel'.man.oan oreata 
a better world� Since there is no oausality� no 
ete1.'ll8l. deeign; life is rendered innocent and the 
individual. is free to aot. . By thtls denying God man
saves hie.self� the world� 
The question of what is valuable ,takes a naw 
direction� Anything is of value ;".t 1 t p:ronote a the 
highest foro of human life on earth.; the Dioeysi� 
The world is neither good (optioien) nor bad (pessicisn) 
Good and ev11; moral.. and inmoraJ. are measured in terms 
of the will to power. "All emotions are traced to a 
single will, the will to power� and are oa.lled essent­
ially equal. The oonoep; of life s in the apparent 
antithesis good and evil; degrees of power in the 
instincts alone are eXpressed� "45) Onoe raan realises 
this, he is freed from the oonoepts of reward� punish­
ment, guilt, sin, eto,and can now live creatively with 
a clean conscience. Worldly justioe,instead of pro­
ceeding frora the gu.11 t of t1an, cust now prooeed from 
his.innocence. He must adopt the Greek attitude to 
nan. "ill in man that has power they called divine�
and wrote it on the walls of their heaven." 46)
The ego must oone into its own. Religion and 
morality had endeavoured to suppress it by stipulating
that man should aot for the benefit ot others. Bt\t 
"No man ever did a thing which.was done for others 
without any personal. motives how should he be able 
to do anything which had no relation to hin.seif.� •• 
How could the ego act without egof ri 47) Man must 
rather devote himself to his own personality and his 
own highest good instead of sacrificing himself to 
the state�••·••••• 66/•••• 
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the state, the eoience or to his neill}lbour. When man 
centres hie will on sooething else� he has no reason 
to exists "Strong ages and.noble oultures see some­
thing oontemptible in pity, in the 'love of one•s 
neighbour� and in a lack o:f egoisn and self esteem -
Agee should be measured according to their positive
forces�" 48)
In the transvaluation Nietzsche re-establishes 
what he calls the order of rank. The higher rank of 
nan is the type which represents ascending life� the 
lower is the type which represents dee� and weakness. 
The purpose before nan is to assist the higher species 
to oorJ.e into being. The concept of equality had so far 
prevented this. The higher oen rm.st declare war on 
the masses. They must strengthen the strong and destroy 
the wear,. The growing self-sacrifioe of everybody- is 
of no value since. it has no purpose. In fact it is 
a collective loss. But the exploitation of mankind 
would have sooe aeaning, if it is in the interests of 
the higher men, the aristocracy - for the highly 
gifted in intellect and will. 
Philosophers L1Ust describe the order of rank 
and the �ifferenoe of values between men, the reverse 
of the equalisation of cen. Their task is to discover 
to what extent nan can elevate hioself� how far his 
powers extend. In doing so they r.iust not shirk an 
exanination of the repulsive and atrocious aspects 
of existence1 In this way; living by the Dionysian 
:foroula of anor fati; the philosophers beoone the 
creators and lawgivers of the new values. 
The Supernan no longer regards his natural 
instincts with an • evil eye• . and associates then 
with a bad oonsoience. Life; instinct, passion as 
opposed to• •• •. • • • • • 67 / • • •' 
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opposed to intellectua1 theorising, are seen to be core 
valuable for culture� Freed fron a repressive norality; 
nan oan elevate himself to his highest glory� The pass­
ions au.st be liberated. Nietzsche sees that the cight­
iest passions are the cost.valuable since they are the 
' 
strongest sources of power. Man oust do□inate 82'ld util-
ise the passions, not extirpate thee.- The great r.ian is 
ope who ho.a full con-!::::-.):;_ ov·or his passions. By discipl-
�J. 
ining hiI:lself in this wa:y raan gives style to his life. 
Culture depends on the style that man gives to 
life; "To give style to one's character - that is a. 
grand and rare art • He who surveys all that his 
nature presents in its strength and weakness and then 
fashions it into an ingenious plan until everything 
appears artistic and rational - exercises that ad.Dir-­
able art�" 49) Thus the sublination of passion is the 
source of the highest cultura1 va1ues� The greater the 
passions of an age or people, the higher their culture. 
The passions - pride, happiness� health, strong will to 
power, discipline, gratitude to earth - all say yea to 
life; To attaok then is to destroy life at its source. 
The Dionysian oen, fu.l.l of overflowing vitality, 
are not afraid to face the fearful thought or deed. 
Nor is their life a mere search for happiness and 
security. They rejoice in danger, war, adventure, 
conquest. Nietzsche urges:" Build your cities on 
• 
the slope of Vesuvius•; Send your ships into unexpl-
ored seas. Live in war with your equals and with your­
selves." 5o) Only then do oen live creatively, accept­
ing will to power as the Vi taJ. pt-inoiple of life •. 
Their hcro:to spir l t enn,'.JJ.es thGrl to accept pain toget­
her with joy� Pain is part of the will to Becoming, 
growth; orea-tion.- "The highest state of Yea,-saylllB 
to existence • •• •• -•• 68/ •• �: 
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to existence is conceived as one fron which the great­
est oay not be excluded - the tragico - Dioeysian 
state�" 51)
The Dionysian attitude enables can to.accept 
the fact that the world is ceaseless becor.iing� How­
ever� every thing becooes and returns e.n infinite 
nuober of tioes. This is the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence with which Nietzsche replaced the fomer 
oetaphysics� He believed that: "Everything goeth; 
everything returneth, eternally rolleth the wheel o� 
existence� :_Everything dieth� everything blosaooeth
forth again." 52)
If the world was ooving towards a goal.. or a 
final. state, it would have been reached by.now. The 
universe has a definite quantity o-r ebergy; It oust 
therefore go through a calculable nunber of combinat­
ions� In infinity every possible oorabination mu.at 
have been realised an infinite nuober of ti□es;- Since 
Nietzsche rules out the existence of God (who eould 
provide endless variety) the universe oust be a, oiro­
ular oovenent repeating itself an infinite nunber of 
tir:lee - a ''Dionysian world of eternal. self creation, 
of eternal self.destruction�" The universe is with­
out a.in or will• 
However the senselessness of eXiatenoe did not 
drive Niettsohe to despair. He saw it as a ground 
for oan•s freedon� Man can fix his own goal ar.d.d the 
eternal. recurrence of things. He au.st live according 
to what he believes is . his highest value and gi v-es 
h1t1 greatest happiness. "Live so that thou I..1a¥est 
desire to live again - that is thy duty - for in 
any case "thou Wilt live again�" 53) Only the cost
exuberant, life - affiroing nan cah desire to live 
in such a wa::,. 
The consequence••••• 69/ •·••' 
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The consequence of the realisation that every­
thing - eood or boo, joy or sorrow - return everlnet� 
ingly, can crush a oan unless he oan attain to soce 
supreme oooent of existence for the sake of which he 
would be willing to relive his whole life. He would 
not cind the evil and pain in his life since they were 
necessary for the achievenent of this one oooent� The 
sensation of joy, which cones froo the increase of pow­
er, is the greatest advocate in favour of eternal rec- .. 
urrence for joy desires "the eternity of all things.�·••••' 
deep profound eternity�" 54)
The doctrine of eternal recurrence stens froc 
Nietzsche's desire to see this world as it had to be 
seen for oan to live creatively - as acceptable. Love 
of the fate which returns everlastingly enables nan to 
live oeaningfully since the universe is endless beoon­
ing and there is no other world to which nan can aspire. 
I have tried to show how Nietzsche rejeoted 
every aspect of nineteenth century cul.ture as leading 
c.an into f a.lse avenues which only deepened his · selt­
alienation. To replace the culture he rejected with
a core vital one - one that was in conforoity with the 
deraands of reality - Nietzsche proposed a revolution 
in human thought and action. 
The recognition that life is will to power 
finds expression in the Superoan who alone affiros 
life as will to power. This new pattern for linng 
deoands a transva1uation of the existing values, a 
transvaluation which is effected by the Superoa.n. 
The transvaluation involves the acceptance of the 
eternaJ. recurrence of things within which oan posits 
his own goal and works creatively towards it. 
In this way•••••••• 70/ ••• 
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In this wa:y Nietzsohe proposes to lead nan 
out of tho lllienation and nih:l.11en 1n �ieh nine­
teenth century- culture had resulted� By the revival 
of can•s creative urge on life's Dionysian basis• 
Nietzsche hoped that □an.would set about to form a 
new positive aulture and, in the performance of this 
creative task, return to an authentic foro of life. 
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In the previous chapter we saw Nietzsche as a 
. . 
superb diagnostician, probing culture with a view to 
elirainating all.that was diseased and life - destroy• 
ing, and offering, as a cure, Superr.mn and his glori­
ous culture. Nietzsche as a prophet is equally 113-
UIJinating. His penetrating analysis of nineteenth 
century cu1tural trends l.ed hira to ppophesy wide­
spread catastrophe if can continued along the same 
path he had been following up to now• He bad warned 
against the growing nationalism and the even graver 
danger of racism joining forces with nationalism� He 
had foreseen the danger of extrece nationalism and 
the danger also of abeolutising science as a solution 
to all human problens. 
In a sense, then� the two world wars oan be 
seen as a horrible materialisation of Nietzsohe•s
prediction of cultural disaster. The wars shattered 
can's oonfidenoe in his ability.to live in a rational., 
neaningfu1 way• The result was, that nen easily 
drifted into various abstractions which relieved him 
of the responsibility of making meaningful deoisions 
and com� to grips with the problem of tru.th and· 
reality• The new century.was one that enbraoei the 
greatest number of people, the greatest technioaJ. 
control over nature as well as the greatest number 
of theories of truth the wor1d has ever known. BU.t 
there was no oe�tre• no fooal point around. whioh a 
oultura oould develop as a meaningful �efiection of, 
reality'- w.B. Yeats wrote s 
Things fa11 apartJ the centre oannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. i) 
In these lines.••••• 75/' ••,
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In these lines.he expressed the concern of philosophers; 
poets, artists; etc�, - man•s dreadful. alienation; the 
absence.of a core of meaning to which he could attach 
himself. 
Even the lure of science had paJ.ed. Disciples 
of the cult of scientism lost their belief in science 
as the key to salvation. They were too well acquainted 
with the horrors of war that science had made possible. 
After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, men oame
to appreciate science as a.power for great evil and 
misery as well as for good. The nat'vet� of men who 
had seen in scienoe the benevolent creator of a 
fabulous Utopia where all confliots would oease, 
was shattered for ever. Freud wrote,. "Soienoe hersel:f 
has lost her passionless impartiality�" 2)
As far as democracy was concerned, Nietzsche 
had emphasized the inadequacies of demooratio libera.1-
ism and expressed his fears about mass culture. Men 
like J.S.Mill and de Tocqueville were also to .voice 
their concern over.the tyranny of the majority. 
Carltle and Ruskin, for instance, were disturbed 
about the ugliness and bad taste which the masses did
not seem to mind.� Contemporary fears about maohine­
mad.e mass culture echo Nietzsche's own thoughts on 
the matter. 
Among many others, Grisebach; Camus and 
Kafka concerned themselves with the problem of 
meaningfulness in the modern age• Grlsebach� for 
instance, maintained that the various •truths' offer-
ed to man served oniy to divorce him from x-eal exist­
ence. "In all these cases, he (man) would be estranged 
from real experience and wou1d be neatly and ingeniously 
blended into some absolute, which represented nothing 
but the making of his own self absolute, so that by 
the construction ••••• 76/� •• 
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the c�nstru.otion of all these various methods, he reaJ.l.1 
kept moving within the circle of the sel:t." 3J 
Albert Camus saw the twentieth oentury as an age 
of ideologies, all seeking absoluteness. Man's penchant 
for living by absolutised ideologies has perverted his 
judgement to suoh an extent that he now uses reason to 
justify crime, murder, bloodshed a.rid -violence. Crine 
takes on the air of rationalit¥ and innocence. -Man ha4 
accepted Nietzsche's pronouncement about the death of 
God. But having escaped from God's prison, nan lands
in another - the self constructed prison of history and 
reason; 4) The nihilisc which Nietzsche had exposed in 
the nineteenth century, Camus sees as still prevalent 
in the twentieth century. The enshrining of historio­
isc (Marxism) as the highest source of value oan lead 
only to servitude, terror and the world of the ooncen­
tration·oanp. 
Kafka's indiotoent of modern culture is convey.. 
ed oost vividly in hie novels The �rial and The Castle. 
Hie characters inhabit a world of absurdity not unlike 
the one Ca.cue visualised. The interninab1eness of 
these novels conveys vividly the tedious, abstract� 
cystifying nature of the kind of lives oen lead, the 
strange nyster:lous forc(?s in control, the anonyca to 
which cen have S\lrrendered their individual. raspohsi� 
. ' 
bilities, Modern life seened to be a reflection of 
the quality of life depioted in Kafka's novels. 
It beoane increasingly clear to □any that a 
way had to be found out of the confusions that had 
ulti.oate1y led nan to the two world wars. The second 
World War had intensified the division of th.a world 
into two ideological camps. It seeoed that on both 
sides, can was oonpletely iDOersed in ideology with 
no contact with reality. Men desired a re-areation 
o"f man •••• ,.•.•• 77/ • .~. 
of man and his Olil.ture in the light of a changed and 
still changing world. It was hoped that a more real­
istic evaluation of the nature'.of man could be arrived 
at. 
Heidegger, for instance; realised the aoute 
need for can to oreate himself anew and replace the 
cultural void with new values. In his philosophy he 
called for a re-thinking of m�•a situation, exhort­
ing man to free himself from the nihilistic We1tnacht 
and take responsibility for himself as a cultural 
being. 
In short, men sought a new abode, and it is 
in terms of this need for a new focnis of meaning that 
we will exacine a few contecpora.ry alternatives whioh 
offer themselves to man as roads to authentic existenoe. 
It is against the background of these alternatives that 
Marouee measures the cultural crisis of the twentieth 
century. He was to flirt_- with each of them before · 
working out his own outlook on the cultural crisis. 
The resu1t is that, like Nietzsche in his relationship 
with Marx, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, Marouse uti­
lises eleoents frOD eaoh of these cultural alternatives, 
although he rejects eaoh in its totality. 
We will now exaoine Neo-Poeitivisn, Soviet 
Marxism, Existentialiso and Freudian theory insofar
as these atteopted to resolve the probleo of authentio 
existende and to what extent, in Marouse•s eyes, they 
fail to provide oan with an ad.equate conception of 
culture. 
Neo,..positivism is a re-emergenc)e o! nineteenth 
oentury classical positivism� the fom of a purely 
desoriptive and functionalist1d theory, having been 
purged of the netaphyeioal (teleologioal) ioplioations 
of Comtea:n positiviso. Neo..positiviso seeks to overcome 
philosophical. •••••• 78/ •• 
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philosophical. and oul.turaJ. problems in terms ot a 
functionalistic soientism. This explains its olose 
alliance with scientific procodure and development. 
In aooordanoe with the soientifio spirit; it 
confines itself to the.question.h2!£. By dispensing 
with the_� question, neo-positivisc claims to have 
abolished philosophy as speculative theory. It holds 
that philosophy, in order to be meaningful and free 
of pseudo-probleos, must confine itself to desoription 
and analysis. Hence it mu.st be purged of all meta­
physical propositions, which are empirioally non­
verifiable. The doetrine of verification was oade 
famous by the logical positivists who saw in it "a 
way of eljo:1nating1 as meaningless, all referenoes 
to entities which are not accessible to observation."5) 
Metaphysics, then, could be dismissed ae 
nonsense. This links up with the ecphasis of the 
linguistic analysts on the therapeutio and oorreotive 
function of philosophy. They claio that philosophical 
probleos throughout the history of philosophy were due 
to the abuse of language, and their fundanental aio 
is to restrict philosophy to language issues. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein set the paoe for neo­
poaitvisc with his Tractatus Logioo-Philosophicus. 
Here he claioed that the world is a totality of facts 
or states of affairs. Knowledge, then, is no core 
than a copy of these facts. A sentence is literal],¥ 
a picture. "The proposition is a pioture of.reality •• 
• • • , a oodel of reality as we think ·it•'' 6) To sey
that a state of affairs is conceivable oeans that we 
can construct a picture of it, and consequently a 
proposition. 
By means of language raan becooes eobedded in 
the world and since this is so, he cannot reflect on 
it but ••••••••• 79/ ••• 
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it but merely record facts about the ecpirioal. world. 
If we do reflect on the world by oetaphysical. theori­
sihg, we estrange.ourselves frora the world and arrive 
at oock questions. tn fact, we make an illegitimate 
transgression into the realm of the ineffable. One 
cannot pass beyond the boundaries of language to ask 
metaphysical questions. SUoh a view affects the 
status of philosophyii "Philosophy is not a doctrine 
but an activity. A philosophical work consists ess­
entially of elucidations. The result of philosophy 
is not a nunber of 'philosophical propositions• but 
to make propositions clear." 7) It is sufficient in
order to live meaning.fully that can sioply records
his experience of the world. 
On the basis of the �-ril.ota1nm,; logical posi ti­
vista went on to develop a theory which holds that 
the laws of logic provide graI:1CaticaJ. rules which cake 
the data of sense experience oore meaningful. Carnap, 
for instance, stated the need for a meta.-lallgUage (a 
langaage about language) in order to determine the 
truth-condition of propositions. 
Linguistio analysis, based on ideas froc 
Wi ttgenetein' s Philosophical Inves,tigations denied 
even that philosophy could add to the scope of know-
-
ledge as theory. 
Bochenski had written of the logioaJ. positivist 
view of philosophy as consisting of metalogioal anaJ.y­
sis which "works out a system of.signs to signify the 
words of s�ientific lmowledge and so becomes capable 
of analysing the expressions of natural soienoe." S) 
Lingu.istio philosophers wish to restrict 
philosophy to the analysis of the uses and functions 
of language. Philosophic probleas are believed to 
arise from the •ordinary use' of words or deviations 
from it, •••••••• 80/ ••••
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from it, and can be solved ·by the correct usage ot
. 
. 
language. The task of philosophy, then, is to analyse 
and clarify empirical knowledge as it is contained in 
the functional relatio�s of language. Facts about 
language become the tools with which one· solves philo­
sophical problems. Great emphasis is placed on philo­
sophy as an essentially therapeutic activity designed 
to clarify the uses of_language. 
Ne o-posi ti viam, as we have seen, dispense a with 
all metaphysical questions (which a.re supposed to be 
devoid of meaning) and confines itself to description 
and analysis, thus abolishing philosophy as tradition­
ally understood. This new outlook on human truth, 
which was a reaction to the disappointment and frust­
ration in whioh idea1ist metaphysical systems had 
resulted, is essentially scientific and f'unotionalistic. 
Values which had previously been projected above as 
idea1s are now assioilated into the funotionalistio 
system and analysed as part of it. 
However, by dismissing metaphysical questions 
as leading to pseudo-problems, neopositivism has by 
no means •solved• the problems of life and culture. 
The problems of human existence are not all due to 
aberrations of language. Restricting �an to contro­
versy ,. free de·scription and analysis seems an attempt 
to find peace at any cost rather than make a genuine 
attempt to face up to human_ problems. 
As Gellrler says in Words and Things -- our 
philosophical problems, like the Soviet state, have 
not withered away• What is mo:re serious is that man! S 
alienation is deepened by nee-positivism in so far as 
all human action is viewed as just so many functional 
events. The reflective individual. subject is eliminated 
froo human experience and replaced by oan as the mere 
analyst of ••.••• • • 81/ • •. • · 
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analyst of functional relations between language•"••• 
the functionalistic method, which is applied by the 
sciences to the material ?,1orld in order to bring it 
under our oontrol••••••••is applied to hw:ian striving 
and action in general. By the mere propositional des­
cription of can's aots, by which their oeaningfu.l.ness 
or their truth character is to be deterained in oonfor­
mity with some underlying principle of verification, 
these acts are deprived.of their actual. existential 
basis••••••••••••The application of the propositional 
bethod to man's moral, aesthetic and religious feelings, 
values and views completely depersonalises him and 
converts him into a kind of anonyoous propositional 
conputer. n _9)
Exclusive eraphasis is place.d by the neo-posi t­
ivists on soientific description and analysis and this 
one-sidedness is undesirable in an alternative offered 
to nan as an answer to the probler.is which·speculative 
idealisu for instance could not resolve. Heineoann 
points out that a r.iere technological approach to 
philosophy carries the danger of.a loss in substance. 
When technique becooes paramount, philosophy is in 
danger of vanishing. 
Neo-positivism nakes the raistake of regarding 
its procedure as the whole of philosophy, when in faot 
it is no □ore than a method. "A technique as such is 
not a philosophy. A tool or a method is necessarily 
linited in its scope, and its limits nay easily be 
mistaken for the licits of the subject matter." 10) 
To lioit huoan activities to the purely teohnicaJ. 
shows.that they have lost.their ground in human exis­
tence� In this connection; G.A.Rauche writes,"Philoso­
phy au.st never permit itself to be shrunk to a oere 
-Pnnctionalistic □ethod. Its true field is oan•s 
actual experienoe ••••• 82/ •• 
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actual experience •••••••• It thus beoomes clear that, if 
philosophy identifies itself with the scientific method 
as such, and neglects or even ignores important aspects 
of oan•s existence •••••• then philosophy loses its real 
function of dealing with all aspects of human tru.th and 
all kinda of human experience." ll) 
The neo-positivist outlook, then, can lead to a 
fwictionalistio pattern of life and culture which cannot 
be transcended,as Marcuse points out, because thought is 
linited to a functional analysis of the status quo. 
Essentially, nee-positivism is an outlook which oan pre­
vent man "from building up again a new genuine western 
culture, which overcomes the nere technological and 
methodical civilisation of contemporary western f\mot­
ionalism, which frees nan from the chains of anxiety 
and insecurity,.and which will restore his balance as 
an intellectual, ethicaJ. 1 aesthetic and religious being."
12)
Marcuse also censures the neo-positivist out-
look and we will deal with his specific criticisn later 
on in this chapter. 
From here, we go on to exaoine Existentialism 
in so far as it offers to nan an a1ternative.t1ea.ns of 
approaching the probleos of life and culture• 
The existentialist •solution• achieved its 
maximum appeal between and after the two worl.d wars. 
It sprang, like neo-positiviSI:1, fron the despair of 
men who sensed deeply this "crisis-ridden situation,"lJ) 
a crisis resulting from over-confidence in rationalist 
and idealist systems of thought as well as in soience 
and technology. The realities of war had proved Hegel's 
rationally ordered world to be an illusion. Ideas and 
ideals were not of rauch use in the face of suffering 
and death. Science, despite its.obvious advantages, 
carried a hidden and fatal sting. 
It was ••••••••• 83/ • • 
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It was a threat just as mu.ch as a promise. It seemed 
at the time that there was nothing man could turn to 
as a valid source of authentic cultural values. All 
he was certain of was a sense of his own existenoe, 
his being-there in the world� And so, the existent­
ialists made this their new starting point in the 
search for a more realistic attitude towards human 
existence, undertaking the oreation of new cultural 
values in the face of nothingness. Man realises that 
he is thrown into the world as a stranger who is surr­
ounded by nothing _and that to live neaningfully ha 
must create values which take into account the real 
nature of man - his temporality, historicity and so 
on •. 
Anti-scientific and anti-rationalist in charac­
ter, existentialism rejects all objective.abstract 
philosophical systems as remote fron life, and replaces 
these with a concern for real hur:ian existence and the 
problem of being. 
Man's awareness of his being thrown into noth­
ingness as well his inability to grasp the universe 
through intellect results in anxiety and despair at. 
the painful and precarious nature of hunan existence. 
However, this burden of anxiety contains also a pos­
itive significance in that it points to the discovery 
of existence or rtbeing - there" (Dasein) as primary.· 
Man realises that since nothing is detemined or given 
with certainty, everything is possible� Man is free 
to commit himself to a scale of values he alone 
chooses. 
G.A.Rauohe writes, "It is true that the
realisation by man of being thrown into the nothing 
will result in the experience of gs;{:, or anxiety, 
but at the same time this anxiety which leads to 
Sori$e or care, has a purging effect. 
The resolution •••••• 84/ ••• 
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The resolution of being oneself in the above sense i.e. 
being determined to keep oneself open to one's reaJ. 
self, would constitute Treue or fidelity to real exist­
ence or the true nature of the self. It leads to free­
dom fro□ the fetters and chains of the intellect and 
the material. world,' and allows us to perform our true 
function viz. to enter into conmunication with the 
absolute through our very being-there•••••••••" 14)
Man, then realises the need to re-assess his situation 
more realistically, in terms of his being-there in the 
world rather than according to metaphysicaJ. constitution 
or scientific functionalism. The absolute cannot be 
known or comprehended, only experienced in one's ow.n 
existence. Idealism and functionalism lead man to 
unfreedom, in fact to his abolition as a cultural agent 
since they absolve him of the responsibility of choice. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, rejected the 
old cultura1 values and attempted to fulfil what 
Heidegger had called for - the re-creation of man by 
himself. Sartre sees man as a being who is condemned 
to be free. In fact he is freedom that chooses. God 
-
has long been dead. It is nan who must nake the 
decisions in whatever he does. It is in this way 
that he creates himself freely within the nothingness 
which he occupies,.accepting responsibility for his 
actions and values. By cm71I:1itting himself.to a parti­
cular course of action, man creates values. In avoid� 
ing commitment and responsibility and in ignoring his 
essential nature (which includes firliteness and histor­
icity) man acts in bad faith. Despite the 'viscosity• 
of things in the world and man's inability to assume 
tota1 control over them, despite the faot that nan 
always ends in nothingness (for that is his nature), 
man must still accept tota.1 responsibility for him­
self and embark on a life of complete engagement. 
OnJ.y in this.•• ••••• 85/••' 
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Only in this way can man justify his.existence and 
create a meaningful cultural pattern. 
Blackham writes,"The nihilism of the modem 
age had undermined everything, working on every front 
in the guise of a humanism that had given up thinking 
about ultimate questions; Sartre proposes to clear 
the ruins and reoonstruot a dogma.tic humanism whioh
understands and assUI:1es the eterna1 hwna.n situation, 
offering a liberation of mankind which starts with a 
total knowledge of man by himself�,. 15) Sartre, in
accordance with the general existentialist outlook, 
emphasizes the need for ma.n's self-.creation in the 
face of the ever threatening nothingness. The result 
would be, according to them, the resurgence of new 
cultural values which would be more in line with man's 
•real' nature.
The existentialists perform an important task 
for man and philosophy in so far as they focus attent­
ion on the existential aspects of human life, which 
had not been adequately treated by idealism and neo-
positivism. However, they displey a.n exolusive 
concern with the negative aspects of hUI.1an experience 
only. 
Otto Bollnow, for instance,.points out that 
the negative experiences of anguish, dread, despair 
and so on a.re counterbalanced by the experiences of 
hope, . confidenoe, joy, etc• "•�•.man, in his being-­
there, is not merely a passive, suffering and experien­
cing being, but rather an active and creative one�" 16)
Positive experiences are •.•complementary to the one-sided 
heroic virtues of bravery, resolution and readiness of 
existentiaJ. philosophy. They convert its pessioism 
and gloomy outlook into optimism and gay expectation. 
The future is not only steeped in the shadow of death, 
but it also••• ••••• 86/ • • 
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,: 
but it also holds great promises and is full of anti­
cipation ••••••••The absolute is not experienced as 
mere negativity, but we experience it in our creative 
acts and in our oomposure ••••••• ".17) Bollnow� in
opposition to the existentialists, sees man•s link 
with the absolute in his experiences of ecstasy� hap,­
piness, contentment and so on. Man need no longer . 
regard himself as an alien in the world and instead, 
anticipate a future of creative action. 
In another criticism of the existentialist 
•solution• Heinemann argues that the existentialists
make an unjustified separation of the natura naturans
from the natura naturata, assuming that the one could
exist without the other. Heinemann appreciates the
fact that existentialism deals with concrete problems
but he thinks that it is unable to supply a foundation.
for logic� science or ethics� The ethics of ambiguity,
for instance, does not make much sense. "If everybody
chooses himself as the creator of his ovvn values and
rejects all objective values, this absolute freedom
seems open to arbitrariness even it qualified by the
desire to see others free�·" lS) But what seems the
most serious shortconing of the existentialists is. 
that they have incorporated existence into a system.· 
Heiner:iann regards existence as "a prinoiple of life 
which escapes all Procrustean systeoatisation." 19) 
G.A.Rauche points out that the relationship between
man and the absolute as seen by the existentialists
is really an imt1.anent construction by man, like
speculative metaphysicoJ. theories. "••••••as the
relationship between r:ian and the Absolute is ration­
ally conceived by the existentialists and becomes
a dialectical pri'nciple·in the light of which the
structure of the universe and man•s existence are
rationally explained and understood, it follows
that the • •• •• •• • 87/ •• 
- 87 •
that the truth of the existentialist is in the end as 
methodologically constituted and therefore as funotion­
al and essential as is every truth-perspeotive of man."20) 
Yet another alternative with which Marcuse had 
to cqntend in working out his own approach to the prob­
lems that confront nan today, was Marxist dialeotioa1 
materialism effected on a Leninist basis in Soviet Russia 
and in the East European satellite countries. Nietzsche, 
in the nineteenth century, had reacted against socialist 
theory as formulated by Marx and Engels, a theory whioh 
visualised the victory of the proletariat over the 
bourgeois class;ana a life of freedom for nan as a 
productive being. "Total man will create the world in 
his image and recognise hioself in all his products.•• 21)
However, Marx's predictions about the collapse of capita,. 
lism had not materialised. Lenin realised that Marx's 
theories would have a greater chance of success in the 
batkward countries. In addition he stressed the iDpor­
tant role of the Communist Party for the achieveraent of 
Marx's utopian vision. "In the face of the receding 
revolutionary potential of the working class in the 
highly industrialised countries of the West, �enin 
cane to the conclusion that the revolution stood the 
best chance in a backward country like Russia, where 
there was the greatest resentnient against the ruling 
classes ••••• the proletariat must be led in its hist­
orical mission by a revolutionary avantgarde, the 
communist party, which would lay dovvn the revolution-
ary strategy and tactics that were to be followed in 
the struggle against capitaliso and imperi'alism." 22)
Stalin, in a further adaptation of Marx•s theory to 
conditions in Soviet Russia, proposed the doctrine 
of socialism in one country, putting aside .the 
theory of a world wide socialist revolution. 
Lenin's • •• •• • 88/ ••' 
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Lenin's dilemma, then, was to adopt western 
Marxism to oonditions in an eoonomically underdeveloped 
and rural society� He was aware of the inadequacy of 
the Russian working class insofar as a mature,politio­
ally oonsoious socialist foroe was necessary for the 
revolution, So he based his hopes on an intellectual 
leadership elite to achieve what the workers were not 
yet capable of. This was to lead to the growth in 
power of the Soviet Communist Party. 
When the Bolsheviks came to power in Ootober 
1917, the situation was quite unlike Marx•s idea of 
what was necessary for the successful functioning of 
sooia1ism •. In the beginning, some attempt was made 
to put an idealistic socialist programme into effect. 
�••••••• factories were turned over to the workors for 
administration and control, salaries for managers, 
speciaiists and state officials were sharply reduced 
to working-class levels ••••••••• the army was trans-. 
f · ·d· t ·t· ·1·t· .. 23)onne in o a oi_izen mi 1 ia.......... 
However, in the fabe of increasing difficulties, 
these measures were soon abandoned. "The citizen army 
gave �ay to a highly organised a.hd centrally oontrolled 
regUlar army1 The irlefficient and unproducti�e system 
of workers' control was replaced by a rapidly establish­
ed economy and the familiar staff of managers and 
specialists. Instead of diminishing to the envisioned 
poini of total. disappearance, the state bureaucracy 
increased steadily along with the salaries for its 
offioials." 24) The foundation had been laid for
increasing total oontrol of the country by a power 
elite - the party. 
Stalin built up his own position on the 
strength of the hnitage Lenin had bequeathed-the 
Party as a •monopolistic and monolithic' dictator­
ship. Having assumed control of the Party, Stalin 
was able •••••••• 89/ •••.• • 
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economic power, has come into existence. And the rift 
between private and general interests still persists 
despite state monopolism and its claim to have bridged 
the gap on a collective basis. 
Milovan Djilas, for instance, in his book !!'!2,
New Class links up with Marouse•s own criticism of 
contemporary Soviet Marxism. Djilas, at one time an 
important official of the Yugoslav Cornnunist Party, 
sees the Communist claim of moving towards a classless 
society as an illusion. In reality, oembership of the 
party means that one belongs to the privileged class. 
At the core of the party are the masters, the exploiters. 
He writes that " for a long time tha communist 
revolution and the oor.mrunist system have been concealing 
their real nature. The emergence of the new class has 
been concealed under socialist phraseology and, oore 
ir.iportant, under the new oolleotive forras of proper:ty 
ownership. The so called socialist ownership is a 
disguise for the real ownership by the political. 
bureaucracy." 27) Djilas argues that the new class
entrenches its power by relaxing its dogcatio severity 
and promising a peaceful and good life. But it is only 
those in power who enjoy inexhaustible sources of 
benefits and privileges. 
So, the Marxist vision of a classless society, 
where all work for the benefit of all is as remote a. 
possibility in the Soviet Union as it is in the West. 
Djilas writes, "from the historical. point of view, the 
new class is forced to fortify its authority and owner-
ship constantly, even though it is running away from 
the truth ••••••••• Having achieved industrialisation, 
the new class can now do nothing nore than strengthen 
its brute force and pillage the people. It ceases to 
create. Its spiritual. heritage is overtaken by darkness."28 ) 
Soviet Marxisn.· •• • • 91/ ••• 
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Soviet Marxism; then, despite its claim to 
provide the most meaningful philosophico.l. and culturei 
-
alternative; oan be regarded as continuing human 
alienation� Its theoretical claims are clearly 
illusory in a practical context, as Marcuse points 
out in his criticism (which will be dealt with la�er 
in this chapter.) 
Uarcuae wc,s also influenced. by Freudiv.n 
psycho-ano.lytic theory in forn1uh'..ting his own stand­
point (although he attempts to go beyond Freud's own 
view on culture and repression.) Freud continued in 
the role that Nietzsche ho.cl filled so well .i. that of 
sensitive diaenostician of the illness of society and 
culture. Freud's theory reflects the inadequacy of 
the old cultural values and the attempt to find new 
values in the face of increasing industrialisation 
and functionalisation. His influence can be allied 
to the rr,rowing scepticism about civilisation and 
morn.lity after the Woxtl.cl Wars. Freudian analJJsis of 
the existill{s conditions destroyed the illusion that 
modern civilisation is essentially good, and evil 
would soon be stamped out. The wnrs confinned Freud I s 
thesis that mo.n is driven by unconscious, irrational 
and primitive urces over which he has less control 
than he thinJcs • 
Like the Marxist emphasis on science, Fraud 
also had great faith in rational scientific method, 
thus shf.l.I'ing the early twentieth century belief that 
science, properly applied, could end the problems of 
mnnkind, and also that man could be studied like other 
natural phenomena. In this respect, F.Alexander writes: 
"FreudiE.1..n doctrine ••••••• from a historical perspective 
was but the lo{�cnl continuation of the rationalistic 
tradition: 
to understand •••••• 92/ •••• 
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to understand natural. phenomena, including those of 
the mind� on the basis of scienti:f'io principles�" 29) 
Sharing the disenchantment of r.iany with Marx­
ian theory, Freud was convinced that economic motives 
were not sufficient.to explain all aspects of h'Wlan 
behaviour� However, he did share Marx• s cri tica1 
attitude towards the status quo, deploring the fact 
that culture was based on repression and hypocrisy .• 
Marx had argued against capitalist repression and 
exploitation of the workers. Freud, throughout his 
life, was a caustic critic of Victorian hypocrisy, and 
argued firrnl.y for individuaJ. self'-fuJ.filment.- He up­
held reaJ. hunan nature as against the hypocrisies of
conventionaJ. morality which he saw as damaging to the 
human consciousness. 
Freud presented man with a whole new world• 
that of the unconscious. He believed that conscious 
life is the result.of the mechanical. play of elements 
in the unconscious�· These elements re-appear in the 
consciousness and influence its operations. The 
deoisivet1otive force in man Freud called the libido.
The highest mental phenomena in the world are sublim­
ations of the libido. The existing cultural. values 
undermine the libido in so far as they lead to the 
harmful suppression of the sexual life of civilised 
people through adherence to a "civilised" sexual 
r.iorality. Nervous illness, feelings of guilt, 
anxiety and so on{ with which the existential. thinkers 
were grappling) Freud traced to the restraints 
ir.iposed on the libido by cultural. developt1ent � In 
The Future of an Illusion he stressed an inner 
instinctual core.in man which strains beyond the 
reach of culture.• 
" •• •.for most • •... 93/. •' 
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"••••••••for most people, there is a limit beyond which 
their constitution cannot comply with the demands of 
civilisation�., 30) 
Cul.tu.re, then, aooording to Freud, has been 
based.on instinctual privation and this, sooner or 
later, leads to aggression •. Civilised society has 
internalised this aggression, only to leave man with 
greater feelings of guilt and unhappiness. For example,
religion deaJ.e with aggression by projecting it to a 
deity. · ''In the development of the ancient religions, 
one s.eems to discern that □any things which mankind 
had renounced ae 'iniquities• had been surrendered to 
the Deity and were still permitted in his name, so 
that the handing over to Hin of bad and socially harm­
ful instincts was the means by whioh man freed h.i.o­
self from their domination." )l) Like Marx, Freud 
oonder:med religion as a han:ifuJ. illusion whose un­
reality would prove harmful to culture. 
Despite his belief that cultural restrictions 
were haroful to huoan needs, Freud did not think, like 
Frotlt'.l did, that total eli□ination of cultural authority 
would lead man to a nore meaningful and happier existence. 
He oonatantly emphasized the positive aspect of culture 
though he was aware that one pays a high prlce in terms
of appntaneity. Just as in the individual psyche the 
id {instinctual drives).is balanced by the ego (ration­
a1 element of the self)� Freud believed that a satis­
factory solution must be found between cultural rest­
rictions and individual needs� Through the workings 
of culture, the libido must be sublinated into crea-
tive activity, and aggression directed towards mastery 
over nature. 
Freud.proposed psycho-analysis as the means to 
undo the ha.rm, caused by cultural restrictions, 
and to•••••••••• 94/ ••• 
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and to combat widespread neuroses. He wrote, " Our 
civilisation ioposes an alr.iost intolerable pressure 
on us, and it oa1ls for� oorreotive •. I• it too fan­
tastic to expect.that psyoho-analysis� in spite of 
ita difficulties, may be destihed for the task of
preparing mankind for such correctives?" 32>. With
the aid of psycho-analysis Freud hoped that nan oou1d 
recapture the directness and spontaneity of childhood 
to counter the abstractions and conformity of adult 
life� 
Freud campaigned on behalf of oan•s.needs 
against.restrictive sooia1 values, opposing, like 
Ma.rouse, everything which i� •oonventio�a.J.lt restriotedt 
well-established and generall.y accepted•• By napping 
out the innennost labyrinths of the human raindi he. 
initiated a new science and revolutionised raan•s think­
ing� It was Freud who introduced into. the huoan cult­
ural order the psychological rational.a. 
Erik Erikson, one of Freud's studenta,writes 
of Freud that he has oade "the decisive step towards 
a true interpretation of the psychologioa1 with the 
technological and the political in the hunan order. tt33) 
However, despite Freud's il'l.val.uable contributions, his 
proposed •solution• for coping.with the proble� of 
culture has Darcy' disadvantages. The worst of Freudian 
inf'1uence is the tendehcy to believe that all problems 
are psychological in origin and remediable by psycho­
analysis. It is a dangerous generalisation to think 
that all social sciences are reducible to psychology·, 
sinoe ver:, rea1 problems in other spheres are ignored. 
It would be as unfortunate for man to look upon psycho­
analysis as a panacea as it would be to disregard it 
oorapletely • .  
This, then is the cultural situation as it 
appeared.•••·••• 95/ •••· 
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as it appeared to Marcuse, a situation which Marcuse 
regards as one of acute crisis. The sharpness of tids 
crisis is evident in the controversial and even antag­
onistic relationship that holds among the alternatives 
offered to cope with it. We have already shown in 
what sense each alternative proposes to overcome the 
crisis. Marcuse is aware of the need for a new alter-­
native that can cope more adequately with the complex 
probiems created by increasing technical. control over 
nature. In the light of this, he criticizes and 
ultimately.rejects the alternatives offered by neo­
positiviso, existentialism, Soviet Marxism and Freud� 
ian theory. 
However, his own •solution• bears the raarks of
each of them insofar as he has incorporated aspects of 
them into his own total analysis of society and his 
own alternative for coping with hunan problems. He 
accepts, for instance, the necessity for science and 
scientific method although he does object to the 
manner in which these are utilised. He appreciates 
Heidegger's call for the self-creation of man, and 
also Freud's views on the relationship between cul.tu.re 
and repression. He desires also that the eoonooic, 
political and cu.ltura1 features of a 'real' classless 
society be aioed at. All these aspects reflect the 
influence of the various alternatives which he u1ti­
oately rejects. 
To.deal nore specifioall.y with Marouse•s 
criticisms, we take neo-positiviso first. Marcuse's 
criticisn links.up with that of Gellner, who had 
oaintained that, like Scholasticisc which accepted 
Revelation uncritically, neo-positivism and espeoial.ly 
linguistic analysis takes for granted 
the concepts •••••••• 96/••• 
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the concepts and presuppositions of ordinary la.?lg'U.88e. 
"Linguistic philosophy 1 � an activity, whether ther� 
peutic or pure, contains doctrines and criteria in a 
camouflaged form. It insinuates and presupposes those 
doctrines and the values on which the criteria are 
based. This is bad for a nunber of reasons: it makes 
against critical examination of those values and 
ideas and against critical examinatio� in general.; it 
inhibits thought and prejudges issues." 34) 
It is for the above reason that Ma.reuse rejects 
nee-positivism-as a valid solution. In One-Dimensional 
Man he contends that because of its confomisn to the 
functionalistic universe, contenporary logical. positi• 
vism and linguistic analysis have rendered oan inoap. 
able of a rational. criticisn of his social environs. 
By limiting itself to therapeutic analysis and a mere 
description of what is, philosophy has rid itself of 
those concepts which enable man to understand what is 
happening and to initiate change. Nao-positivist 
philosophy has no power to change the s�atus quo 
since its criticisms occur on1y within the established 
franework anc1 not of ito
Nao-positivism renders nan impotent by bring­
ing his thinking in line with the functionalist universe. 
''To the degree to which the given reality is scientifi­
cally comprehended and transforoad•••••�•positi.visn 
finds in the society the oediuo for the realisation 
of its concepts.- harmony between theory and practice, 
truth and factse Philosophic thought turns into 
affirnative thought; the philosophical. critique 
criticises within the societal franework and stig­
matizes non-positive.notions as oere speculation, 
dreans and fantasies;" 35) 
There will be no qualitative change in the 
statv.s S½1 ••••••••• 97/ ••• 
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status guq since philosophy avoids unorthodox elements 
which may constitute a threat to the existing sooia1 
and cul turaJ. order. Ma.reuse sees neo-posi tivism as 
having failed in its attempt to provide matl. with a 
meaningful way of life. Not only has it failed but 
it is even proving detrimental to meaningful hwnan 
activity and the attempt to lead man out of alienation. 
According to Marcuse, neither does existent­
ialism offer much hope for man. In Negations he 
analyses existential.ism as an empty functional 
gesture, devoid of any concrete content. Marcuse sees 
that the existential philosophers rightly concerned 
themse·lves with concrete historical man in his rea1 
life process, attempting to replaoe abstract mentaJ. 
activity with concrete hwna.n experience. Existent-
ialism sought to regain the "full &on.oration of the 
historical subject in opposition to the abstract 
'logical' subject of rational idealism�., 36)
However, Ma.reuse claims that the existentia.1-
ists did not attack the presupposition of bourgeois 
philosophy's abstractions i.e. "The actual unfreedom 
and powerlessness of the individual in an anarchic 
production process." 37) The result, as Ma.reuse sees 
it, is that abstraot reason (which the existentiaJ.ists 
criticised) was replaced by an equally abstract 
'historicity.• Marcuse claims that existentialism 
avoids looking at "the historical situation, with 
regard to its material faoticity, of the subject to 
which it addressed itself ••••••••••• Philosophy did 
not go on to ask about ••••••• the people's mode of 
being, and about the real powers and forces that 
are history. It thus renounced every possibility 
-
of comprehending the 
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facticity of historical situations and distinguishing
beyween theo." 38)
Existentialisci does not concern itself with
the individual's position in a repressive production 
process. Also, since it ranges itself against reason 
(which it sees as alienating nan) existentialiso fails 
as a possible instruoent against the forces of dooina­
tion. So Marcuse rejects it because, like neo-posit­
iviso, it oakes possible the continued existence of 
the status quo. 
Marouse is equally critical of established 
Marxiso, especially as found in Soviet Russia and in 
the East European satellite countries. Despite the 
fact that Marcuse belongs to the neo-Marxist school 
of thought, he rejects established Marxisn on· the
grounds that the rift between state oonopolisn and 
the productive forces still exists despite clains to 
the contrary. 
Marcuse shows in One-Dinensional Man and 
Soviet MarxiSt:l that in the Soviet systeo the tendency 
is against transferring econooic and political. power 
froo those in control (Cor:u:ru.niat Party functionaries) 
to those who actually produce. Marx had prophesied 
that such a transference of power would lead to the 
withering away of the state. Ma.reuse writes in this 
connection : "••••••••••the actual developnent in 
present day co:r:u:.nmist society postpones the qualita­
tive change to the second phase, and the transition 
froo capitaliso to socialise appears in spite of 
the revolution, still as quantitavive change. The 
enslaveoent of oa.n·by the instrur:1ents of his labour 
continues in a highly rationalised, and vastly 
efficient and prot:1ising fore." 39) 
Ma.reuse ••••• 99/ ••• 
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Marcuse believes that there is little possibi­
lity of institutionalised Marxiso leading to the ful­
filnent of nan's real. needs and the creation of a 
cultural situation to which all contribute and in 
which all participate. 
As far as Freud is concerned, Marcuse accepts 
his eophasis on nan•s libidinal freedoc. He agrees 
with Freud also that a certain basic degree of repreea­
i�n is necessary for the building up of culture 
and civilisation. However, Marcuse also believes that 
increasing technological control over nature should 
lead to the gradual eli□ination of a great deal of 
repression. 
The kind of repression that exists today is 
surplus repression - repression that has gone beyond 
the noroal degree necessary for culture, and which is 
used to naintain specific foros of social donination. 
Such repression of the libido at this advanced level 
of civilisation is unnecessary and unnatural. In his 
book Eros and Civilisation, therefore, Marcuse goes 
beyond Freud in calling upon nan to liberate hinself 
by renouncing the false asceticisn i□posed on huoan 
sexuality by the existing social. order. 
Ma.rcuse's own 'solution• to the oultural crisis 
incorporates eleoents fron the various approaches to 
which he reacted. He calls for the re-awakening of 
□an•s historical consciousness and the de-r:1Ythologi­
sation of freedoo so that it is given a concrete
content in the technological oediun which exists today.
Man can win his liberation by the translation of values
into technological tasks.
The application of science and technology to 
achieve freedoo and happiness for all, will bridge the 
gap between••••••• 100/ ••• 
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gap between real and iar�ediate interests, between 
the ruling forces and the actual producers, both in 
the East and in the West. The way to authentic exist­
ence lies in the utilisation of scientific and tech­
nological progress for the liberation rather than for 
the repression of □an. The various facets of Marouse•s 
analysis of.conter:iporary society and the alternative 
he proposes, will be discussed in greater detail in 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARCUSE 1 S STAND WITH REGARD TO 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE. 
In Reason and Revolution Marouse charaotel'ises 
conteoporary.society as obtaining "freedoc thrOUBh 
exploitation, wealth through impoverishnent� advance 
in production through restriction of production,••••• 
The highest davelopoent of the productive forces.co-. 
incides with oppression and raisery in full flood•••••' 
The negation of this sooiety and its transforr.1ation 
beoooe the single outlook for liberation," l) 
In One-Dimensional Man he.attacks the irration­
ality which oaaquera.des as Reason. Of our sooiety 
Ma.rouse wri tesi ''Its productivity ie destru.otive of 
the free development of huoan needst its peace oaint­
ained by the oonstant threat of war; its growth 
dependent on the repression of the real possibilities 
for pacifying the struggle for existence. n 2)
These quotations signify Marcuse•s total. 
opposition to tb.e trends which are shaping our so.oiety 
and its culture, and his awareness of the need for a 
historical alternative� which will enable oan to live 
a kind of life where the 1 optioaJ. developcent and 
satisfaction of individual needs and faculties with 
a r:li.nicucl ° of. toil and nisery·• is ensured�- Like that 
of Nietzsche� Marcuse•s opposition is total. To work 
for the ioproveoent of· existing society Will only 
delay the attaino.ent of a free society� Liberation 
will never cone through an inproveoent of what 
already exists� because even the t'reedocs and 
satisfaotione this culture offers are based on 
repression.••• �105/ •.•·••
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repression. What he asks for is nothing short of total. 
reversal; a total. rejection of this life - destroying 
ouJ.ture for a non-repressive one, a possibility which 
can no longer be relegated to utopia, since materiaJ. 
and intelleotual resources do exist for its realisation. 
In Negations Marouse cites so□e of the character­
istics of affluent society which.have forced culture into 
its current one-d.imensionali ty e�g�·; 
(a) A great technical oapaoity which is unfortui­
nately msused in the production of •unproductive goods
and services' - luxury goods, planned obsolescence, 
military equ.ipoent� etc. 
(b) Manipulation of technology by political and
econorJio power groups.-
(o) Scientific and pseudo-soientifio oontrol of
individual and group behaviour, both in work and play; 
for comoeroial and political purposes. 
(d) Technical progress oo-incides.with.the
elimination of personal initiative•· taste, etc. 
(e) Oversooialisation, crowding, noise, erosion
of the need for privacy and independenc,s. 
Men are conditioned through oass cedia to believe 
that the above characteristics funotion in the interests 
of all� when in reality, they represent uonopolistio 
interests of do□inant power groups.- Technology loses 
its neutrality in the servm.oe of these groups. The 
technological universe has becone a political one.- In 
fact, political power asserts itself by its control of 
the technological process, exploiting soienoe and
technology to caintain itself. The whole of.society 
is drawn into this process� Political power, through 
its control of technology, 0shapes the entire universe
of discourse and action, intellectual.and :oateriaJ. 
culture� In the □ediuo of teclmology; mutura; 
politios•••••••••106/; ••• 
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politics and the eoonocy oerge into an ocnipresent 
aysteo which swallows up or repulses all alternatives�"3)
Societal forces exercise repression froc a
position of strength; using technology (which procises 
increased efficiency and higher standards of living)
instead of terror. The result is, that qualitative 
change, which could establish a new node of huoa.n 
existence, is contained; The distinction between 
oppressor and oppressed is elitlinated.by a cor:u:ion 
interest in preserving the status quo� "If the 
worker and his boss enjoy the sane television progr8DI!le 1
and visit the sane resort places ••••••••• if they all 
read the sane newspapers, then this assim.lation indi­
cates not the disappearance of classes, but th� extent 
to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the 
preservation of the Establishoent are shared by the 
underlying popu.J.ation�" 4)
Marouse denounces the false needs imposed on 
man by monopolistic interests - needs like relaxing, 
having fun; behaving and consuming in accordance with 
the advertisenents�- With these, Marcuse contrasts 
•real, vital needs' ·1ike 0nourishoent� cl.othing1 lodging
at the attainable level of culture.- The satisfaction
of ll!Lese needs is the pre-requisite for the realisation
of all needs." 5)
-
Marcuse points out how the Welfare and Warfare 
state are combined.in our industrial civilisation� In 
capitalist society, all opposing forces oerge in the 
face of the threat offered by the enemy (CoIJOUniso). 
The result is a universe where all conflict is 
stabilized by.the benefits of productivity and the 
threat of war. The militarization of society has 
enabled the uniting of constructive and destructive 
eleoents. Men work alonside for life and for death, 
unable••• •••• � .107 / • � • ;-
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unable to imagine a qualitatively different condition 
of life since the system offers an•ever-oore-ooofortable
life for an ever - growing nUilber of people�• Despite 
the 'good life• it supposedly offers to man, Ma.rouse 
rejects it as a repressive, totalitarian system. Any 
negating political forces in society are arrested or 
reduced to the teroa of this universe. And politlonl 
behaviour like.all else ie firoly entrenched in one -
diL'.1.ensionality. 
However, it is not only the capitalist politioaJ. 
and economic naohine which Ma.reuse attacks�. The Soviet 
system cones in for equal censure. In.fact, Marouse 
sees cany sinilarities beyween the two, despite the
widely publicised differences. Marcuse says: ttTota.l
industrialisation seemed to exact patterns of attitude
and organisation which out across the essential politioal 
and ideological differences. Efficient business-like 
oanagenent, highly rationalised and centralised, and 
working on equally rationalised and co-ordinated huoan 
and technical material, tends to promote political and 
cultural centralisation and co-ordination." 6)
Cooraon to both systens is a technical - econor.tlc
basis which affects all spheres of life even though the 
one systeo relies on private enterprise and the other 
on a nationalized econouy. Ma.reuse does not see Soviet 
nationalisation as leading to the elinination of 
alienated labour since the neans of production are not 
in the hands of the inoediate producers (a situation 
identical to the one in the capitalist West)� 
"Nationalisation is but a technological. - political 
device for increasing the productivity of labour••••• 
a change in the mode of domination ••••• rather than 
the pre-requisite for its abolition�" 7) 
Marcuse•••••• 108/ ••••
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Ma.rouse maintains that in Soviet society 
industrialisation proceeds without waste and obsoles­
cence but.under the sane totalitarian control of 
resources. Qualitative change towards a liberalisation 
of totalitarian controls is postponed. The labourer 
still endures toil and delay in the satisfaction of 
vita1 individual needs. 
I� Soviet society, conflict between individual 
and social interest is supposed to have been elioinated, 
since Soviet society professes to cater for the real 
needs and interests of all its individuals. Statenents 
to the effect that Soviet society is a de�ocraoy, free 
of exploitation; etc., are continually.pepeated until
they elicit a fixed response. However, they have little 
relation to truth. As Ma.reuse sees it; their 'truth' 
lies in their effect. The result is the obliteration 
of the difference between truth and falsehood. The 
irrational .. be cones part of the scientific □anage□ent 
of society. Marxist ideology becooes an instruoent of 
domination� no longer containing a meaning which is
critical and opposed to the status 4uo. The Soviet 
state, instead of withering away, do□inates the 
worker. A oonopoly is exercised by the political, 
econo□ic and nilitary bureaucracy and □aintained by 
an authoritarian organisation of the productive process. 
The dialectic, one of the main tenets of 
Marxian theory, has undergone a drastic change in 
function. "It has been transforned from a node of
critical thought into a universal •world outlook' and 
universal oethod with rigidly fixed rules and regulations, 
and this traneforoation destroys the dialectic raore 
thoroughly than any revision�" B) The dialectic is
no longer part of the revolutionary consciousness 
directed towards liberation, but part of the established 
systen of••• ••• •... 109/ •. •· 
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system of dooination. It serves the status quo, with 
the result that Soviet society is no longer the negation 
of capitalism but shares part of its function viz., 
"the industrial developoent of the productive forces 
under separation of control of production froo the 
1 iDIJ.ediate producers' �t• 9) 
The Soviet state in fact has taken over a 
large part of individual rights in its control. over 
the realn of .necessity. The state cones to. control 
personal aspirations, objectives and values. Private 
values are externalised• Everything detri.I:lental to 
Soviet morality is repelled. Politics co-ordinates 
traditionally separated areas of huraan culture e.g. 
ethics, the erotic sphere, art, literature, etc. These 
beco□e politicized and geared towards productivity. 
The fusion of technological and political 
rationality results in the creation of a hooogenous 
culture devoid of any transcendent dimension. This is 
cor:u.Jon to both East and West. The result - oan and 
his culture are trapped within a pattern of one-d.ioan­
sional thought and behaviour, a pattern which does not 
pronote an authentic oode of human existence since it 
suppresses a legitimate diraension of existence, that 
is, the negating, transcending dinension - that which 
contains the possibilities and potential. for the· 
future. 
When Marcuse considers whether industrialisation 
in the backward countries could lead to the satisfaction 
of vital needs and pacification of the struggle for 
existence, he fears that since the capital. for develop­
ment.will be obtained froo the capitalist OJ' coC1r.1unist 
bloc, the backward country in question could adopt one 
of various foros of •neo-colonialiso•. Most men, it 
seems to Marcuse� have been seduced into accepting a 
re pres si ve •••• ·• •••• 110 / • • • • 
- 110 -
repressive node of hUIJan existence.in return for the 
comforts offered by the status quo, at the expense 
of autonoIJy, satisfaction of rea1 human needs and 
liberation. 
Marcuse•s critique of contemporary culture with. 
regard to the daoage caused in the psychologica1 sphere, 
is to be found in greatest detail in his book Eros and 
Civilisation. In his preface to the book Ma.reuse 
points out how psychologica1 problems have been turned 
into political ones by the repressive forces in control. 
Autonomous psychioa1 processes are now being conditioned 
to the extent that psychology as a legitimate aspect of 
culture no longer exists independently. 
Ma.rouse is aware that r.iodern culture is based 
on the almost total conquest of nature. Moro and 
□ore needs of greater nunbers of people are being
satisfied than ever before.· But he feels that this
culture is deficient because of the very creation of
a 'happy consciousness• within the established fraoe­
work. Mechanisation of life, mental irapoverishr.lent,
etc., are overshadowed by tho pronise of a better
life for all.
What is overlooked is that greater progress 
goes hand in hand with greater un:freedoo and repression. 
Abuse of soientific and technological power, Marcuse 
sees as responsible for atoo boobs, concentration 
camps and wars. He thinks it ironio that "the oos:b 
effective subjugation and destruction of nan by man 
takes plaoe at the height of civilisation, when the 
nateriaJ. and intellectual achieveoents of oankind 
secraed to allow the creation of a truly free world�ulO ) 
Freud saw instinctual constraint as the pre­
condition for culture. Civilisation begins when 
'the reality principle' replaces •the pleasure 
principle •••••••• 111/ •••• 
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principle•; Marouse aclmowledges the necessity for 
sooe degree of repressive oontrol over the instincts 
in the interests of civilisation. But he notes that 
the existing reality principle, in the service of 
specific interests of domination, introduced addition­
al controls above those necessary for civilised huraan 
association. This he calls •surplus repression'• Its 
presence points to a repressive culture organised in 
the interests of donination. The existing reality 
principle has fostered a systen of institutionalized 
social and political controls. 
Marcuse is alsp aware that outside repression 
is supported by one from within. Men freely accept 
and live their repression . ......... the unfree indivi-
dual introjects his nasters and their cont1ands into 
his own oental apparatus. The struggle against freedom 
reproduces itself in the psyche of man; as the self• 
repression of the repressed individual, and his self­
repression in turn sustains his raasters and their 
institutions�" ll)
Marouse shows how this situation has affected 
the value systeo to such an extent that nen easily 
forego imnediate satisfaction for a delayed one, 
pleasure for the restraint of pleasure, joy (play) 
for toil (work), receptiveness for.productiveness and 
absence of repression for security� Men come to 
accept the redirection of their energies and instincts 
away from their sexual activities to work. Pleasure 
has to be suspended since the satisfaction of needs 
requires work. So the instincts are repressively 
modified in the presence of scarcity (Lebensnot). 
Marcuse attacks this scarcity as really a 
specific organisation of scarcity in the interests 
of a dooinant group which desires to oaintain and 
inprov�••••••••• 112/ •• 
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improve its privileged position. Goods are distributed 
in such a.way that individual needs are not fully 
satisfied. $0 raen toil on while sexual.ity is quanti­
tatively and qualitatively restricted and subjugated 
under a solely procreative function. Sexu.ality, which
Marcuse sees as an autonooous principle whose sole 
function is to gain pleasure from the body, is turned 
into a oea.ns to the end of reproduction. This is 
necessary for the repressive social organisation which 
exists. Any sex instinct not airected towards procreat­
ion is outlawed as a perversion. 
The specific forra of the reality principle which 
has governed the growth of conteoporary culture, Ma.rouse 
calls the performance principle . .......... under its 
rule society is stratified according.to the conpetitive 
econooic perfomances of its □eobers." 12) The powers
of do□ination make the interests of the Whole co-incide 
with their own and nen are satisfied as long as their 
needs are ful.filled. 
However, Marcuse is positive that men do not 
live their own lives in tem.s of their own faculties 
and desires. They perform set functions, without 
gratification and in opposition to the pleasure 
principle. Libido is diverted for socially useful 
perforoances. Man's "erotic perfom.ahce is b:t-ought in 
line with his societal perfornanoe." 13) Even oan•s
leisure tine is controlled by the repressive forces 
in control. The individual is not to be ieft alone 
at all. ''For, left to its elf, and supported by a 
free intelligence aware of the potentialities pf 
liberation froo the reality of repression, the libidinal. 
energy generated by the id would thrust against its 
ever nore extraneous linitations and strive to engulf 
an ever larger field of existential relations, thereby 
exploding the reality ego and its repressive perfom.ance."14) 
Society ••••••• 113/ •••••• 
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Sooiety prevents any form of liberation .by 
strengthening its control over the oonsciousness; both 
in work and play. Men accept this irrationality as.the 
new reason, since everyone seems to benefit from it. 
They are content to "find their soul in their automobile; 
hi-fi set;· split-level ho1"1e,· kitchen equipr.ient�" 15)
Any opposition to the established systen appears.neurotic, 
a crime against that which satisfies human needs� 
Marcuse.is aware of.the very real benefits of the production 
process, but he sees that their effects are negated when 
they are used to justify a system of domination. 
The individual identifies himself totally with 
the system. The ego has becone socialised; with r.iass 
media setting the pattern for conformity. The result
is that the individual. no longer �as a private realm in 
which he can become 'himself•; deternine his own noeds 
and satisfactions; The inner dimension of the oind 
which could exercise the power of negative thinking and 
critical Reason is eliminated� Totalitarian control 
over f�morly free areas of consciousness allow relax­
ation of sexual taboos and there appears to be greater 
sexu.aJ. freedom. However, these sexua1 relations are 
tolerated by the system and brought into confornity 
with it� The result is that they no longer contain a 
negation of society� Similarly, terror and normality, 
war and peace; truth and propaganda;.aestructiveness 
and constructiveness are assimilated. 
As far as the work world is concerned, oan no 
longer realises himself through his labour. His products 
dominate him•: The result is alienation and dehumanisation. 
The entire work world becomes a system of animate and 
inanimate things; all subject to administrative control. 
Consciousness is no longer concerned with autonomy but 
with co-ordinating.•.• •••• 114/ ••
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with co-ordinating the individual with the whole. This 
decline in consciousness confines the linits of know­
ledge and alters the content of happiness. Happiness 
cones to nean fraedoo froo any knowledge which will
induce anxiety. Marcuse writes : "These trends seen 
to suggest that the expenditure of energy and effort 
for developing one•s own inhibition is great1y 
dioinished. The living links between the individual 
and his culture are loosened." 16)
Despite the fact that the.individual identifies 
himself fully with the status quo, Marcuse cakes it 
clear that alienation still abounds when judged in terns 
of true consciousness outside this one dioension which 
exists. The aanipu.lation of hUL1an instincts, energies 
and needs does not allow for the eaergence of an 
autonooous individual, nor for the creation of a non­
repressive culture. 
Ma.reuse then goes on to show how Freud's theory 
of instinctual repression is related to the basio context 
of Western philosophy. Freud had □aintained that 
civilisation begins with the inhibition of Eros and 
its subsequent wea.kaning as a culture - building force. 
Marcuse sees the history of Western netaphysics as the 
conflict between the logos of gratification and that 
of alienation. Hegel.had thought that 'on the attained 
level of civilisation, with the triur�ph of reason, 
freedoo had beoone a reality�• But Marcuse writes 1 
"Neither the state nor society enbodies the ultioate 
fora of freedora. No natter how rationally they are 
organised� they a.re still afflicted with unfreedoo. 
True freedoo is only in the idea. Liberation thus is 
a spiritual event. Hegel's dialectic re□ains within 
the fraDework of the established reality principle�" 17)
In Western•••••••••• 115/ •• 
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In Western philosophy the ultinate fom of 
reason and freedon appears as spirit. The enpirical 
world is conceived in negative teros. Spirit is 
supposed to cake no difference to established reality. 
Freedon is conceived by philosophy in terns of pure 
thought only; thus elininating the influence of 
philosophy on reality� Philosophy becooes no oore 
than a functional p4I't of the acad.enic establishnent 
under the logic of douination. Thought is redefined 
and brought in line with reality. All transgressions 
beyond the established universe of discourse and 
behaviour are elininated. Linguistic philosophy 
eophasizes the therapeutic. function.of philosophical 
analysis - elinination of illusions� deceptions and 
obscurities. Ma.reuse brands this as a perversion of 
the function of philosophy, since it is not the task 
of philosophy.to cure but to cooprehend the world in 
which we live; �to understand it in terns of what it 
has done to nan, and what it can do to oa.n." 18)
Subversion of the given� Ma.reuse.sees as the 
legitioate historical task of philosophy� Philosophic 
concepts must be antagonistic to the realn of ordinary 
reality. However; today, all negative connotations of 
concepts are.reooved and placed in the realn of fiction 
or oythology. Theories which project genuine historical. 
possibilities are rejected as irrational. -Ma.reuse 
places linguistic analysis "at the opposite pole froo 
those nodes of thought which elaborated their concepts 
in tension with; or even in contradiction to, .the 
prevailing universe of discourse and behaviour�n 19)
Marcuse states that restriction to the existing 
behavioural. universe results in an 'intrinsically positive 
attitude' which leads to.the tra.nsforoation of philosophy 
into affiroative thought. Criticisn occurs only within 
the societal ••••••••• 116/ ••• 
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the societal franework. The transcendent dinension is 
eliminated. Philosophy proclaims its oodesty in 
'leaving everything as.it is', which Marcuse rejects 
as sado-masochisn. This attitude can only lead to. 
the lioitation of the scope and ·truth of philosophy, 
and the iopoverishr.lent of thought and language. 
The restriction of thought to the given forces 
oa.n to live and think in a world closed against any 
disturbing, controversial elenents, not to seek solutions 
beyond those which already exist. In this way all non­
oonforr:rl.ty is suppressed and the authority of philosophy 
is used to endorse.those forces which control this 
�iverse. In fact,· Ma.reuse sees no value in even the
nost exact and clarifying description of linguistio 
analysis since it adds nothing to a critique and 
betterr.1ent of human conditions. 
Marcuse ad.nits that the universe is indeed 
anbiguous and in neod of clarification� But philosophy 
can only achieve this genuine therapeutic function to 
the extent to which it.frees thought fro� its enslave-. 
oent to the status quo. Since philosophy,!! ideology, 
its function lies in showing reality as it really is 
and what prevents it froo being so. But today the 
therapeutic function of philosophy is oore of a political 
task "since the established universe of ordinary language 
tends to coagulate into a totally oanipulated and 
indoctrinated universe�" 20)
The universe of ooonunication is equally 
affected by the forces of dooination. Language is allied 
to promotion of positive thinking and opposition. to 
transcendent critical ideas. It soon becones function• 
alised • "•••••••the tension between appearance and 
reality, fact and factor� substance and attribute tends 
to disappear••••••••••·117/� ••• 
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to disappear; The elooents of autonoey, discovery, . 
deoonstration and critique recede before designation, 
assertion and initation." 21)
Essentially oppositional categories become 
integrated into industrial society by operational 
treatoent i.e;, identifying concepts and things with 
their function. Conceptual thinking is iupeded by 
lioiting the content of a concept to the word which
designates it in oomlon usage. Analytical propositions 
function like uagic fori;:rulas whose constant repetition 
encloses.ma.n's mind within the established way of 
thinking. The ra ss media reconcile all opposites, 
oingling truth and hal.f truth, inf'ornation and propa­
ganda. This language proootes identification of the 
particular with the general interest� "The unified 
fWtctional l�e is an irreconcilably unti-criticol. 
o.nd anti-dia.J.ootioal language. In it, operational and 
behavioural rationality absorbs the transcendent, 
negative, oppositiona1 eleoents of reason;" 22)
Marcuse sees the suppression of a transcendent 
diraension of thought as a suppression of history. 
Functional language is anti-historical in so far as 
it prevents remembrance of the past (by the subversive 
force of memory) and invocation of the future (which 
is negation of the present); Language has become an 
instrument of control and repression. 
Even universals, which could undermine 
funotionalisr.i.� are translated into operationaJ. terras. 
Analytical philosopby dissolves.concepts like Mind, 
Consciousness,· Will� Soui; etc., into state:oents on 
particular.operations, which can then easily be 
dealt with� It refora:u.latee the meaning of universal.a 
in a non-contradictory way, whioh then eliminates a:ny 




hidden negation. The result is the loss of key concepts 
of critioal thought. 
As far as logic is concerned, foroal logio, 
purged of all negative eleoents," is valued above 
dialectical. logic, which Marcuse sees as the logic of 
contradiction and opposition. Dialectioal. logic defines 
the raoveoent of things froo that which they are not to 
that which they are. In this way� it cou1d underoine 
the abstractions of fornal. logic as well.as deny the 
concreteness of the status quo. However, this logic 
is totally rejected because "they belong to raodes of 
thought which are non-operationa1 in their very structure •• 
•••••••their historical concreteness oilitates against 
quantification and nathenatization on the one hand; and 
against positiviso and eopiriciso on the other. Thus 
these oodes of thought appear to be a relic of the past, 
like all non-scientific and non-enpirioal. philosophy. 
They recede before a nore effective theory and practice 
of Reason�" 23)
Concerning existentialiso, Marcuse believes that 
it succeeded in ••regaining the f'ull. concretion of the 
historica1 subject in opposition to the abstract logical 
subject of rational idealisn�" 24) But he rejects it 
in so far as it avoids looking at nan•s historical 
situation with regard to its •oaterial faotioity.• It 
displays no knowledge of the real forces of history 
and does not concern itself with the unfreedom of 
the individual in a repressive production process. It 
sioply believes that nan r.ru.st act even though he raay 
not know what for. By opposing reason it has becone 
the tool of the established forces of donination, 
which do not welcone an objective justification of 
their actions. In this way, having lost its oriticaJ. 
insight ••••••••• 119/ ••• 
.. 
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insight, it makes all forms of opportunism possible. 
Contemporary philosophic trend like neo­
positiviso and existentialiso help to promote the 
ccnt:Lr.n1.o.�i"..n of the status guq,. In the Soviet Union, 
philosophy is also brought in line with reality. By 
being absorbed into the official theory, it ceases.to 
be transcendent. For that matter, a.rt, literature, 
music, etc., have lost their critical force. These 
areas of culture had once constituted another di.raension 
whose truth posed a subversive force to the status quo. 
In art, for instance, was once contained •the 
Great Refusal' which was a protest in the nane of 
transcendent truth and freedom against repression. 
But now this dimension has been absorbed by the 
technological realityo Art is reduced to the societal 
function of reflecting the existing reality, and has 
becooe "an instrunent of social control in the last, 
still nonconfornist dioension of the hunan existence."25)
Works of alienation hav0 lost their subversive 
force by assirailation into the �atus quo. Art, 
philosophy, literature and religion are blended with 
c0Dr.1ercials, and rendereu. :i .. n cor:modi ty fom as 
faoiliar goods and services.- "It (the ideal) is 
brought down from the sublimated realrl of the soul or 
spirit or the inner na.."'1, and translated into operational. 
terns and problems•o••o•••r.Higher culture becomes 
part of the material culture. In this transforoation 
it loses the greater part of its trutho" 26)
However p the cultural assimilation does not 
indicate the disappearance of privileged groups. The 
fact of cultural equality ioe.,, making cultural. values 
acceptable to all, does not go hand in hand with the 
elicination of injustice, do□ination, etc. The 
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situation where the najority still work to provide 
life's necessities for the benefit of the few; still 
exists. What does happen is that the indioroent. 
contained in culture is renoved by its diffusion. 
"It is good that alnost everyone can now have the 
fine arts at his fingertips, by just turning a lmob 
on his set or just stepping into his drugstore. In 
this diffusion however they becone cogs in a culture­
t1achine which reoakes their content�" 27)
The result of the above is an 'affiroative 
culture• far renoved froc the social process and 
supposed to exist in an independent real.n of value. 
This view of culture affirns a better world, different 
fron the factual world of the struggle for existence. 
Abstract happiness is pronised to oask the inequa1ity 
in the social reality. The ideal that all nen 
participate in culture as free and equal beings is 
used to postpone gratification of real hunan needs. 
It eophasizes spiritual values "thus exalting the 
individual.without freeing hin froc his factual 
debasenent�" 28)
Rebellion is pacified by the injection of 
ideal cultural happiness into real nisery� "The 
truth of a higher world, of a higher good than oateriaJ. 
existence conceals the truth that a better oaterial 
existence can be created in which such happiness is 
realised••••••• This is the real oiracle of affirca.tive 
culture. Men can feel theoselves happy even without 
being so at all." 29)
Ma.reuse condeons every oanifestation of 
contenpora.ry culture as working for the perpetuation 
of the authoritarian state. In this way, culture 
has betrayed its original task - oonoern with oa.n•s 
clain ••••••• 121/••••• 
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claim to happiness. It has absorbed all qualitative 
opposition - in politics, a.rt, literature, philosophy, 
eto. Even the concepts of love and marriage .have 
been bureaucratized. In The Or�anisation Man, Wbyta
points out how the corporation has invaded the 
enployeet s life, even to the extent of calculating a 
nan•s wife along with the rest of his assets and 
liabilities. 
This has led to the creation of a 'Happy 
Consciousness• i.e., satisfaction with.the established 
systeo because it 'delivers the goods•� Culture is 
fatally entangled within the •web of donination•. The 
destruction of this repressive culture is the pre­
condition for liberation and for the creation of 
Marcuse•s ideal of culture, which is "the totality of 
social life in a given situation, in so far as both 
the areas of ideational reproduction (culture in the 
narrower sense; the 'spiritual world') and of nateria1 
reproduction (•civilisation•) form a historically 
distinguishable and conprehensible unity." 30) 
A oulture nust be created where potential. 
oaterial and intellectual. resources are utilised 
fully for the satisfaction of individual needs and 
faculties. However, Marcuse does not visualise a 
situation where the econooy appropriates the entire 
life of oan. The present organisation of societal 
resources oust be overcorae before a free spciety can 
energe. The established technological sooiety has 
already denonstrated its truth value as an alternative 
in that it has organised nan's struggle with nature, 
offering a oor.rfortable hunan existence. 
The tioe has cone for a qualitatively 
different alternative which depends on planning for 
au, ••..•..• i22/ •••••• 
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all, against ninority interests� but which oakes use 
of possibilities �vailable at the.attained level of
raaterial and intellectual culture� This alternative 
"offers a.greater chance for the pacification of
existence; within the franework of institutions whioh
offer a greater chance for the free developnent of
hur.ian needs and faculties." 3l)
The dialectical process must be carried 
through by conscious nen who nust recognise and seize 
liberating potentialities to attain a more rational 
fort1- of hunan existence. It is because of this that 
Ma.reuse sees in his alternative a higher historical 
truth, in that it offers a greater chance for the 
pacification of existence. But this can only be 
realised if industrialisation proceeds in different 
ways and with different ai□s. 
At tho oooent technology is an instruoent of 
repressive politics. So liberation would involve a 
political act. Political change would corae.by a 
re-direction of technological. progress i.e., it must 
be used solely for the iacification of existence. 
Pacification can open new relations between man and 
man. Technological rationality, freed from its
exploitative features, will be dependent on political 
direction, but this will not necessarily result in 
an accunulation of power. Ma.reuse feels that .the 
reconstruction of the oaterial base of society, with 
freedom in mind� could lead to.a quantitative and 
qualitative reduction of power. 
Ma.reuse does not ask for total eliraination of 
the technical base of society, since he believes it
is the basis of all hunan freedom. Nor does he see 
a total abolition of labour. 
What he wants •••••• 123/ ••• 
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What he wants is the re-organisation of the realo ot
necessity in the interests of all men - to eliminate 
raisery, poverty, violence, etc., so that oen can 
concentrate on creating a true culture in accordance 
with their needs. Marcuse quotes Nietzsche to this 
effect: "if we are ever happy at all, we can do 
nothing other than promote culture." 32)
A new conception of Reason mu.st emerge which 
is characterised by Whitehead's proposition: "The 
function of Reason is to proaote the a.rt of ll1a�n3)) 
Proootion of the art of life must be the goa1 of the 
scientific transformation of the world. This can be 
made possible by the nechanisation of all socially 
necessary labour. "Complete automation in the realc 
of necessity would open up the dimension of free time 
as the one in which man's private and societal. exist­
ence wouid constitute itself." 34) Not only would
vital needs be satisfied but labour time reduced as 
well, leaving man to develop in conditions where his 
needs are no longer icposed on him by the powers of 
domination. 
Marouse calls for a redefinition of huoan 
needs. The false identification of social and indivi­
dual needs must end. Man iri his needs mu.st not 
reproduce the repression of the exploitative system. 
Liberation involves the developoent of new needs and 
the change.mu.st occur in the very nature of the 
individual, in his 'biology' as Ma.reuse puts it. 
"Such a change would constitute the instinctual basis 
for freedoo ••••••••• Freedom would become the environ­
ment of an organism which is no longer capable of 
adapting to the oompetitiva.perfoniances required for 
well-being under dor:1ination, no longer capable of 
tolerating the aggressiveness, brutality and ugliness 
of the established• •••• -.124/. • 
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of the established way of life." 35)
To achieve liberation, autonomous individuals 
with effective control over the production and distri­
bution of necessity, free fron indoctrination and 
manipu.lation,are necessary. Marcuse visualizes the 
emergence of a new historical Subject who is free in 
every sense of the word - free from the struggle for 
existence, free from baing controlled by econoaic and 
politica1 forces over which he has no control, free 
fron ioposed ways of thinking and acting. 
In the backward countries there must be 
improvement of indigenous modes of life and labour, 
instead of the imposition of exploitative technology. 
And in the advanced countries.there r.xust be a reduction 
of over...development. By this, Marcuse does not envisage 
a return to poverty but the elimination of profitable 
waste. Human energy, instead of being channelled into 
oindless tasks, could now go towards creating a new 
node of human existence which allows the free play of 
individual faculties. The standard of.living wou1d 
no longer be measured in terms of cars, television 
sets,.etc., but in terms of gratification of basic 
needs, and freedoc from toil and fear. 
PoliticaJ. and technologica1 reversal would
signify the end of the tyranny of the perforoance 
principle in the psychologica1 sphere. The abolition 
of this principle would make obsolete the repressive 
organisation of the instincts and lead to the gradual 
elimination of surplus repression and the strengthening 
of the libido. A non-repressive culture can be created 
through the"non-repressive development of the libido 
under the conditions of mature civilisation�" 36} The
elimination of repression wou1d remove the.antagonistic 
relation•••••••••••l25/ ••• 
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relation between the pleasure prinoip1e and the reality 
principle. "Eros� the life instinct would be released 
to an unprecedented degree." 37) 
The resu1t of this would not ·be savagery and 
violence but the eraergence of a non.repressive reality 
principle.which teaches receptivity, contemplation, 
enjoynent, etc. Productivity, which contenporary 
culture values so highly, could then be seen in a 
new light - as.working towards the free development 
of human needs• The rationality of doraination becomes 
that of gratification, opening up a new experience of 
being which could totally alter human existence. 
The feeling of individual al�enation from others 
and from the world woula vanish since power would 
express the rational decision of autonomous individuals, 
free from repressive needs. SU.ch a situation would 
refute Freud's identifioation of civilisation with 
repression, of progress with domination. Ma.reuse 
believes that the pleasure and reality principles are 
not irreconcilable. It is possible to have a "non­
ropressive civilieation_based on a f'wldamentally 
different experience of being, a funda.raentally 
different relations between man and nature and 
fundamentally different existential relations�" 38) 
The non-repressive release of libidinal 
energy wou1d reverse the process of desexua1isation 
of the body, and cake for a freer world based on 
mature erotic relations. This could faoilitate 
the creation of a more authentic culture since 
Ma.reuse believes that "The sex instinct are the life
instincts: the impulse to preserve and enrich life 
by mastering nature in accordance with the developing 
vital needs is originally an erotic iopulse•••••••• 
And •••••••••• 126/ ••• 
-
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And the· • struggle for existence• is originally a 
struggle for pleasure: culture begins with the collective 
implementation of this aim." 39)
Culture mu.st become th� free sell-development 
of Eros rather than a repressive sublimation of it. 
The taboos on the use of the body as an instruoent of 
pleasure, fostered by civilised norality, must be 
removed. The whole body 'in opposition to genital 
supremacy' must be drawn into the-orbit of pleasure. 
Marcuse calls this process the erotioisation of the 
entire personality. Sexuality would be transformed 
into Bros since it wo)tld no longer be primarily 
directed towards reproduction. 
Marcuse upholis the value of perversions and
phantasy as expressions of rebellion against the 
existing psyohologioa1 and sexual nores. Perversions, 
with their claim to instinctual freedoo and gratifi­
cation, uphold sexuality as an end in itself, against 
society which sees in it a means to an end• Marcuse 
sees phantasy as containing a truth incompatible with 
repressive reasonJ the truth of the 'Great Refusal••
Phantasy "pt-otacts against all reason, the aspirations 
for the integral fulfilment of man and nature which
are repressE!d by reason.•• 4o)
Phantasy, which Marcuse relates to ioagination, 
retains the structure of the psyche prior to any kind 
of societal organisation. It preserves the memory of
a state where there exists immediate unity between the 
universal and the particular under the rule of the 
pleasure principle. "The truth - value of ioagination 
relates not only to the past but also to the future: 
the forms of freedom and happiness which it invokes 
claim to deliver the historical reality. In its 
refusal •••••••••• 127/ ••••• 
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refusal to accept ·as final the limitations imposed 
upon freedom and happiness by the reality principle, 
in its refusa1 to forget what can be, 1 liea the
critical function of phantasy. "41)
The liberation of the raeoory.of the identity· 
between necessity and freedoo oontained in the un­
conscious, holds hope for the liberation of the 
future since oen would desire the re-creation of such 
a paradise. And.art carries oost visibly the return 
of the repressed, reflecting the inage of raan as a 
free subject. The culture heroes of the new reality 
principle Ma.reuse sees in Orpheus and Narcissus, as
opposed to Pronatheus- the hero of the performance 
principle. They symbolise a.revolt against a culture 
based on toil and dooination, and the-desire for a 
freedom that will release the powers of Eros to unite 
art, freedoo and culture. 
In teros of philosophy, there will eoerge a
new conception of hunan essence which takes into 
account the utilisation of real possibilities for the 
fulf'ilnent of human life. 11The essonce of man is 
understood.in connection with those tendencies which 
have as their goal a new form of social life••••••••• 
the real fulfilment of everything that oan desires to ba 
when he understands hinself in terms of his potentialit-
ities�" 42) Such a theory of essence would point to
a new situation where freedom and happiness are no 
longer merely philosophical propositions but a histm-ioal 
situation which can be achieved. These cultural 
values would then become valid for all, as part of 
general objective truth, as part of common human 
existence rather than being confined to the •rank 
of privilege.• 
Such a concept of essence is not utopian 
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because it points to oonorete realisation through 
historical action. By being directed towards historical 
practioe rather than absolute knowledge, the concept 
of essence ceases to be pure. theory and has the power 
to shape the future. In a different social organisation, 
the new essence of can would. appear in reality and 
the antithesis between essence and appearance would 
disappear. 
Philosophy must become active critica1 theory 
and regain its subversive power - the 1 power of the 
negative' which was the original concern of Western 
thought. It can and must aid in the "construction 
of a reality which is not subject to the painful. 
difference between potentiality and actuality, which 
has mastered its.negativity and is complete and dependent 
in itself - free. " 43) 
The result would be a new relationship between 
science and metaphysics� Ma.reuse believes that 
industrial society does have the potential to "transform 
the metaphysical into the physical, the inner into the 
outer, the adventures of the oind into adventures of 
technology." 44) Ideas defining reality in meta,. 
physical tert1s would lose their emotive• tmreal 
character. Scientific concepts in turn could define 
the possibilities of a free and pacified existence. 
The ability of oetaphysios to project different 
possibilities.could combine with science and technology 
to end misery, toil and mppression. Scientific and 
ioaginative thought could guide the realisation of a· 
pacified existence. "And the ideas of justice• freedom 
and humanity then obtain their truth and good con�oienoe 
on the sole ground on which.they could ever have truth 
and good conscience - the satisfaction of man.1 s materia1 
needs, the rational organisation of the realm of necassity;:n45)
Technological •••••••••• 129/.�� 
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Technological progress has made possible the •trans­
lation of values into technical. tasks - the material­
isation of values.• Values oan be redefined in 
-
technical terms. Universals like •man•, 'freedom,• 
•justice,• eta., whichMarcuse reg�ds as primary
elements of experiehce, express real potentialities
which can be realised in the technical world. Trans-
-
formation of human society towards fr0edom is no
longer a utopian idea since men already possess the
ne•eaaar,-material and intellectual resources. The
only thing that has to be developed is the need for
freedom.
The new conception of man will result in the 
emergence of a new morality, whioh will be a negation 
of existing Judeo - Christian morality, whioh Marouse 
sees as part of the repressive needs enforced on man 
by society. The new morality will prepare man for 
freedom, showing him that it lies within his power 
to create hell or.heaven on earth - a morality "i-ooted 
in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to. 
create and preserve •ever greater unities• of lif'e�1146)
The humanistic promises betrayed by the old 
culture could be ful.filled in the new morality. But 
for this, a new kind of man with a different sensiti­
vity and consciousness is necessary, "men and women. 
who have.the good conscience of being human, tender, 
sensuous, who are no longer ashamed of themselves." 47)
Marcuse quotes Nietzsche to this effeots 'The token 
of freedom attained, that is, no longer being ashamed 
of ourselves.• 
Marcuse sees the rise of a new sensibili�y 
which desires the ascen� of the life instinots over 
aggressiveness and guilt. Science and technology are 
to be used for the gratification and protection of 
life •••••••••••• 130/ •••• 
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life - "playing with potentia.ll.ties of fohn and matter 
for the attainment of this goal�u 48) Then only can
one speak pt a teG.h.?1.ology of liberai;ion. Under a 
non-repressive re.:uity principle "a new sensibility 
and a desublimated soientifio intelligence wou.l.d 
combine in the creation of an aesthetic ethos." 49) 
Marcuse 1.1.:ias the aesthetic principle to show 
the inner connection be�een pleasure, sensuousness, 
beauty, truth, art and freedom. He proceeds from 
Kant•s philosophy where he finds that the "aesthetic 
dimension occupies the central position between 
sensuousness and morality, " 50 > because it contains
principles valid in both. The basio experience. in
this d��enaion is sensuous, not oonceptuaJ., and the 
aesthetic perception is accompanied by pleasure. 
The chief categories of the aesthetic order 
Marcuse sees as 'purposiveness without purpose' and 
1 lawf�ess without law.• .These two"oiroumsoribe, 
beyond the Kantian context, the essence of a trulq 
non-repressive order. The first defines the stro.cture 
of beauty, the second that of freedom; their common 
character is gratification in the free play of the 
released potentialities of man and nature." 51) The
introduction of the truth values of the sensuous
order into human oulture will free man from the 
repressive order of reason. "The sensuous, the 
playful, the calm and the beautiful become forms ot . 
existence and thereby the Form of the society- itself .. '' 52)
-
The aesthetio will be the form of the free 
society as opposed.to the commodity form of contemporary 
culture. Morality, political action, in fact� all 
human cultural activity must be guided by aesthetio 
principles. In this way, art becomes an important 
productive••••••••••i)l/ •••• 
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productive force in the material and cultu.ra1 trans­
formation of society. It helps to shape the way of 
life in such a way that sooiety becomes •a work of art•. 
Marcuse does not reject reason completely as 
can be seen in his wish to make sensuousness rational 
and reason sensuous. Culture could then be based on 
an interaction between tne two, and the function of 
Reason and Art would converge. The antagonism between 
Eros and civilisation would then be overcome by the 
idea of a sensuous reason. Freud's definition of Eros 
as the culture builder whioh strives to 'form living 
substances into ever greater unities so that life may 
be prolonged and brought to higher development�• would 
then be validated. 
A strengthened Eros could also absorb the•death 
instinct• which is today used as an instrument of 
repression. Free men will accept the necessity of 
death while seeing that it does not cancel out the 
possibility of liberation. "Men can die without 
anxiety if they lmow that what they love is proteoted 
from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they 
may talce it upon themselves to die - at a moment of 
their own choosing. " 53)
The one factor which threatens non-repressive 
development in the aesthetio dimension is death, 
finiteness. Men become llesigned to the passage of 
time and forget what was and what can be. But Ma.rouse 
maintains that to for�et and forgive reproduces the 
conditions which breed injustice. Instead of surrender-
ing to time, men must look to reoenbrance for liberation. 
"Time loses _its power when remembrance redeems the past." 54)
The struggle against time must be translated into histor­
ical action by the play impulse. "In this task culminates 
the progress•••••••••• 132/•••• 
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the progress of mankind to a higher form of culture�" 55)
Time must not be regarded as linear bu.t
cyolical, just like the return contained in Nietzsche's 
idea of the 'perpetuity of pleasure�• This is only. 
possible in a· civilisation where work has become play, 
where work is the free play of human abilities. And 
the key to liberation from all constraint lies in the 
aesthetic dimension. Liberation will enable man to 
explore all possibilities of being, aided by the 
imagination. 
Problems concerning the liberty of the individual. 
in relation to the whole can be reoonoiled by a 1generaJ. 
will' which must, however, be directed always towards 
individual needs. For this reason Marouse•s alternative 
demands a rejection of both capitalist and communist 
forms of societal organisation, where the majority of 
the people oomes to mean the majority of the masters. 
A new,· real democracy must emerge which would involve
the.self-government of free people;w:tth justice for 
aJ.ll 
A1though Marcuse believes in the value ot a 
type of communism which involves the equitable 
distribution of social wealth according to freely 
developing human needs, he rejects contemporary 
socialist society on the grounds that it fails to take 
into account the •aesthetic - erotio' dimension,.which 
visualizes the convergence of teohnology and a.rt, work
and play. So he oalls for the construction of a new 
socialism by "creating a genuine solidarity. between 
the leadership and the liberated victims of exploit­
ation." 56)
The institutions of liberation would then be 
collective ownership and control of the means of 
production and distribution. This is the foundation 
of the new••••••••••• 133/ •••. 
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of the new historical alternative - utilisation of 
all available resources to abolish poverty and create 
a reality guided by a new sensibility and consciousness. 
Marx's historical logos must be aimed at achieving the 
economic, political and cultura1 features of a real 
classless society. Only then can a sensuous culture 
be created, with the ascent of the 'Aesthetio Principle 
as Form of the Reality Principle.' 
And as to the problem of what men will do once 
a free society has been created, Marcuse answers in 
the words of a yOUl'lg black girl : ''•.•• ••• for the 
first time in our life, we shall be free to think 
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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
OFFERED BY NIETZSCHE AND MARCUSE
1 
AS WEJ:tA 
AS SOME PERTINENT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILAR­
I TIES IN APPROACH". 
Having examined the cultural climate in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which p�ecipitated 
the reaction of Nietzsche and Marcuse respectively, as 
well as having presented the •solutions• offered by 
these two different thinkers in order to reverse the 
cultural malaise, we come now to a oritioaJ. examination 
of these actual 'solutions'• and an analysis of signi­
ficant similarities and diff�rences in their approach 
to the problem of culture. 
It has to be ascertained whether Nietzsche and 
Marcuse have, in terms of their specific alternatives, 
satisfactorily solved the problem of man's authentic 
existence and whether their vision of what culture 
ought to be can indeed rescue man from the alienation 
and umauthentici ty they condemn. 
As far as differences and similarities between 
the two critics are concerned, an obvious similarity 
is their position with regard to the culture of their 
respective times. Both stand apart and aJ.ienated 
from the established prder of the day - Nietzsche 
against the debilitating Christian/democratic 
spirit of the nineteenth century, and Ma.reuse 
against the sophisticated but repressive technological. 
culture of today. Nietzsche was openly contemptuous 
of nineteenth century culture. In Marcuse•s writings 
we find a deep - seated distrust of what he calls 
•affirmative••••••••�l38/ •••
-138 •
'affirmative culture•� Nietzsche was oonvinced of the. 
total..worthlessness of the cultural efforts of his diq-1
which, far from promoting true freedom and happiness, 
only serve to lower man to the depths of mediocrity 
and inauthentioity; Marcuse's distrust of twentieth 
century culture stems from his belief that the apparent 
benefits our culture offers to man are used to manipulate 
him towards a speoifio way of thinking and acting� a 
way which will not constitute a threat to the status quo. 
The opposition of both philosophers to their 
respective cultures stem from a oormnon conception of the 
task of philosophy and philosophers - the Socratic task 
of •applying the lmife viviseotionally to the very 
virtues of the time;• Both men probe culture.with 
disregara for all the holy cows upheld by man •. Nietzsche 
speaks of the therapeutic effect of philosophy, whe�e as 
Marcuse assigns to it the task of negating and trans­
cending the ,:;ta]),\S. quo� 
Both, after examining their respective cultures 
a.nd finding them repressive a.nd not.in line with the 
•real' needs of man, go on to offer,·eaoh a different
historical alternative, in an effort to rescue man
from his cultural alienation and return him to him­
self as an authentic oulturaJ. agent. Both give us
their own oonceptions of what culture ought to be like
and also provide a model of the type of man who is the
ideal oultural agent, who lives in line with reaJ.ity
as seen by Niatzsche and Marcuse respectively.
Nietzsche believes that.true culture is only 
for the superman, for only he is capable of it� The 
mass of men are quite content to live their average, 
mediocre lives. It does not matter that they do not 
enjoy •true• happiness and •true• freedom. They do 
not qualifY••••••••• 139/ •••• 
:·· . .. •·· 
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not q�alify_ for it. Marouse, on the other hand, wants 
•true• cultural values to become part of .. oommon.human
. . . . . 
existence and not remain the privilege of a few.
Anoient idealism, Marcuse tells us in Ne6ations, 
refleoted a situation where the realm of the good and 
the beautiful. was pure theoretical speculation, lying 
beyond the existing conditions of life� The highest 
truths and values were reserved for the dlite. This 
state of affairs, which Marcuse deplores, is precisely 
what Nietzsche desires. For Marcuse; cultural. values 
of truth, beauty, freedom and justice must beoome 
applicable to all men. This is not a utopian demand 
but perfectly feasible in tenns of the almost total 
conquest of nature. 
Although both are opposed to 'idealist culture' 
in the sense that cultural values are derived from some 
spiritual� other-worldly realm instead of being based 
in existing reality, Marouse's conception of culture 
does talce into account the majority.of men as well as 
the material. struggle for existence, whereas Nietzsche's
conception does not. For Marcuse, culture signifies 
"the totality of social life in a given situation, in 
so far as both the areas of ideational reproduction 
(culture in the narrower sense� the 'spiritual world') 
and of material reproduction ('civilisation') fonn a 
historically distinguishable and comp�ehensible unity." i) 
For Nietzsohe� the production o� life's necessities, 
the struggle for existence is the concern of the average 
man and not a part of 'true' oulture� Because the. 
average man makes available the necessities of life, 
Superman is left free for higher things, that is, the 
creation of •t:rµe' culture (culture in a more spiritual 
sense). 
Comfort a,nd freedom for all men, which Marcuse 
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desires, is not what Nietzsche would prefer. He 
despised the idea.of 'bread for all' as leading to 
spiritual decline. His attitude is well expressed 
by Harrington: "the world of democracy, science and 
technology •••••••must be thin and shallow. In it 
men will lose contact with their own depths. The 
sense of tragedy will vanish, the highest value will 
smother under the weight of material. satisfaction. 
Ultimately, all this mindlessness, this ignoring of 
the irrepressible irrationalities of life, will lead 
to a disaster. Gradual progress prepares an apocalypse." 2)
The idea of democratic abundance for all, the 
ending of economic misery and suffering, which Marcuse 
espouses as one of the fruits of technological progress, 
Nietzsche r�jects because it is.opposed to the natural 
order of inequality. Nietzsche, like Dostoevsky, 
believed suffering and unhappiness to be an inevitable 
condition of human exist.ence. To seek to end this 
condition would be going against life itself. 
As opposed to Marcuse 1 s idea that all men must 
recognise the dangers of industrial enslavement and 
guard against it, Nietzsche believes that "there is 
nothing more terrible than a barbarian slave class
which has learned to recognise its own existence as 
an injustice, and is ready to take vengeance, not only 
for itself but for all the past generation as well�" J) 
Whereas Marcuse sees that technology carries 
the possibility of abolishing all repetitive enslaving 
work, Nietzsohe is quite convinced that the ttinternaJ. 
reform of the technological system towards a freer 
society is impossible, because he saw an essential 
poverty at the centre of technology and therefore he 
felt the eternal impersonality of the factory process 
could not be•••••••• 141/ ••••• 
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could not be transcended." 4) 
Both Nietzsche and Marcuse believe in man's 
self-oreation as a cultural being - Nietzsche by will 
to power, and Marcuse by man's ohanging the world, so 
that,· in both instances, man is freed from repression 
and unauthenticity. Both desire the self-transcendence 
of man - to create man anew, to perfect nature • 
. Nietzsche calls on man to cultivate and improve 
himself, to transfigure nature in the direction of the 
highest specimens of humanity. By doing so, man lives 
in accord with the full potential of his being. Marcuse•s 
vision is similar. Man must unlearn everything he 
knows, free himself from the conditioning imposed on 
him and remake his own nature. In fact, Ma.reuse.demands 
a change in the very •biology• of the individual. 
Freedom must become a biological necessity in man. Both 
Nietzsche and Ma.reuse deplore the fact that men internal.­
ise their repression and reproduce it in their own lives. 
Both demand, in Ma.rcuse•s words : 0men and.women 
who have.the good conscience of being human, tender, 
s�nsuous, who are no longer ashamed of themselves." 5)
Both philosophers demand a new type of man, with a 
different sensitivity and consciousness, and in this 
way, both arrive at Superman in different ways-- .a 
can who.is free from all that is abhorrent in men, 
in fact, a type of ideal man.
Both Nietzsche and Marcuse reject the abstract, 
the other-Norldly, as leading to alienation, and demand 
that man focus on this finite existence as the starting 
point of human endeavour. In this, they both realise 
Heidegger's conception of Being as manifest in finite 
human existence. Nietzsche rejects axry- metaphysics 
which seeks to explain this world in terms of abstract 
absolutes,•••••••••• 142/ ••• 
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absolutes� for instance, the manner in which Hegel 
constituted the Absolute Spirit from which.he there­
after derived the values of truth, freedom, etc. On& 
must accept one•s contingent experience as real. 
Marcuae agrees that this so-called world of 
appearance is the only reality within which one oan 
act and change the world. To think otherwise ia to 
evade one• s responsibility as a human being. . Marcu.sa 
writes: "The wea.lmess and despondency of man, the 
inequality of power and wealth, injustice _and suffer­
ing were attributed to some transcendental crime and 
guilt; rebellion.became the original. sin� disobedience 
against God, and the striving for gratificatioh was 
oonoupiscenoe�" 6) It is time for man to re-assume
his responsibility in the only world that is truly 
his own. 
Nietzsche urges man to capture eternity now. 
Marcu.se wants total affi:nnation of the life instincts 
instead of their negation. This leads to another 
similarity between the two thinkers,·. in that �hey oan
be said to allow Freud's libido to live itself out; 
both in man gaining pieasure from his body and in 
pouring its vital power into the creative act. Both 
deplore the restrictions placed on joy among people 
and see how the wild, breathless pace of life and 
tho glorification of work acts as a powerful. restraint 
on man as an erotic being. 
Nietzsche, in his critique of Western rational­
ism, insisted on.joy and enjoyment as the measure of 
hwnan .fuJ.filment. He envisaged Superman as the being 
in whom is contained an overflowing spirit and fullness 
of bodily vigour, enabling him to feel totally the 
joys of life. The passions, ma.n•s natura1 instincts 
are to be liberated .from the spirit of bad conscienoe. 
Superman•••••••••••l43/ ••••• 
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SU.perm.an lives freely his passion, though realising 
the necessity for control over them. Sublimation of 
passion becomes.the foundation for the creation of 
cultural values. 
Marcuse approves of Nietzsche's idea of erotio 
being. He believes that Nietzsche speaks in the name 
of a reality principle quite antagonistic to that of 
Western.civilisation, by emphasizing joy(�); For 
Marcuse; the new culture must be "rooted in the erotio 
drive to oounter aggressiveness,to create and preserve 
ever greater unities of life�"?) He calls for the 
liberation of the erotic impulse in man, the freeing 
of sex from the purposes of reproduction only; a 
widening of the concept 'libido' to include the antire 
body as an instrument of pleasure. Only in such a 
state can man preserve and enrich life and culture. 
Marcuse finds a way out.of Freu.d. ♦ s equation 
of civilisation with repression, by allowing. that a 
certain degree of restraint is necessary for oivili� 
sation, but that the larger part of sexual repression 
in contemporary society is surplus repression i.e., 
repression in the interests of domination. Ma.reuse 
is certain that society can rid itself of its 
repressive oharaoter without disintegrating into chaos. 
It is interesting to note the difference in 
the two critics' choice of the revolutionary element 
in society. Nietzsche sees hope for society in the 
aristocratic SU.perman. He is charged with the task 
of leading society to a higher.level of existence, 
away from the mediocrity of the.average man. As 
against Nietzsche•� E!lite group, Marcuse chooses 
the outcasts - those on the fringes of society as 
those who contain the potential for change to a leve1 
of existence which transcends the repressive existing one. 
His ohoice ••••••••• 144/ ••• 
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His choice falls on "the outcasts and outsiders, the 
exploited and persecuted of other races and other 
colours, the une:iployed and the 1.mecplo1a.ble .. " S)Both 
philosophers reject the average individual as too
much a part of the 'happy consciousness' to be able 
to effect a:n:y form of change which will revitalise 
culture. Nietzsohe sees the majority of men as being 
incapable of the saorifioes necessary for the new 
level of existence. They are quite content to live 
by medioore values. Ma.rouse regards most men as too 
deeply ensconced in the material comforts of existence 
to be able to initiate change. Having rejected the 
average man, Nietzsche and Marcuse look to the two 
extremes of society as potential agents of change -
the one extreme at the top of society, the other at 
the bottom. 
The alternatives they offer are deficient in 
that they seek hope only in such extremes - the 
aristocrats and the outcasts* especially when one 
considers the fact that society in the large consists 
of average individuals i.e., men who are neither 
geniuses �or unemployed outcasts. A.consideration.of 
what is beneficial to cUlture should, of necessity, 
include a consideration of thll. role and status of 
the average man. In this respect, both •solutions' 
are problematio. To guarantee an existence that does 
not degenerate into tyranny, whether it be that of the 
majority or of a minority, all men mu.st be treated as 
potentially •truly human beings•. 
Having attempted a comparative analysis of 
the theories of the two philosophers, we now go on 
to evaluate the alternatives offered by Nietzsche 
and Marcuse. First, we take Friedrich Nietzsche, 
whose tastes were so offended by the vulgarity and 
mediocrity•••••••• 145/ ••• 
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mediocrity of what pasood for culture in his day,
Nietzsch&'s philosophy reflects the �ocess which 
the whole of European culture was undergoing in the 
nineteenth century - the breakdown of the old 
cultural values according to which man had lived up 
to this time, the traumatic "tearing consoiousness 
loose from its roots." g) The specific idols by 
which men had lived so securely were no longer 
satisfactory. Instead, man was plagued by insecurity, 
and his culture assailed from all sides by strange, 
alien forces. 
Before the blight of madness engulfed 
Nietzsche's mind completely, he was able to give us 
a sound and penetrating analysis of the culturaJ. 
crisis in the nineteenth century, as well as suggest 
a road to recovecy. Although every aspect of human
cultural enterprise seemed to lead man deeper and 
deeper into alienation, perverting the possibility 
of a genuinely human existence, this low water mark 
in human culture also pointed to its dialectical 
transcendenoe - the era of a culture dedicated to 
life instead of its repression. 
For the new level.of human existence, a new 
kind of man was necessary, and Nietzsche proposed 
Superman - bountiful creator of the new culture, a 
perfect balance of Dionysian passion and Apollinian 
restraint. Nietzsche's •solution' to the problem of 
culture reflects his deep admiration for the early 
Greeks who lived.by a wholesome quality of life which 
moderhity, sadly, could not match. 
Nietzsche's indictment of his age is indeed 
severe. Collins writes of Nietzsche as a critio of 
culture that· "his keen psychological insight into 
human motives enabled him to detect a basio rottenness 
beneath.•••••••••146/, •••• 
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beneath the facade of nineteenth century optimism••••• 
However perfervid and mixed with metaphysical myth 
were his oultura1 observations; they also oontained 
shrewd diagnoses, still relevant for understandillg 
ourselves as the heirs of the nineteenth century;" lO) 
William Barrett in his book Irrational. Man comments 
that the problem of man could never again be taokled 
on a pre-Nietzeohea.n level,.for it was Nietzsche who 
showed in its fullest sensei the thoroughly problematical.
and complex nature of man. l) 
What Nietzsche deplored was the loss of dignity 
in nineteenth century culture. The charaoterless face 
of culture, the deference for wealth, the commercialism, 
the impersonality of mechanisation - these were all. 
inevitable consequences of the Industrial Revolution, 
consequences which seemed to be driving out a:n:y nobler, 
more dignified impulses in man. Culture had become 
•practical• and Nietzsche abhorred this standardisation
and stultification of human potential. He desired that
culture reappropriate the dignity lost to it, and become
a means to self' transcendence, to selt over-coming.
The new culture and the new man is to be free 
of any form of transcendental justification, of any 
kind of divine sanotion. This call to man to remain 
true to the earth, not to be seduced by the promises 
of illusory happiness in some otherworldly realm� ad.de 
more dignity and demands a greater responsibility to 
the human condition than had been ever required before. 
The self-oreation of man as a cultural being within 
the cycle of Beooming, the recognition of Becoming as 
natural, and.the aclmowledgement of human finiteness, 
contingency and mortality - all these Nietzsche demands 
as part of the cultural re-awakening. In this, he proves 
the forerunner of Heidegger who echoed Nietzsche's call 
to accept••••••••• 147/ ••••• .-
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to accept and to love one 1 s fate, this being the pre­
condition of a more realistic form of existence� 
A culture focussed on man as finite being 
rather.than on some abstract absolute - this is 
what Nietzsche urges man to pursue if he is ever to 
regain.the dignity and self respect of.which Christ­
ianity, Darwinism, mechanisation, eto.; had robbed 
man. Amor fati and the responsibility this oarries 
could mean the start of a new creative freedom for 
man, freedom from an ethics which is inimical to the 
fundamental instincts of life� Celebration of life, 
rather than its repression, oannot but aid cu1ture to 
free itself from the deadwood that paralyses it. 
Nietzsche's probing ethical analysis becomes a 
pertinent �oritique of culture, a viv.i,section of 
modern man�" 12
) 
Despite the value of Nietzsche!s diagnosis 
of an alienated and alienating culture, we have to be 
on our guard when evaluating his •solution', his 
vision of the road to recovery. His genuine and 
legitimate criticisms of many aspects of nineteenth 
century culture and our.own possible agreement with 
his criticisms mu.st not, by their sheer enthusiasm, 
lead us to an uncritical acceptance of the alternative 
ho proposes. 
We must consider carefully the question of 
whether Nietzsche, in fact, does provide us with a 
valid and feasible alternative to the whole problem 
of culture� His own role he saw as that of a 'herald 
and precursor• of new values which will guarantee. 
culture as the ••self - surpassing activity of man. 11 l))
The focal point of the revaluation of values are 
Superman, the Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence 
of the Equ.a.J.. 
As far as••••••••••148/ ••••• 
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As .far as Superman is concerned• Nietzsche 
sometimes refers to the idea as if he means an 
individual, and other times as it he means the entire 
species of Supermen. What emerges olea.rly howe�er; 
is that ·Superman is a specific type or model of man 
on which hinges Nietzsche's •solution' to the problem 
of culture. In which case, we must guard against the 
danger of absolutising it, despite its appeal to the 
highest potential of man.
The whole history of philosophy is evidence 
.of man• s persistent,· even obstinate sea.rah for truth� 
It is a reflection also of the perspeotival and mu.lti­
fnoeted nature of hum.an truth. Vastly different 
visions of reality and models of man have been offered 
by philosophe:rs in different times- each equally valid 
in the light of specific historical and existential. 
circumstances. Nietzsche's •solution' must be seen 
in the light of the above. 
Nietzsche himself realised the perspectival ' 
. . . . . . . � . . . 
:n.�:t;:ure qf trut�. He saw how huoan thought is oonoerned 
� . ·; , \ .:. � .. � . 
. w�th imp.osing form and structure ( the Apollinian 
·element')' on a formless reality ( tlie Dionysian eiement) •
Different men in different societies have specific
conceptual schemes according to which they decide the
nature of truth. He writes: "suppose that this, too,
is only an interpretation - and one will be eager
enough.to raise this objection. Well - so muoh the
bettor�" 14)
There are times, however, when Nietzsche 
writes of his own •solution• as if it were an 
undeniable and exclusive truth, when he claims the 
greatest reality and genuineness for his own theory. 
Who is to say which theory is more val.uable sinoe 
each� to some extent, satisfies the need of its time. 
In Nietzsche's •••••••�149/ •• , 
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In Nietzsche's writings, we are constantly 
reminded of h�s horror at the decline of oulture, and 
of the depth of his desire to see the rise of a new, 
more vital culture. One gets the impression that it 
is this intense concern for cultui-e and 1l)8n whioh 
leads him to such excesses of thought and expression 
as, for instance, "I was the first to discover truth."lS) 
He seems to want to shook man into reality, using the 
most excessive means. And, as a result, there exists 
in certain respects, a contradiction between his 
obvious awareness of the many possibilities of truth, 
and his belief that it is his own philosophy which 
provides man with ultimate explanations and formulas 
of existence. 
To go on with our examination of Nietzsche's 
conception of Superman - we consider an important 
issue raised by Barrett� "Is the Superman to be the 
extraordinary man, or the complete and whole man? 
Will the superman, then, be the titanically striving 
individual, dwelling on the mountaintop of the spirit,
or will he be the man who has realised within the 
world his own individual capacities for wholeness?"16 )
Nietzsche proposes noble neans to return man 
to a more authentic form of existence, but are they 
feasible means as well? It is admirable to call on 
man to surpass himself, to realise the full potential 
of his being, but is man capable of the titan.ism which 
Nietzsche demands? For man to beoome Superman would 
require the total tranafonnation of his present nature 
to a condition which seems to me to be qu_i te beyond 
human attainment. 
We mu.st always keep in mind the underside of 
man's character - the petty, the paltry, the mean, 
and the mediocre - which existain the human condition 
as inescapably as the noble, the brave and the 
magnanimous •••••••••• 150/ •••••
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magnanimous. This duality is reflected by Zara­
thustra who wants to climb upwards and the dwarf who 
wants to pull him downwards to earth. NietEsohe 
wants only one side of the coin - the ideal side,. 
though he is aware of the existence of the other 
side, for he says, in oan there is not only the 
creator, the.ha.t:1Der, the sculptor but also matter, 
excess, clay, mire, folly and ohaos. But he chooses 
only the exalted and the supreme. Zarathustra says 
"Dwarf, either thou or I." 17) Ba.:rTett writes in
this connection: "To be a whole man - a round man, 
as the Chinese say• Western man may have to.learn 
to be less Faustian. A touch of the average, the 
nediocre may be necessary ballast for huoan nature. 1118 )
Despite the fact that all raen are not equal 
in potential, that there are sone more gifted and 
mor� capable than others, Nietzsche's aristocratic 
ethic can lead to a dangerous situation where one's 
scorn and contempt for the less capable members of 
hur.:ianity (whom Nietzsche often referred to as •the 
botched and the bungled') can lead to a desire for 
their repression. Nietzsche constantly re�inds us
that the mass of humans have no claim to the level 
of existence enjoyed by superman._ In fact, the 
majority exists only for the good of the highest 
specimens of hum.anity. Rather than submit to the 
will of God, they should submit to the will of 
Superman • .  
so, the position of Superman is one which 
demands the greatest degree of tolerance and care 
in order not to degenerate into a destructive 
tyranny. Men without the necessary control and 
restraint that ought to accompany the role of 







mankind, believing that Nature and Destiny are on their 
' 
side, that they are in fact the •torohbearers of history• 
!his is.one of the dangers of his €.1.itist conception of 
culture, that is, culture exists only as a means for 
the well-being of Superman. 
The olaio to true happiness, that is, happiness 
of the kind experienced by Superman, made by the oedioore 
majority is invalid-in the Nietzsohean conception of 
life, since only Superman can live at this exalted level. 
Bu.t why should a truly authentic form of existence be 
open on1y to Supernan? What about the rest of humanity? 
The old cultural values satisfy the average man, but; 
in Nietzsche's opinion, still lead to nihilism and
alienation. Why then, should not the average.man 
strive for a more fruitful level of existence, 
it is not the level of the Superman? 
Nietzsche's 'solution• to the cultural. 




as human relations are concerned, Nietzsche had despised 
pity,_ syrapathy and compassion as wea.lmess. His conteopt
for these emotions blind him to tho fact that meaningfu.1 
huruan relations can be founded on genuine love and
sympathy for one's fellow man - love which is not self­
repression and sympathy which is not weakness. 
As far as Will to Power is concerned Nietzsche 
regarded it as the essence of all being, the activating 
principle of the universe. Every living thing in the 
world is driven by the will to power. But is it 
legitioate to reduce all impulses in the world to one 
basic impulse, to lay down the essence of Being as 
will to power? Collins writes: "The tendency towards 
power is, indeed, an important component of the 
human personality; it is.also a fact that man's will 
exercises some efficient, causal. control over his 
cognitive ••••••••• 152/••••• 
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cognitive powers. But from these data, it cannot be 
concluded that all cosmic energies constitute a 
-
single, voluntaristic movement of becoming and power--
seeking, sufficient unto itself. All things are 
moved by an appetite for their own perfeotion. Yet 
whether this inclination is one, universal, oosmio 
will and whether it spri?}8s from itself alone, with
no transcendent implications are speculative issues 
that cannot be settled in terms of a life-promoting 
myth." lg)
Nietzsche's reductionism of everything to will 
to power is ha.rmfu.l to the organic unity of human 
impulses, where various impulses exist side by side 
without one being regarded as more basic than. the 
others. In the final analysis, will to power, like 
the eternal recurrence of the equal remains,in Collins' 
words, "only a private reading of the universe. tt 20>
As far as Eternal Recurrence is concerned,the 
inevitable cyclic return of everything that has 
happened in the past has certain implications which 
Nietzsche seems to overlook at times. If things 
reour to all eternity, what-ever is, whatever ha.a been. 
and whatever will be, all exist legitimately as 
elements of the oyolio pattern. Superman has been 
and will be again but so also• will the· mediocre 
and the weak. This is the law of the cosmos. 
The peaks of culture as we11· as the murkiest 
depths are equally inevitable stages in the rhythm of 
eternal recurrence. The sterile values of Christianity, 
democracy, socialism, etc., when seen in terms of tho 
cyclical pattern, are all as necessary as the glorious 
era of superman. The negative is not evil � a long 
range point of view, since it stands in a dialectical 
relationshiP•••••••••l53/ ••• 
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relationship with the positive. Superman can only 
emerge from the culture of the mediocre man. 
In the light of the above, Nietzsche's severe 
attack on the various aspects of nineteenth century 
culture seems wijustified. His own theory of eternal 
recurrence demands that he see the various stages of 
human culture• whether they be exalted or wretched, 
as standing in inevitable dialectical ·relationships 
with each other, where the emergence of the one is 
dependent on the perfectly legitimate existence of 
the other. Nietzsche's alternative may be more 
valuable in the light of its life - promoting qualities, 
but it is not more valuable or� rather, it is equally 
valuable as the existing mediocre oulture in the sense 
that they a.re both elements of the pattern of eternal 
recurrence. 
The cardinal points of Nietzsche's •solution' 
to the question of culture, the essential elements of 
the new creed are Supernan, Transvaluation of Values, 
Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence. In the final 
analysis, all these require the same kind of faith, 
the same degree of strong belief demanded from those 
who adhere to a Chri�tian God, for instance, .In 
Nietzsche's oreed the gods are different. So, too, 
is the prophet and th0 eschatology. Bu.t the faith 
and devotion demanded are the same • 
. What we have said about Nietzsche also, in 
essence, applies to Ma.reuse, different though his 
approach to the cultural situation.of his time may 
be. Like Nietzsche was in his day, Marcuse is 
deeply disturbed by the state of culture today. 
This leads him to analyse those trends which seem 
to be leading man into alienation, and also outline 
means by which •••••••• 154/ ••• 
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means by which man oan return to a more authentic form 
of life. 
As with Nietzsche, in fact, as with any theorist 
we must iisti:ngu.ish between the value of Marouse's 
exposure of the repressive aspects of contemporary 
culture; and the va1idity of the •solution• he 
proposos to initiate a new level of human cultural 
existence.· Also Marcuse•s criticism of contemporary 
society, like that of Nietzsche in his time, must be 
seen within the framework of his model or theoretical 
soheme� I£ one accepts his model as totally valid, 
then his criticisms can also be seen as tota1ly 
relevant. 
However, the fact that his model, like all 
others, is controversial and debatable, must not lead 
us to dismiss all his criticisms as purely arbitrary. 
Other critics of contemporary society echo some of 
Marcuse•s ow.n criticisms, There is no denying that 
technologica.1 society does have a levelling effect on 
man; that it conditions man and reduces him to a 
functionalised existence. In this respect, certain 
criticisms directed �Y Ma:rcuse_against technologidal 
society can be regarded as va1id. 
Araong those who point to the warning signals, 
to the dangers which threaten our culture, Marcuse is 
one of the most articulate. In his writings, we 
discover a deoP-seated distrust of a culture which 
seems to offer man so much - so many more material 
comforts and benefits, so many more luxuries than 
ware ever possible before in the history of man. Yet, 
beneath the apparent rationality and benevolence of 
contemporary culture, Ma.reuse detects a dangerous 
irrationality. The benevolence is a veneer which 
only serves to conceal the steady repression of all 
possibilities••••••••• 155/ •• 
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possibilities of a truly liberated human existence. 
As Nietzsche had pointed out the dangers of 
uncri tioa.J. acceptance o_f the demooratio outlook, 
Marouse shows the dangers inherent in the 'pluralistic 
tolerance• of the status quo; whioh enables it to 
assimilate all opposition. He w�ns also against the 
dangers of the 'happy consciousness• of the majority 
of men - satisfaction with the establishment on 
account of the many benefits it p�ovides, so that 
men no longer desire change. 
Marouse•s writings indicates his own alienation 
from today's cul.ture which, for him, is one oomplex 
system of repressive conditioning, a conditioning which, 
for the most part, men have internalised and made their 
own. So,.no rift exists between public and private 
interests, between those in odntroi and those being 
manipulated• 
Marcuse believes that, despite its reputed 
neutrality, technology functions in the interests of 
those in power. Political power is rendered more 
effective by its control of technology, which promises 
greater efficiency and higher standards of living. 
From this position of control, economic and political 
power spreads its domination into evecy avenue of 
life. The sexual, psychological, philosophical and 
literary realms, previously traditional areas of 
freedom, come to reflect the mechanism of repression. 
Marcuse does not reserve his censure for the 
West alone. Bureaucratic Eflites function equally 
effectively in the West and in the East. Harrington 
writes: "As the West becomes more collectivised under 
a managerial dl.ite and Russia becomes wea1thier under 
a political. Eflite, the conscious self-seeking decisions 
of a minority could become the basis of both economies. 
In 
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In terms of their evolution, there would be a trem­
endous oontrast between GeneraJ. Motors and a 
Commissariat of Transportation. In terms of economic 
function and practice, the two entities could come 
to resemble one another more and more. u 21)
Marcuse exposes the claims of both East and 
West to provide man with greater freedom of existenooi· 
Alienation is prevalent in both camps, since the 
means of produotion are not in the hands of the 
immediate producers. Totalitarian control of resources 
still exists, despite the satisfaction of the needs 
of more and more people. Neither capitalism nor 
communism really exists for the freedom of the people. 
They are no more than different modes of domination. 
The 'happy consciousness' generated by the 
satisfaction of needs is, as Ma.reuse wamis, perhaps 
the greatest danger of all, since it leads to an· 
uncritical acceptance of the �tatus guo whioh offers 
benefits and imposes unfreedom contemporaneously. 
Human beings identify so greatly with the status.quo, 
finding their souls in their cars and hi-fi sets, that 
they become indifferent to the mechanisation of life, 
mental impoverishment, absence of seli responsibility 
and so one 
Democracy, popular education, etc., have led 
to a wider diffusion of culture. Big business concerns 
realised the value of producing mass cultural. products, 
a process which the media of communication soon 
accelerated. Technology satisfied the mass demand for 
trivial and comfortable cultural products, the mass 
becoming "more and more malleable with every advance 
in technology." 22) The collectivisation of taste,
the transformation of man into homo oonsumena, of the 
child into a •consumer trainee• - Marcuse .warns against 
these very real •••••••• 157/ •••• 
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these vGcy real dangers. 
But can his own •solution• gu.arantee the 
freedom he desires? Marcuse.is, at times, rather 
pessimistic about the possible existence of the new 
society but at other times he writes as if the new 
era has already been ushered in. As evidence for this. 
belief he mentions the fight for liberation in Vietnam, 
cu.ha and Chinat student opposition both in the East 
and the Wesi; and the prophecies contained in the 
works of men like Freud and Nietzsche. In this 
connection Robinson writes: "Marcuse defended the 
possibility of a non ... repressive civilisation on two 
fronts; one theoretical} the other historical. In 
historical terms he attempted to identify certain 
trends in the development of contemporary civilisation 
which moved in the direction of a non-repressive order, 
or created the historical precondition for such an 
order. At the level.of theory, he tried to demonstrate 
how the inner logic of Freud's thought, and that of 
several other major nineteenth and twentieth aentury 
theorists, suggested a way out of tho dilemma of 
repression. Characteristically, Marcuse devoted muoh 
less attention to the historical trends facilitating 
a non-repressive civilisation than to the matter of 
demonstrating its theoretical legitimacy•••••••••••• 
Marcuso seemed to imply that the mere conceptualisation 
of a particular historical possibility (such as that 
of a non-repressive civilisation) represented more 
than half the battle. The simple fact that the 
wri-tings of Hegel, Marx, Freud and others contained 
such splendid indictments of the existing order, 
such.trenchant arguments for a non-repressive society, 
tended to make Marcuse speak as if the new order were 
already an actuality." 23)
Marcuse •••••••••• 158/ ••••• 
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Ma.reuse confuses the genuine desire for changa 
(and the need for change is indeed great) with the 
belief that a non-repressive society is already under 
way. The continued existence of the status quo 
oontradicts Marcuse•s theory that the dialeotica1 
emergence of human fulfilment put of the depths of 
repression, is inevitable. 
Marcuse's alternative demands that the fruits
of scientific and technological progress be used in 
the interests of all rather than enriching those in 
power alone. This call seems to me to be rather 
utopian in the sense that it demands an entirely 
different type of individual in whose 'biology' self 
interest is absent and the welfare of other men an 
important.consideration. This would require, as with 
Nietzsche, the transformation of man: into something 
other than human, for "can man really sacrifice self­
interest altogether in favour of general interest ••••• 
or is self-interest the very criterion of being hUIJ.an, 
so that the conflict between self-interest and 
general interest is natural and cannot be overcome 
by methodological. constitution ••••••• ?" 24) Changes
in society will.most certainly occur since human life 
is never static, but it seems likely that these will 
occur only within the framework of control by the 
bureaucracy, as Marcuse himself points out in Soviet 
Marxism. _" ••••••• as long as the East - West conflict 
remains a determining economic and politica1 factor, 
it precludes the decisive transformation, for it 
serves to justify •••·••••••repressive competition 
and competitive mobilisation on a tota1itarian scala. 1125)
To think of more sweeping changes seems over-optimistic 
especially in view of the contentment of the majority 
with the existing state of affairs. 
Another ••••••••• 159/ ••••
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Another controversial point is Marcuse•a choice 
of the revolutionary forces capable of ef:feoting a.
decisive transformation in society. He sees students, 
blacks, the poor, the Wlemployed, etc., as revolutionary 
agents of liberation. It is their confrontation with 
affl�ent society that mey mark the and of the present 
era. Undoubtedly, the elements Ma.rouse refers to, are 
in conflict with the status q�o - this is what they all 
have in common. But what percentage of them are in 
conflict with the status quo merely because they can­
not themselves participate in the affluent society? 
If the poor and the Wlemployed, for instance, 
were assimilated into the affluent society, would they 
still be in conflict with the system? Do they want 
a better life for all men or just for themselves? To 
identify those who stand against the system as agents 
of liberation merely be�ause they stand in conflict 
with the status quo, is to idealise them and give them 
a responsibility (i.e., the transformation of this 
sooioty into a non-repressive one) which, perhaps, 
they do not even care to assume. So, "to be in 
conflict with the established order is not necessarily 
to be an agent of liberation. 11 26)
We can also ask the question - what will social. 
relationships be like in the liberated state? It is 
not sufficient, I think, to see thera, as Marcuse does, 
only in terms of the absence of domination and the 
transformation by libido of all human relations. 
Marcuse•s vision of meaningful social relations is 
that of a state where all men oan achieve free self­
realisation. Bu.t some form of conflict is bound to 
continue, since men can choose different modes of 
fulfilment and satisfaction. It is quite possible, 
then, that this conflict could lead to new forms of 
domination•••••••••••• 160/ ••• 
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domination and repression, considering the unprediotabla 
behaviour of hwnan beings.
In his writings, Marcuse maintains that the 
majority of raen are so much a part of the system that 
they are incapable of determining what their real needs 
are, as against the false needs imposed on them by 
the status quo. Marcuse maintains that a distinction 
between true and false needs can only be made by 
individuals free from all repression. And as long 
as men live in a society like ours, they will never 
be free to decide on what their true needs are. 
Marcuse talces upon himself the right to say 
of othors what their true needs are, what true happiness 
and true freedom mean. But this situation is potentially 
explosive since Marcuse views the majority of men as 
incapable of autonomous choice. If the majority are 
to be merely "objects of benevolent revolutionary 
concern i• 27) · with no say in anything oohcerning them,
thon it is quite possible that new modes of domination 
may arise. 
The fact that new modes of domination always 
a.rise is a typically human characteristic which 
Ma.reuse does not seem to talce into account. His
aspiration for a society without apy form of domination 
can be regarded as utopian. Is it possible to have a 
society without any form of control? That there will 
be some men who.assume control and others who consent, 
in some measure, to be controlled seems to me to be 
part of the human condition. The question which arises, 
then, is whether the average man desires the establish• 
ment of Marcuse•s utopian •solution', whether, in faoti, 
man can live in a control - free utopia where he has to 
make his own decisions on a majority of issues. 
In any case ••••••••• 161/ ••••
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In on:y case, the distinction arulo by Ka.reuse 
between true a;nd false needs is questiono.ble. It 
seems to me that r.my fore of society, at least origin­
ally, is based on man's n9eds as they emer.ge in the 
specific historical. situation in which he finds him­
self'. So, needs which se�m fnls(! from Marcuse•s 
utopian point of view, mo,y y-et satisfy the majority 
of men in a specific a:ttuation. So the question 
arises whether ta.an wishes to be fyced frora tpe 'false• 
nee4s, the •nruu.pulation' and •repression' that can 
be fowid in technological society? Ma.reuse is, in 
fact, aware of the contentment of the majority of nen 
with the existing situation, o. contentment which 
contradicts his call for change. 
In this same connection we can also ask 
another question• whether both capitalise n.nd 
established communism do not eenuinely believe in the 
good of their respective systccs, whathar the 
advocates of the two systems deliberately set out.to 
exploit and repross me.nor whether the,-•o not adhere 
in som� way to the conviction that theirs is the bost 
way to achieve •the good life'• Ayn Rand, tor instance• 
in her philosophy expresses her firm cour.li. tment to 
"laissez-faire caKita.lism as the best defender ot the
rights of man." 2) Equally tirra is the conviction
of theorists of established cori1r.runisin thnt their 
system is the roost effective one to prooote froedom 
and happiness. 
Marcuse hopes that once science and technology 
aro. used in the interests of a.ll men, a. transvalua.tion 
of values will occur. Formo:rly 111etaphysical ideas of 
freudom, justice, beauty, etc., would acquire a 
c::oncrete conte11� in the technoloqico.J. sphere. Thio 
is what Marcu.se calls the •q1.1antification ot val.�s•­
using technology to free man from o_ppres$ion, hunger, 
anxiety, 
war ••••••••• 162/ ••• 
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wa:r, etc., and to guarantee an au.the-nt:lo existe� in 
this way. 
But is Marouse•s conception of freedom an 
adequate one? Is freedom from want and suffering the 
entire content of freedom? We can also ask - freedom 
for what? What are we going to do in our liberated 
-
state? Is it sufficient for Marcuse to answer in the 
words of a young black girl that "for the first time 
in our life, we.shall be free to think about what we 
are going to do�" 29)
If· freedom means merely freedom from material 
want, what does one do in one•s leisure time once this 
freedom has been secured? Surely the content of freedom 
should be wide enough to go beyond mere freedom from 
material want, and inolude the creative activities of 
one's free time as also advancing the freedom of man. 
This contradiction between Marcuse•s theory of freedom 
and the problem of leisure time underlines the danger 
of Marcuse•s reductionism of all needs and values to 
material ones • 
. Marcuse has attempted to give us an account 
of how, onee total automation occurs, man ought best 
to utilise the free time that would be left to hj�. 
But his treatment of the problem is inadequate in that 
all he does is to speak, rather vaguely, about man 
employing his.leisure time for the promotion of the 
•art of life•� for living by the aesthetio ethos and
so on. However, the problem of free time and the
absence of work deserves greater attention.
Ma.rouse has not considered the problem of 
whether the disappearance of work as a cultural. 
ethic may not lead to a new crisis, to a bewildering, 
empty freedom, Have all men the capacity to live by 
the aesthetic ethos, as Ma.reuse visualises? 
Do all men ••••••••• 163/ ••• 
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Do all men have the ingenuity to live with freedom? 
The proper utilisation of.freedom woul.d indeed demand 
a new type of human being, or rather superhuman being, 
and this, aa I pointed out before, is an idealistic 
attempt to alter the human condition to a state where 
it is unrecognisable. 
Another problem also, is one which Freud 
pointed out in Civilisation and Its Disoontents -.that 
without the coercion of work upon the mass of men, 
society would disintegrate into an orgy of instinctual 
gratification. Freud had also seen a therapeutic value 
in work - work as a means of linking man to reality. 
To return to the problem of whether all men 
can live by the aesthetic principle - there would be 
no point in a situation where only those who can live 
creatively.do so, while the rest.merely exist as 'homo 
consumens•, living out a passive; parasitic exist�nce. 
It becomes quite clear from Marouse•s writings that his 
is a powerful expression of critical analysis, but when 
it comes to an explicit tactical programme of how to 
effect change as we11 as what one will do in the 
liberated order, Ma.reuse remains rather sketchy. 
MacIntyre sees Marcuse•s failure in the above 
respect as connected with his lack of interest in 
empirical facts, for instance, what are we going to 
do in a sexually liberated state? Marcuse•s indict-
ment of monogamio genital sexual culture is severe 
indeed, but uncontrasted with a serious account of 
what is possible in its place. Maointyre argues that 
tho psychoanalytic writer Wilhelm Reich, for instance, 
has given a more effective and explioit account of the 
contrast between a liberated and an unliberated sexuality.JO) 
Even where Ma.reuse gives some indications, for 
example, where he speaks approvingly of perversions 
because ••••••••• 164/ •••••
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because these stand in the opposite direction of a 
repressive sexuality employed in the interest of 
reproduction only, he tends to resort to extremes. 
Marcuse views perversions as leading to greater 
human freedom sinoe they are grounded in genuine 
erotic impulses. Bu.t Marcuse does not consider the 
kind of perversion that is mere debauchery and, in 
this sense is still repressive of true human freedom. 
A frequent criticism directed against Ma.reuse 
is that he pr0aches anarchy and violence, that by 
calling for a rejection of the st�!U,s guo he welcomes 
lawlessness and dfi.sorder. But this is too simplistic 
and convenient an explanation, Marcuse does reject 
the s�atus ,4UO because he believes it leads to
alienation, but the very fact that he offers an 
alternative order to the status quo indicates that he 
does not desire anarchy. His Essay on Liberation 
demonstrates this most explicitly. 
By the transformation of values into techno­
logical tasks Marcuse hopes to rescue Nature from 
exploitation by monopolistic forces, to be used only 
for civilising purposes. In this way, Nature, Man 
and Society are to be brought in line with each other. 
However, one cannot deny that M:arcuse's stand can 
-
lead to anarchy, even though he does not consciously 
advocate it. Anarchy could bo the practical rosul� 
if one agitates against the status g,uo and yet cannot 
replace it with something qualitatively different. 
So, the problem really revolves around whether 
Marcuse's conception of qualitative transcendence 
is feasible or not. 
As far as the problem of violence is concerned,
unfortunately, Marcuse is never very clear on this point, 
and this ••••••• 165/ ••••• 
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and this ambiguity could prove dangerous. Sometimes 
when he speaks of the 'Great Refusal', that is, 
refusal by men in significant positions, for instance, 
scientists, to participate in the system any longer, 
thus bringing it to a stancistill, he seems to.discount 
violence as a means of effecting change. But, at. 
other times he appears to welcome it, for example, 
when he speaks of the violence inherent in the status 
quo in so far as it imposes its will on men, and the
need to counter this with violence. Moreover, his 
giving certain groups the idea that they are the 
torchbearers of historical reason, may well prove 
an incitement to violence. 
As far as the less developed countries are
concerned, Marouse hopes that the over-production and 
over--sophistication of life which charaoterises 
technologically advanced countries will not be 
reproduced here. Rather, he hopes that the best 
features of technology will be combined with indigenous 
modes of life in these areas.to produce a wholesome, 
individualistic, bureaucracy�free sociat�,
Marouse�s vision in this respect seems rather 
naivea Marrington asks s 11Is it possible to utilize 
mass means of production and avoid the mass corruption 
of spirituality?" )l) Routinization, bureauoratis­
ation, over-sophistication, eto., constitute an 
inevitable part of technological life, Mass
communication in no time standardizes all reaotions 
and imposes a common way of thinking, feeling and 
acting. "In point of fact, as Max Weber and 
Schur.a.peter and many others realised sometime ago, 
bureaucracies are a characteristic and inevitable 
· 
32)mode of the modern age •••••••• •  • a fate of the age•" 
As far as••••••••••• 166/,, •• 
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As far as human needs a.re concerned, Ma.reuse 
hopes that the 1 quantification of values' will ensure 
their true fulfilment. Man's materiaJ. needs will, 
doubtless, be well taken oare of. But w111 man•s 
other needs - his aesthetic� spiritual and intellectual 
needs - will these be automatically satisfied once 
material needs are fulfilled, as Ma.reuse seems to 
imagine. 
Marcuse proposes that man's intellectual and 
imaginative capacities will be fully absorbed by 
scientific and technologicaJ. planning. But is the 
sum of man to be the imaginative technocrat? Such 
a conception is daatructive to the unity of man. 
Redu<i ng man's various facets to one is, like Nietzsche's 
reduction of everything in the cosmos to Will to power, 
dangerous and unrealistioL "!n this way, all values. 
would actually be reducible to one common denominator, 
namely, man's material needs. But surely this trans­
formation of man•s intellectual, aesthetical and 
spiritual needs into material ones and the translation 
of all values into teohnological functions, give a 
distorted picture of man and his real needs." 33) 
As G.A.Rauche points out, Marcuse returns 
full circle to the same kind of one - dimensionality 
he criticises so severely. In this respect, Marouse 
cannot be said to have •solved' the problem of man's 
authentic existence in terms of the outline he 
presents for a non-repressive society. Neither for 
that matter.has Nietzsche, for, inevitably, both their 
alternatives pose fresh problems which can again lead 
to the unauthenticity and alienation Nietzsche and 
Marouse fought against in nineteenth century and 
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Having completed a comparative as well as a 
critical study of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Harbert Marcuse in relation to their specific 
oultures, we come to a point where we can draw a few 
general conclusions.
Nietzsche and Marcuse were examined in their 
roles as critics of their specific cultures (Nietzsche 
of the nineteenth century and Ma.reuse of contemporary 
technological society), and also in their roles as
theorists proposing different alternatives to rescue 
man from what they believe to be situations of 
cultural crisis, to lead man to a more authentic form 
of existence. 
The alternatives proposed by both philosophers 
must be seen in the light of the human, all too human 
oondition - that men propose theories and 'solutions' 
which are bound to be problematic. Utopian theoretical 
constructions can lead, in practice, tm the same kind
of alienation and unfre0dom which they hope to resoue 
man from. "Men must hold both ideas and ideals, but 
they should not regard these as being wholly realisable. 
We need to comprehend the nature of utopianism. 
Utopianism, once it achieves power, becomes dogmatic, 
and it can quite readily create human suffering in the 
name and in the ·. cause of its own soientism and 
idealism." l) 
Utopia, thus, is always one step ahead of man. 
The perfect •solution' is beyond the reach of man. 
In fact •••••• 170/ •••• 
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I:nfact� it is an other than human condition. Man and 
human existence are both problematic because of the 
oont:i.ngenoy� finiteness and historicity of human life 
and because of changing needs and oond.itions. There­
fore, it is doubtful whether one theorist can effect­
ively solve all problems for all time. This is the 
lesson that the history of philosophy and the history 
of man teaches us •. It is, however, a situation not 
to be despaired at, since by the oontinual search for 
'solutions', the horizon of hum.an truth and of human 
potential is forever widened. "The task for contempor61.I"Y' 
man is to accept the reality that society is unperfeot, 
but also to understand that humanist, humanitarian 
dreams and visions are necessary in order to reform 
society� in order to improve and advance it." 2)
As far as Marouse is concerned, cert�in of his 
criticisms are especially relevant to us.in th& 
technology - dominated twentieth century. Marcuse•s 
fears about the functionalisation of contemporary 
culture are eohoed by other thinkers as well. 
Jaoques.Ellul� a French criric of modern teclmologioal 
society, describes in The Technological Societz tho 
manner in whioh "on autonomous technology is in the 
process of talcing over the traditional values of 
every society without exception� subverting and 
suppressing these values to produce at last a mono­
lithio world muture in which all non-technologioal 
difference and variety is mere appearance. 0 3) 
Ellul points out how man had oreated technology 
to free himself from the extremities of nature, but 
in rloing so, has created a new, more oppressive 
extJ!'emity� Ellul believes that technology has alienated 
man from nature and created an artificial and mechanioal 
environment ••••••••••• 171/ •••• 
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environment in which man's natura1 inclinations a.re 
"8mpered with. He writes: "The new order was meant 
to be a buffer between man and nature. Unfortunately; 
it has evolved autonomously in such a way that man 
has lost all contact with his natural framework and 
has to do only with the organised technical inter­
mediary which sustains relations both with.the world 
of life and with the world of brute matter� Enolosed 
within his artificial creation, man finds that 
is •no exit', that he cannot pierce the shell 




he was adapted fo� hundreds of thousands of years •••••. 
It is easy to boast of victory over ancient oppression, 
but what if victory has been achieved at the price of 
an even greater subjection to the forces of the 
artificial. necessity of the technical society whioh 
has come to dominate our lives?" 4)
Another critic, Lewis Mumf'ord, maintains that 
technology ignores the human faotor, and "instead of 
serving humane purposes, automates even the human 
being�" 5) In The Myth of the Machine he points out
how technology which can contribute to human dignity 
-
and freedom.is not doing so, since it disregards 
huraan needs, which should be the·centre of all our 
schemes of thought. Mumford calls on man to "take 
upon himself, once more, the wide range of capabilities 
and potentialities he surrendered when he developed 
the ma.chine�" G) 
Erich Fromm speaks of the new spectre haunting 
the world - not communism but mechanised man and 
mechanised society. He writes in The Revolution of 
Ho2e; "In the search for scientific truth, man oame 
acrmss knowledge that he could use for the domination 
of nature ••••••••• 172/ ••••
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of nature. He had tremendous success. But in the 
one-sided emphasis on technique and material consumption; 
man lost touoh with himself, with life ••••••• The machine 
he built became so powerful that it developed its own 
programme, which now deterraines man•s thinking."?) 
Since the keynote of contemporary culture is 
the dominance of technology, the dominance of the 
machine, it is not surprising that theorists and critics 
of society ponder over the complex problems this gives 
rise to, expressing their fears at the dangers inherent 
in the over-emphasis on technology. One of tho questions 
invariably asked is whether the present direction of 
technological progress is not leading man into a greater 
'Wlfreedom than the one it proposes to free him from, and 
whether there ought not to be a redirection of scientific 
and technological progress towards the genuine promotion 
of life and freedom? One wonders if it is absolutely 
inevitable that technology should satisfy material needs 
at the expense of spiritual fre·edom or is there some way 
to prevent the technologisation of the human spirit. 
In the last two centuries, man has changed more 
than at any other time since the beginning of history. 
Any further changes depend on a reversal in ma.n's use of 
the machine. The tyranny of the machine and of those in 
control of it must be shattered if we are to achieve a 
more human level of existence. Man must consoiously truce 
control of his world and the potential.contained within 
it" to achieve a truly human existence. The end must 
not be forgotten because of the magnitude of the means 
available to us. 
The choice of whether science and technology will 
lead to.freedom or tyranny lies with man. And.in this 
respect, the responsibility of the scientist , the 
politician •••••••••• 173/ ••••
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politician - of all those in oontro1 - is tremendous. 
In faot, some people are wondering whether it is safe 
to leave the problems of society in the hands of the 
scientist alone, even though the world is penetrated 
through and through by science. Men are wondering 
whether science in itself can provide the sum of 
hurnan values, or wheth0r the pursuit of scientific 
knowledge is only a part of our Western values. 
The creation of a new type of human being in 
the Marcusean sense, a being who has a highly developed 
sense of responsibility to others, may be a rather 
Utopian demand. In ony- case, it must be remembered 
that even Marouse•s 'ideal' tends to end up in the 
teohnologioal functionalism. that he oriticisea.
However, the realisation that human actions have 
greater repercussions now than ever before and that 
no country, however great a.power it may be, is a 
totally self-contained unit; may lead to some kind of 
concerted effort to tackle human alienation and prevent 
the total despoliation of the earth. In this respect, 
the recent conference on environn1ental pollution problemsj 
held at Stookh.olm, which was attended by delegates from 
cany countries, is a step in the right direction - a 
joint effort at dealing with a oommon problem. Other­
wise, culture and more important, human life are in 
danger from man. 
Ih oonneotion with the oolleotive effort to 
cope with human problems, whioh is undoubtedly necessary 
there is, however, a danger to be vigilantly guarded 
against. This is that the individual and individuality­
as a value should.not be absorbed and levelled by the 
collective effort, which tendency is not1oeable in 
Marcuse•s teachings. In this respect, we oan look to 
Nietzsche and his warnings that loss of individuality 
and individual •••••••••• 174/ ••• 
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and individual responsibility are the perils that faoe 
mass human efforts. Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, �akes 
us aware of the facelessness and anonymity that endanger 
hunan life and culture. _This aspect must be borne in 
mind when men embark on a joint effort at dealing with
the problems with which they are faced. 
In Chapter One, I indioated, to some extent, 
the close relationship between culture (the material 
and. 'spiritua1' achievements of man) and speoifio 
historico - existential situations. It was shown how 
both the material and spiritual aspects of human 
cultural life reflect man•s attempt to create meaningful 
patterns of life in the universe, to free himself from 
the insecurity and lack of meaning that constantly 
threaten man. From this, it can be deduced that culture 
is always rooted in raa.n's specific existential situation• 
inextrioabJ.v related to his noeds and aspirationst his 
unique vision of what constitutes •truth• or •reality'• 
Culture reflects mon's attempt to make himself 
comfortable and safe in the universe, not only in terns 
of his material conquest of nature but also in terms of 
satisfying intellectual formulations about the ultimate 
nature of reality. When man confronts the world and 
attempts to control his situation, he makes him.self at 
hone in a way whioh gives rise to what we call 'culture•. 
But men have adopted different ways of making themselves 
at home in the universe and this accounts for the 
difference in cultural systems (as I showed in Chapter 
One by examining the Greek, Medieval and more modern 
eras). 
However, despite the differenoee between cultural 
systems there are also certain links, for example, a 
ou.lture is inevitably related to its predecessor. 
It is•••••••••••• 175/, •••• 
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It is the defioiencies of one system, its inability to 
satisfy human needs adequately, that call Up its negation­
an alternative system which seems to offer greater 
meaning and security in the light of ohanged needs and 
aspirations. For this reason, defenders of a:ny one 
ouJ.tu.re ought not to oondemn past cultures in absolute 
terms, since these always stand in some form of 
dialectical relatio_nship with those that follow. .Any 
culture, any society is originally a reflection of 
prevailing needs in a specific existential situation. 
As suoh, it is unfair to reject totally, from a utopian 
standpoint, past cultures as being based on false needs 
and herlce l�ading to alienation. 
We would do well to keep in mind, also, the 
danger.of absolutising the values of any one ou.J.tural 
system, whether it be the past or the present. There 
cannot be a 'super culture• because of the nature of man• 
who is a contingent, historical creature, perpetually 
creating truth anew. Truth, in its entirety, is beyond 
our grasp. What man is capable of is to offer perspectives 
of truth, none of which on its own ean satisfy men in 
different situations. It is for this reason that human 
life is a perpetual search for Truth, in the process of 
whioh oan creates cultural values which satisfy him in
his situation. 
To insist dogmatically on the virtues of Or»'e 
own culture is to open the doors to authoritarianism 
and tyranny. The need for fluidity, flexibility is 
always vita1, as is the need for vigilant critics of 
culture who could point out the dangers of rigid 
conformity to the status guo, as well as suggest 
possibilities for a new level of huoan existence. The 
existenoe of critical theories of sooiety indicate that 
the human spirit is still unfettered and man has not yet 
been ovarwheloed •••••••• 176/, •• 
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been overwhelraed by authoritarianism. 
Nietzsche and Marcuse, in their roles as 
critics of society, fulfil a vital function despite 
the eA"tremity of their views. They are able to 
stand �part from their cultures, to evaluate them 
critically and then offer new alternativos in the 
light of alienating deficiencies in the cultures 
which they criticise, even if their own •solutions• 
admittedly tend to be doe;matic and point in the 
direction of a closed system. That their own 
• solutions• a.re probletiatic doos not detract from
their value as th0orists SUc;,;estine new dime11Sions
of human existence �..nd more important, as critics
who ensure that society moves in the direction of
openness, fluidity and dynamisri1 rather than being
enmeshed in rigidity and dogmatism.
Proudhon in a letter to Marx speaks of this 
spirit of openness which should �e our guide. "•••• 
let us Give the world the exrunple of a leurnod, far­
Si6hted tolcrMbe t but let us ••••••••• not niaka 
9urselves the leaders of a new intolerance, let us 
not pose ns the apostles of a new religion, even 
if it be the religion of logic, the religion of 
reason. Lot us n0ver reeard a question as 
-��" . d " 8) 
84,u.CJM.Sue •• •• • • •••••• 
Static conclusions and final answers can 
only lead to alionation. A culture that is open to 
chance and criticism can only widen the horizon 
of truth. Just us past cultures ought not to be 
totally condemned, so, too, the existing one 
should not be accepted without critical evaluation. 
The �tat�s quo is never so perfect a human condition 
that it stD.nds in no need of iuproveraent. And the 
various alternative systems offered to raan 
indicates that the search for satisfying answers, 
far from being a purely intellectual and theoretical 
exercise •••••••••• 177/ •••• 
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exercise, is a vital part of human life - an activity 
whioh ru.los out nutomatio, unoritioal acoaptanoe of 
the established values of society. In this respeot, 
the perpetual relevance of Socrates' dictum can be 
appreciated. The unexamined life is not worth living. 
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This dissertation conoenis itse!f with a 
comparative study of the philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Herbert Marcuse in oonneotion with their 
positions as oritics of their speoifio ou.ltures, and 
as theorists proposing new alternatives for the 
regeneration of culture. In addition, oertain obser­
vations are made on the relationship between oulture 
and speoifio existential situations• 
Friedrioh Nietzsche reaoted strongly to the 
cultural atmosphere of the nineteenth century, 
rejedting trends like Christianity, soientism1 sooia.1.­
ism, democracy, eto., as leading man into alienation. 
To replace the existing alternatives, NietBsdhe 
proposed a •solution• based on a conoeption of life 
as Will to Power, which is to be effected by a new 
breed of man - Superman. By a complete transvaluation 
of values, Nietzsche hoped to revitaJ.ise life and 
oulture and return man to a more meaning£'� existence. 
Herbert Marcuse, like Nietzsche, is also 
deeply critical of his cultural milieu, that is, the 
contemporary situation. Marouse objects to the 
manipulation and repression of man by minority forces 
in control. Such repression has resulted in a one­
dimensional level of existence. To overcome such 
alienation, Ma.reuse proposes a sooiety guided by the 
•aesthetic ethos•, where the liberated Eros element
comes into play, directing a human existence which
is free of manipulation and repression.
Both Nietzsche a;nd Marcuse, then, have this 
in coomon, that they are deeply critical. of the 
cultures., ••••••• 18o/ ••• 
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cultures with which they are confronted, and offer 
speoifio alternatives which they hope will enable 
the self-creation of man as a qualitatively different 
cultural being. The •solution' offered by both 
philosophers cannot be said to have solved definitively 
the problem of man's authentic existence since they 
are speoifio truth-perspectives and do not represent 
ultimate Truth which is multi-faceted. 
Certain observations are also made on the 
olose relationship between culture and specific 
historioo-ex.istential situations. Both the material 
and spiritual aspects of human cultural life are se�n 
to reflect man's attempt to create meaningful. patterns 
of life :for himselt. �his means that when one 
cultural pattern failed to oontinue to provide the 
required meaning, due to changed circumstances of lifa, 
it gradually gave way to another, in aocordanoe with 
ma.n's changing needs and aspirations. This brings us 
to the conclusion that culture and truth are dynamio, 
and that statio conclusions and final answers as to 
the question of culture .and truth (the two being 
interrelated) can only result in alienation from 
reality, that is, the ever ohanging oiroumstanoes of 
life. Such static conclusions and final answers lead 
to closed and rigid systems that are contrary to 
actual life and estrange nan froo his fellowman. 
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